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ABSTRACT 
 
The Medical Net: Patients, Psychiatrists and Paper Trails in the Kashmir valley 
Saiba Varma, PhD 
Cornell University 2013 
 
This dissertation examines psychosocial interventions as specific social, 
political, medical, and ontological formations in the Kashmir valley.  Till 
recently, medical humanitarianism was dominated by short-term, surgical 
interventions that focused on providing emergency biomedical care.  In recent 
years, however, humanitarian organizations have increasingly focused on mental 
health interventions, particularly in places marked by low-intensity, long-term 
conflict, such as Kashmir.   
This dissertation traces the indeterminacies that have arisen as the 
outcome and effects of humanitarian work have shifted away from questions of 
life and death to the terrain of psychosocial wellbeing.  Specifically, it argues that 
while humanitarianism is constituted by new subjects and objects of 
knowledge—such as psychiatrists, counselors, PTSD, and trauma therapies—it is 
also made up by less visible moments of (mis)translation, (mis)apprehension, 
and doubt.   
As such, I argue that medical humanitarianism takes the form of a “net” 
(jal), an object that is constituted by both its visible nodes and threads, as well as 
by “gaps” in between.  Taking its inspiration from feminist science studies, the 
dissertation enacts the form of the net by moving from a focus on the visible 
nodes, that is, asylum and experts, to the threads that move between the clinic 
and the outside, namely medical cards and pills, to finally, the “gaps” in the net, 
that is, love stories.  
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The “politics of visibility” that marks humanitarian practice is also 
replicated within the anthropology of humanitarianism.  Anthropology has 
traditionally approached humanitarianism as providing the gift of life—in the 
form of citizenship, asylum, or legal residency—for victims of violence.  Yet 
organizations that focus on psychosocial suffering do not hold out the promise of 
life as much as they provide limited techniques for living with suffering.  Far 
from universally embraced, this latter gift raises questions about the worthiness 
of humanitarian endeavors in places of long-term suffering.  This dissertation 
thus goes beyond a focus on humanitarianism as a “politics of life” to an 
ethnographically rich account of the everyday contestations and 
misapprehensions that characterize humanitarianism in a zone of political 
stagnation. 
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INTRODUCTION: ILLNESS IN THE AIR 
 
One day in May 2011, three friends and I set out for a wedding reception 
in Islamabad, about ninety kilometers from Kashmir’s capital, Srinagar.  We left 
the city at noon to make it in time for the wazwan, a fifteen to thirty-course meal 
of mostly meat dishes, served on large silver platters (traamis) shared by four 
people.  As we drove out of the city, I noticed the air filled with translucent 
pollen bubbles.  They wafted through the air gently, the seemingly pure and 
innocuous products of nature’s springtime renewal.  Alif,1 who was sitting next 
to me in the back seat, pointed to the bubbles and said, “In my childhood, we 
used to call them retkael-sheen.  Summer snow.” 
Summer snow.  A cheery euphemism for a seasonal epidemic – known 
medically as seasonal allergic rhinitis – that besieges Kashmiris every summer.  
During the two summers that I spent in Kashmir, all around me people 
developed a range of symptoms associated with summer snow: itchy and watery 
eyes, sneezing, sore throats, fevers, and headaches.  Summer snow also brought 
about a general weakening of the body (kamzori), a loss of physical and emotional 
strength, making a person further susceptible to more illness.  As the summer 
began its crescendo in May, so too did complaints about the pollen that would 
stick to hair and eyes and lungs.  By my second summer in Kashmir, I too felt a 
scratching and burning sensation in my throat.  When I complained to a friend, 
he smiled wryly and said that I was showing signs of becoming a Kashmiri, for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 I have changed the names of all the interlocutors with whom I worked, except for mental health 
experts and other professionals who requested that I use their real names.  I use the term “mental 
health experts” as an umbrella term to refer to those engaged in biomedical or humanitarian 
work, including psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, social workers, and counselors.  
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summer snow did not affect people the first time around; it required long-term 
exposure.  
I took the opportunity of the leisurely car ride to ask my companions 
more about summer snow and its associated symptoms.  They told me that the 
pollen came from poplar trees, which had tall and skinny trunks.  The poplars 
had been imported from Russia for timber because they are fast growing and 
highly profitable.  “But aren’t poplars indigenous to Kashmir?” I asked.  From 
the front passenger seat, Rashid turned around and said, “Yes, there are 
Kashmiri poplars, but they are smaller and don’t grow as fast, so now you don’t 
see them around as much as the Russian poplars.”  I asked how you could 
distinguish between them.  “The Kashmiri poplars have silvery trunks,” Alif 
said, pointing them out through the window.  I couldn’t help but notice that the 
glistening trunks of the Kashmiri poplars were much more beautiful than the 
pale brown Russian variety.  “And the Kashmiri poplars don’t produce summer 
snow,” Alif noted.  
“Who planted these?” I asked, still astounded at how prolific the Russian 
poplars and their pollen were, despite being relatively recent transplants to the 
region.  Alif responded that the Russian poplars were planted by the Department 
of Horticulture in the 1980s.  Then he said softly, “You know, the older 
generation of Kashmiris never knew this problem,” while his finger traced the 
snowflake’s meandering path.  A heavy silence took over us as unanswered 
questions lingered in the air: Had the Indian state planted the poplars to 
deliberately poison and weaken Kashmiris?  Were the “increased profits” yet 
another ruse to bring a slow, painful death to the Kashmir valley? 
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A few months after the conversation about summer snow, back in Ithaca, I 
emailed Alif and asked him to comment on that afternoon and the silence in the 
car.  He responded, “I think the silence means unarticulated fear.  
Unsubstantiated but believed.”  In his email, Alif also added that in his 
childhood, he had heard the “old and wise” speak of the poplar plantation as not 
only bad for its health and environmental costs, but as part of a larger “nasty and 
ugly” plan to sicken the population.2  Although Alif acknowledged the 
“unsubstantiated” basis of the claim that the poplars had been planted as part of 
state policy to make Kashmiris ill, he felt that it tapped into something “real.”  
I suggest that the silence in the car did not have to be explained because 
its implications were commonsensical to Kashmiris.  For instance, Alif did not 
need to say why it was significant that the Russian poplars were planted in the 
1980s.  The fact that they were planted in the 1980s was explanation enough, 
because this period represented a historical watershed.   Sparked by reports of 
municipal elections rigged in favor of the Indian state in 1987, decades of 
frustration with Indian rule spilled on to the streets in the form of massive 
protests and demonstrations calling for Kashmiri independence (azaadi).3  These 
massive street protests eventually culminated in an armed struggle against 
Indian rule, which lasted till 2002.  Some insurgent groups acted in order to 
assimilate Kashmir with Pakistan—what they believed should have been done 
during Partition in 1947—while others fought for an independent Kashmir.4   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Personal communication, Wednesday July 27, 2011. 
3 Kashmiris refer to their self-determation movement as tehreek, an Arabic word adopted into 
Urdu and Kashmiri which signifies a continuing struggle with the ultimate goal of independence 
(azaadi). 
4 To date, approximately 70,000 Kashmiris have lost their lives in the conflict, about 10,000 are 
disappeared, and torture and rape have also been widely reported.  There has been no definitive 
political resolution of Kashmir and the region continues to be mired in political instability.   
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In the dissertation, I use the shorthand “Kashmir” to refer to the 
geographical region of the Kashmir valley, approximately 135 x 32 kilometers, 
located between the Karakoram and Pir Panjal mountain ranges.  The Kashmir 
valley is located within the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.  In 1947-48, the 
newly independent states of India and Pakistan fought the first war—of three—
for control of the territory.  On January 1, 1949, a ceasefire was declared, with 65 
per cent of the territory under Indian control (the state of Jammu and Kashmir) 
while Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) went with Pakistan.  
While the ceasefire line was intended to be temporary, the Line of Control (LoC), 
as it later became known, remains the de facto border.  In the summer of 1999, 
war again broke out between India and Pakistan in the Kargil heights, leading 
then US President Bill Clinton to famously call Kashmir, “the most dangerous 
place on earth.”5  As you can see in Fig. 1, India, Pakistan and China each make 
competing claims to the region. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Mishra 2008. 
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I present this condensed history of the Kashmir conflict reluctantly.  This 
story, of Kashmir as the site of ongoing territorial disputes between India and 
Pakistan, is the dominant narrative learned by Indian and Pakistani citizens 
alike.  In recent years, this security studies narrative has been given even more 
urgency by a “war of terror” paradigm, which dominates scholarship on the 
region.  As an anthropologist, this is not the story I want to tell, although it is also 
impossible to avoid the material and epistemological force of this narrative on 
Kashmiri lives.  My aim is to understand the ways in which frustrations with 
ongoing Indian rule, militarization, and the loss of self-determination, have 
materialized in the form of chronic illnesses in Kashmir.  To this end, I argue that 
while medical humanitarianism is used to make political claims, not all forms of 
suffering are rendered as urgent, knowable, and worthy of intervention as 
others.   
Figure 1 
Kashmir 
regional map 
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Rather, I show how particular kinds of subjects and objects—psychiatrists, 
counselors, trauma, and psychotherapy—crystallize ongoing violence, whereas 
forms of everyday suffering are often unrecognized.  I suggest that sustained 
ethnographic attention reveals the existence of alternative occurrences or “quasi 
events” within the existing catastrophe that is the “turmoil.”  Following 
Povinelli, this dissertation accounts for those forms of suffering and enduring 
that are “ordinary, chronic and cruddy” rather than those that are “catastrophic, 
crisis-laden and sublime.”6  This particular politics of visibility marks both the 
organization of humanitarian and biomedical knowledge, as well as to the 
anthropology of violence.  As Beth Povinelli has argued, the anthropology of 
violence has predominantly focused on moments of crisis and catastrophe, the 
“kinds of events that seem to necessitate ethical reflection and political and civic 
engagement.”7  In the case of Kashmir, this focus occurs around the category of 
“turmoil” [Eng.] as the conflict is known, which has become the placeholder for 
all kinds of social and economic problems.  The conflict is a disease (bemari), 
people told me.  This narrative was ubiquitous, part of a protective and collective 
narrative shell that Kashmiris have learned to tell in the face of heightened 
human rights and media attention.  This is not to say that the “quasi events” I 
describe do not produce ethical reflection or powerful ways of narrating the self, 
but rather, that they are frequently occluded in the face of events that are marked 
as catastrophic.   
In another example, one of my arguments in this dissertation is that while 
forms of chronic bodily distress such as weakness (kamzori) are being occluded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Povinelli 2011: 13. 
7 Povinelli 2011: 13-14.  
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by psychological idioms of distress, this is not a straightforward replacement.  To 
this point, I draw inspiration from Marilyn Strathern’s argument that acts of 
revelation – in this case the production of new subjects and objects of expert 
humanitarian and biomedical knowledge - also invite us to consider “what is 
hidden and concealed” behind them.8  Rather than view psychiatric and 
psychosocial interventions as outside of existing healing practices, my aim is to 
show how they have become a part of a collective Kashmiri ‘common sense,’ 
which views all suffering as always having a political etiology. 
A History of Violence  
The Kashmiris I spoke with remembered the late 1980s as a period of 
impassioned and hopeful nationalist sentiment and recalled how young men 
bravely made the treacherous journey across the border to Pakistan for training.  
However, there were also darker undercurrents to the burgeoning movement, 
and by the mid 1990s, the mood had drastically changed from optimism to 
fatigue and disillusionment, as the years and death toll mounted and 
militarization continued, unrelenting.  Many Kashmiris told me that they 
believed the true martyrs (shahid) had been killed in the early years of the 
conflict.  Those who had survived had done so for the wrong reasons.  The shiny 
SUVs that had appeared on the roads in Srinagar were viewed as examples of the 
corruption that had beset the movement for Kashmiri self-determination and 
evidence that ex-militants had been coopted by either India or Pakistan.    
The Indian state had officially responded to the “insurgency” in 1989 by 
codifying a state of emergency through extrajudicial laws such as the Disturbed 
Areas Act (DAA) and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).  These !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Strathern 1999: 11. 
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laws continue to be in place today, despite widespread criticisms that they have 
perpetuated widespread human rights abuses and sustained a “culture of 
impunity.”9  The state of emergency, uninterrupted since 1989, is also sustained 
through the mass mobilization of Indian troops, making Kashmir the most 
militarized region in the world.10  Yet Indian state power in Kashmir is not only 
sustained through extrajudicial means and militarization.  As Haley Duschinski 
and Bruce Hoffman have argued, state power also functions through everyday 
means, such as a legal system that “promises but systematically denies, 
possibilities of accountability and redress.”11  In their ethnographic work, 
Duschinski and Hoffman chronicle local struggles to engage with the law in 
Kashmir, including efforts to find alternative forums for justice. 
In addition, there is also the unresolved problem of Kashmir’s minority 
Hindu population, which all but left the valley after members of the community 
were directly targeted in the first year or two of the conflict.  As Suvir Kaul has 
argued, the exodus of Kashmir’s Hindu (Pandit) population “allowed most 
Indians to believe that they were dealing not with a political movement for 
independence, but with Islamic secessionism.”12  The effects of this polarization 
were devastating on both sides: it enabled the Indian government to construct 
the Kashmir problem as one of “cross-border terrorism,” and following 9/11 as 
“Islamic terrorism,” rather than as having any indigenous basis, and for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Human Rights Watch 2006.  
10 Anjum and Varma 2010. 
11 Duschinski and Hoffman 2011: 45. 
12 Kaul 2011: 174. 
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Kashmiris, the brutality of the Indian state only reminded them of previously 
oppressive Hindu rulers who had subjected its Muslim population.13 
During my fieldwork, it became clear to me that the “common sense” that 
enabled Kashmiris to identify summer snow with a nefarious Indian government 
policy thus ran deeper than the years of militancy.  There was an active 
remembering of periods of colonization that came before Indian occupation in 
1947.  I thus understand Kashmiri bodies as sites of accumulated suffering over 
time, rather than the products of a recent “epidemic of trauma” as they are 
imagined in humanitarian and state discourses.  
Many pointed out that the Indian state was just one in a long line of 
successive colonizations that began with the Mughal annexation in 1586, 
followed by consecutive Afghan, Sikh, and Dogra rulers.  The princely territories 
of Jammu and Kashmir – ultimately divided in the 1947-48 war – were cobbled 
together in 1846 from defeated Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh’s lands.  Through the 
Treaty of Amritsar, negotiated with the East India Company in 1846, the Hindu 
Dogra ruler Gulab Singh was instated as the successor to the Sikh rulers rather 
than as an independent sovereign.  As a princely state from 1858-1947 not 
officially part of the British Empire, Jammu and Kashmir was under indirect 
colonial rule.  Until 1885, the British government was represented in Kashmir by 
an Officer-on-Special-Duty, who had limited functions.  However, from 1885 on, 
the presence of colonial officials increased with the posting of a full-fledged 
Political Resident in the territories.  The increased presence of colonial officials 
was also a much-needed boost to the fledgling enterprise of medical 
missionization, which had been ongoing since the 1860s, with limited support !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Kaul 2011: 174. 
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from the colonial government.  Nonetheless, as the biographies of medical 
missionaries who served in Kashmir attest, relations between the Dogra regime, 
the British government, and the Church Missionary Society, remained thorny 
(see Chapter Two). 
As Mridu Rai has argued in her monograph on the history of the Dogra 
regime, although the colonial state removed the right of the Dogra rulers to wage 
war, the “incontestable control over the Hindu religious domain allowed the 
Dogras to ride roughshod over the interests and rights of the vast majority of 
their Kashmiri Muslim subjects.”14  It was also during the Dogra period that 
“religion and politics became inextricably intertwined in expressing the protest 
of Kashmiri Muslims against their rulers.”15  In October 1947, in the wake of the 
Partition, the Dogra Hindu ruler of Kashmir signed a controversial “Instrument 
of Annexation” to the Indian state, despite the lack of public support and the 
existence of a vibrant Kashmiri nationalist movement.   
Many of the Kashmiris I spoke to were fluent in this history, and would 
remind me, “We have not been free in 400 years.”  This longue durée of suffering 
was an important frame for how Kashmiris imagined the “chronically insecure 
environment”16 in which they live.  It was also a radically different vision of the 
past than what was presented in the Indian school textbooks that Kashmiris on 
this side of the border had to learn.  Thus, although a ceasefire between Kashmiri 
insurgent groups and the Indian state was declared in 2002, there has been no 
definitive resolution of the conflict and the region continues to be mired in social, 
political, and economic instability.  For many, the words of the late Kashmiri !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Rai 2004: 13. 
15 Rai 2004: 16-17. 
16 James 2010: 6. 
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poet Agha Shahid Ali—“they make a desolation and call it peace”17 –were a 
testament to the present state of things and to historical patterns of oppression. 
During the course of my fieldwork, in June 2010, reports of a fake 
“encounter”18 killing by the Indian army surfaced in the media, sparking 
widespread protests once again, which reminded many of 1989.  This was not the 
first time that mass protests had broken out in the “post-ceasefire” period, but 
the scale and impact of these events could be described as catastrophic, in 
Povinelli’s sense of the term.  The international and national Indian press was 
awash with images reminiscent of Palestine, of kaffiya-wearing youth hurling 
stones, while the Indian military responded with gunfire and tear gas.  Scholars 
and commentators sympathetic to the movement christened it, “Kashmir’s 
Intifada.”19  By October 2010, when the protests gradually dissipated, 124 youth 
protesters had been killed and months of strikes and curfews had paralyzed life 
in the Kashmir valley once again.   
To live and do fieldwork in Kashmir meant accommodating myself to this 
uneasy present and past, which was somewhat different from the optimistic 
phrase that Kashmir was “inching towards normalcy,” 20 that both the Indian 
media and state officials periodically proclaimed.  This volatile present was also 
marked by the presence of two, simultaneous calendars: a state-sanctioned 
calendar and a “protest calendar,” issued by the Hurriyat-G, a separatist political 
organization, which called for a protest once a week, usually after Friday 
prayers.  Yet even non-protest days (so-called “normal” days) could !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Ali 1997. 
18 An encounter is a euphemism used in South Asia to describe extrajudicial killings in which the 
victims are described as suspected gangsters or terrorists.  A “fake encounter” refers to death in 
custody or cases where unarmed victims are framed.  
19 Kak 2011.    
20 Habibullah 2011. 
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unexpectedly be interrupted by protests and violence.  One of my friends told 
me he wanted to write a short story in which an Indian Army truck accidentally 
runs over some chickens that crossed the highway at the wrong moment.  In the 
story, the farmer who owned the chickens begins protesting their death, 
eventually leading to massive protests all over Kashmir.  The story was meant to 
be a humorous parable for the always-present condition for violence: “I want to 
show that all it takes is a match,” my friend had said.  
The$Rise$of$Humanitarianism$!
This dissertation describes new configurations of psychiatric and 
psychosocial humanitarian interventions in the post-ceasefire period (post-2002) 
in Kashmir.  However, while these specific interventions in the terrain of mental 
health may be new, the kinds of suffering that they come into contact with are 
not necessarily new.  This shows the ways in which the language of suffering in 
Kashmir, such as ideas of weakness (kamzori) and a temporality that bursts forth 
beyond the insurgency period, constantly exceed attempts to bound it.   
In my analysis, I try to attend to these historically significant ways of 
marking bodies and suffering, while also understanding how “new” knowledge 
practices are interwoven in everyday Kashmiri social life, how they circulate 
within and outside the clinic, and how they are appropriated to unintended 
effects.  The efforts I chronicle include the crystallization of developmental 
efforts by the Indian military through Operation Sadbhavana (Goodwill) since 
2001; the growing presence of psychosocial organization such as Action Aid 
International, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins 
sans Frontières (MSF), among others; and an intensified commitment to mental 
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health care programming by the Indian government on a national level, 
including efforts to de-institutionalize care and promote the availability of 
psychiatric pharmaceuticals at the village level.  These state programs are known 
as the National Mental Health Program (NMHP) and District Mental Health 
Program (DMHP) and have been shaped by experts within the movement for 
Global Mental Health (GMH), which I describe in detail in Chapter One. 
The non-governmental organizations involved in humanitarian work in 
Kashmir, most notably MSF, embody what has been called the “new” or 
“international humanitarianism,”21 which has focused on alleviating suffering 
through providing emergency medical care.22  While this dissertation does not 
focus on MSF’s activities specifically—MSF has been well explored in the 
anthropology of humanitarianism—the organization has had a large impact in 
Kashmir, both in terms of its own activities and trainings, as well as in 
influencing the work of smaller humanitarian projects.    
Within MSF, as in other medical humanitarian organizations, there is a 
push to increasingly incorporate mental health within the ambit of “emergency” 
care.  According to the MSF website, “it was on the killing fields of Bosnia in the 
1990s that MSF volunteers recognized that it was not enough to meet the 
physical needs of people caught up in conflict.”23  From 1993-1997, MSF 
implemented a program to address the psychological trauma produced by the 
Bosnian war, and since then, has conducted mental health interventions in more 
than forty countries.  While most of MSF’s global mental health programs exist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 de Waal 1997.  
22 Ticktin 2011: 16. 
23 From http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/allcontent.cfm?id=92.  Accessed October 
4, 2012. 
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within emergency medicine, the project in Kashmir—which lasted for eleven 
years—was somewhat unique as a stand-alone mental health program.24   As 
Peter Redfield has noted, despite its foray into other kinds of intervention, the 
ethos of MSF remains opposed to conventional practices of “development.”25   
For this reason, stand-alone mental health programs raise fundamental 
questions for humanitarian professionals, both because they challenge the 
concept of “emergency” as a temporal and life-threatening event, but also 
because they require intimate social and cultural know-how.  In the case of MSF 
in Kashmir, for example, this know-how was provided by seventy local staff who 
were trained as counselors and worked in MSF’s two mental health clinics, one at 
the Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital in Srinagar and another in the 
border district of Kupwara.  Expatriates, by contrast, provided training, 
supervision, and performed administrative duties.  Although by May 2012 MSF 
had considerably scaled back its operations in Kashmir, their influence on mental 
health and humanitarian programs, particularly the emphasis on psychosocial, 
rather than psychiatric care (Chapter Two), is noteworthy.  Further, the duration 
of the MSF project in Kashmir also raised fundamental questions about the 
program’s purpose, goals, as well as criteria for measuring success in mental 
health.    
Not surprisingly, however, the Indian state has historically defined 
humanitarianism, particularly in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, quite 
differently than “new” humanitarianism.  Scholars have argued that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 In May 2012, the New York Times reported that, after eleven years of operations, MSF would be 
considerably scaling back its operations in Kashmir, including closing down its mental health 
clinic in the border region of Kupwara as well as cutting its staff of 100 by nearly half (Najar 2012).   
25 Redfield 2012: 359. 
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humanitarian efforts by the postcolonial Indian state have mirrored European 
humanitarianism in the close dovetailing of humanitarian and military 
concerns.26  Vazira Zamindar, for example, has shown how the management of 
refugees in the aftermath of the Partition was viewed as a military problem first, 
and a humanitarian one, second.27  Within the anthropology of humanitarianism, 
however, there is a debate between scholars such as Didier Fassin, who has 
located humanitarian reason within “a Western sociodicy,”28 drawn from a 
politics of compassion from within Christianity, and others such as Erica 
Bornstein, Peter Redfield and Jonathan Benthall who have argued against 
“attempts to monopolize the charitable sector within a historically Western 
frame.”29  Jonathan Benthall, for example, has argued that the positive values 
associated with sacrifice, for example, are not specific to Christianity, but are 
rather foundational to Islam, as are notions of universalism and charity (zakat).30   
Similarly, as I show in this dissertation, the idea that humanitarianism 
was a politics of “lives to be risked” and “lives to be saved,” as Dider Fassin has 
described, did not ring true in the Kashmiri context.  As I show, Kashmiri 
humanitarians did not see themselves as outside of an existing social and 
political milieu, thus casting into doubt both their ability and desire to “save.”  In 
addition, the language of “saving” was not expressed through a call to a 
universal humanity or sense of compassion, but was rather articulated through 
the specific lens of Kashmiris as a political and security ‘problem’ for the Indian 
state.  For example, as I show in Chapter Five, the argument that drug addicts in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Fassin and Pandolfi 2010.  
27 Zamindar 2007. 
28 Fassin 2011: 248. 
29 Bornstein and Redfield 2011: 96. 
30 Benthall 2011. 
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Kashmir needed saving was not articulated through a language of compassion 
and care, but rather through a gesture of separating them from the larger 
bodypolitic. 
India’s military-cum-humanitarian efforts have also played an important 
role within the global history of humanitarian intervention.  As Nicholas 
Wheeler has argued, India’s military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 was 
the first case of a military intervention justified through the logic of 
humanitarianism.  India argued to the United Nations that it could not remain 
passive in the face of ongoing massacres perpetrated by the Pakistani Army on 
the Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan.  When the Security Council 
chose not to act, India invaded East Pakistan on its own accord, a process which 
eventually led to the formation of Bangladesh in 1971.  Wheeler points to this 
moment as the first instance of a sovereign state championing the right to 
intervene while the UN insisted on respect for sovereignty.31   
This background is important in understanding how and why 
justifications of Indian militarism in Kashmir have also shifted over time, away 
from being purely about national security and Islamic terrorism, to a posture that 
includes humanitarian care.  This seems to vindicate Foucault’s assertion, in the 
concluding session of his 1976 lecture at the Collège de France, that the concept 
of biopower—that is, interventions in the social body to augment it and reshape 
society as a secure, life-supporting environment—was reshaping the meaning of 
sovereignty.  As Nicolas Guilhot has argued, these technologies did not merely 
express the sovereign’s traditional right of life and death, they “sought to secure 
conditions optimizing the life of populations in its most immediate biological !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Wheeler 2000. 
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manifestation.”  In this sense, “biopower does not just preserve extant life: it 
actively intervenes throughout the social body to augment it and reshapes 
society as a secure, life-supporting environment.”32  In the case of Kashmir, the 
exercise of biopower in the form of humanitarian and biomedical efforts have not 
so much replaced a more traditional form of sovereignty as supplemented it. 
This is because “endemic dangers,” including “threats to life, health, livelihood, 
personal safety and human dignity,” the stuff that biopower is meant to secure, 
still emanate from the Indian state itself.33         
This is largely consistent with Indian state intervention in Jammu and 
Kashmir historically, where humanitarianism is viewed as the work of the Indian 
military, rather than the civilian government, which is viewed as ineffectual and 
corrupt.  In Indian-administered Kashmir, much like in the Northern Areas of 
Pakistan, the Army (Indian/Pakistani) is credited with performing what 
Nosheen Ali has called “participatory militarism,” whereby humanitarian work 
helps the military reinvent itself as a caring institution, thereby occluding the 
project of empire.34  As Mona Bhan and Ravina Aggarwal have similarly argued, 
the Indian’s Army’s Operation Sadbhavana (Goodwill) initiated in 1998, was 
directed towards border communities in the Ladakh region with the explicit 
message to ‘Win the Hearts and Minds’ (known by its unfortunate acronym, 
WHAM) of the local population so as to “forestall further destabilization 
resulting from people’s growing alienation from the nation” as well as to prevent 
the rise of “incipient terrorism.”35  Further, as Arpita Anant has noted, Jammu 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Guilthot 2012: 81. 
33 Foucault 1997: 13-15. 
34 Ali 2010. 
35 Aggarwal and Bhan 2009: 534. 
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and Kashmir is the only state where the Indian army has extended its mandate to 
include not just the rooting out of terrorism, but “rebuilding the lives of people 
devastated by terrorism.”36  These efforts have included developmental and 
humanitarian works including building schools and training centers, as well as 
publicity campaigns such as billboards and slogans.  I locate the Jammu and 
Kashmir police efforts to combat drug and alcohol addiction within the ambit of 
Operation Sadbhavana (Chapter Five), itself one, specific instantiation of 
biopower, while acknowledging that the state’s powers to protect can come into 
direct conflict with each other.  
Despite the different genealogical and historical legacies at work in these 
various humanitarian efforts, they share an ethics of intervention, one of the 
defining features of humanitarian action, according to Illana Feldman.37  During 
my fieldwork, from September 2009-December 2010, and May-June 2011, I 
observed a range of such interventions within the sphere of mental health, from 
psychopharmacological care in the Out Patient Department at the Government 
Psychiatric Diseases hospital, to psychosocial care such as counseling, to drug 
and alcohol awareness and treatment programs, to NGO self-assessments to 
evaluate the worthiness of victims of violence.38   While not coordinated, these 
interventions and the experts who staffed them intersected but also diverged in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Anant 2010. 
37 Feldman 2007.  I am also sympathetic to Feldman’s argument about the ways in which 
humanitarianism does not always have to be a radically transformative force, but in Kashmir as 
with Gaza, can work to maintain the status quo.   
38 My primary field sites consisted of the Out Patient Department (OPD) and counseling sessions 
in the Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital, the Drug De-Addiction Clinic run by the 
Jammu and Kashmir police, and visits to local and international NGOs specializing in mental 
health.  In addition to observing this range of mental health interventions, I also analyzed 
documents including published academic articles, reports by human rights and humanitarian 
organizations, and the medical cards of patients.  I also interviewed Islamic healers (pirs), Unani 
doctors, and non-psychiatric medical professionals during the course of my fieldwork, in 
addition to extensive interviews with the users of mental health services.  
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key ways.  For instance, while there were significant operational differences 
between these programs, many experts moved between them, working part-time 
in multiple settings.  As scholars of expert knowledge such as Timothy Mitchell 
have argued, these programs and interventions must be viewed not just as 
representative of, but as constitutive of, the field of medical humanitarianism in 
Kashmir.39   
The Politics of Visibility  
The overarching argument of this dissertation is that collectively, 
psychiatric and psychosocial interventions have produced a politics of revelation 
wherein certain forms of suffering, bodily enactments, and subjectivities, such as 
those around trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), are rendered 
more knowable, urgent, and worthy of intervention than others.  I suggest that 
other forms of knowledge and practice are not excluded from spaces of 
authoritative biomedical or humanitarian practice, but rather, they require a 
different kind of ethnographic attention.   
In making this argument, I follow feminist scholars of science such as 
Donna Haraway who have argued that vision is a specific, embodied, and 
material practice.  As Haraway argues, the point is not “partiality for its own 
sake, but rather, for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings 
situated knowledges make possible.”40  In using the concept of a ‘net,’ I 
emphasize that clinical encounters are not merely instantiations of unequal 
power dynamics between doctors and patients, but rather, consist of alternative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 As Timothy Mitchell (2002: 4) has argued in the case of the economy, “It is not adequate to 
describe the economy as a social construction, or an invention of the social imagination, for such 
an approach always implies that the object in question is a representation, a set of meanings, a 
particular way of seeing the world.  This kind of analysis leaves the world itself intact.” 
40 Haraway 1988: 590. 
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epistemologies, affects, and objects, which although less visible, are nonetheless 
present, making the outcomes of these encounters oftentimes surprising. 
Approaching biomedical and humanitarian visions as partial also 
provides a counterpoint to the argument that the birth of a modern subjectivity 
has been associated with a particular mode of vision: a disinterested gaze, which 
objectifies and grasps whatever is placed before it.41  In the prison, for example, 
Foucault claimed that an oppressive transparency rendered everyone visible and 
subject to calculation.42  Similarly, in his work on the clinic, Foucault described 
how a range of investigative tools—including the stethoscope, percussion, and 
other chemical tests—produced truth by probing inside the body.43  Building on 
this work, medical anthropologists and STS scholars have argued that new visual 
technologies, which objectify disease play a crucial role in producing a “new” 
regime of transparency.  In Joe Dumit’s monograph on brain-imaging 
technologies, for instance, PET scans “become visual truths, presenting 
themselves as facts about people and the world such that even their own 
producers cannot refute them.”44 
Despite interdisciplinary efforts between psychiatrists, neurologists, 
physicists, chemists, and psychologists to develop brain-imaging data such as 
PET in the identification and treatment of psychiatric disorders, such efforts 
remain peripheral to humanitarian efforts to ameliorate trauma and PTSD.  This 
is not merely because of technological disparities between the West and non-
West, but is also representative of the fragmentation of the field of psychiatry in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Reed 1999. 
42 Foucault 1977: 193. 
43 Foucault 1963; see also Berg and Harterink 2004.  
44 Dumit 2010: 17. 
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the contemporary moment.  As Kathleen Allden has argued, for example, 
although the past three decades in psychiatry have been intensely focused on 
neurobiology, psychopharmacology and quantitative analysis, since the 1980s, 
medical and psychiatric experts have also been increasingly involved in human 
rights and humanitarian work.45   As Allden argues, these tasks often expand the 
work of mental health professionals beyond caregivers—they have become 
political actors, criminal investigators (in the case of medical-legal investigations 
of torture) and scholars.46   
Humanitarian efforts, in my experience, were grounded much more in 
verbal and non-verbal communication between mental health professionals, 
patients, and kin, rather than brain-imaging technologies.  This was not a space 
where the “fair, impartial objectivity of numbers”47 had colonized expert 
subjectivity and talk; as I show in chapter 2, there was significant back and forth 
between various orders of knowledge.  Instead, the “provisionality” of not just 
psychiatric diagnoses, but of the objects and subjects it calls into being, became 
apparent to me as I did fieldwork.48  In this sense, rather than an objectifying, 
disinterested, and unidirectional gaze from doctor to patient, I found that there 
was a substantial “reciprocity in vision, a mutual gazing which motivate[d] and 
orient[ed] action.”49  Yet I would argue that even the idea of “mutual gazing” 
does not capture the circulation of knowledge and affect in the clinic and the 
multiplicity of relations between patients, doctors, objects, and kin.  In looking 
beyond the visible knots and nodes of humanitarianism and biomedicine—!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Allden 2008.  
46 Allden 2008: 398. 
47 Dumit 2010: 121. 
48 Davis 2010. 
49 Reed 2006: 950. 
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beyond the asylum and experts, for instance—I argue that these knowledges are 
not simply at odds with local economies of knowledge and practice, but rather, 
interwoven with them. 
I understand these entanglements of knowledge/practice as producing a 
“net” of medicalization in Kashmir—a malleable and yet surprisingly durable 
texture.  This “net” enables moments where surprising connections and relations 
can be made, but it also ensnares Kashmiris in a sense of political non-
movement.  In this dissertation, I traverse this net by focusing first on the 
production of expert knowledge and bodies, to an account of objects that mediate 
relations between experts and patients and increasingly come into focus in 
everyday biomedical care, and finally, to reflect on some of the unintended and 
eclipsed effects of medicalization, namely the proliferation of love stories.  In 
each chapter, the authorized objects of biomedical knowledge (institutions and 
experts) are made to fade away as objects and affects that are initially obscured 
come into ethnographic focus.  In so doing, this dissertation examines the 
indeterminate outcomes of humanitarian and biomedical practice.  
The Weakening Body(politic) 
I now want to return to the anecdote with which I began – that of summer 
snow – in order to show the politics of visibility at work as well as how 
seemingly opposed objects—trauma and weakness (kamzori) work in tandem to 
produce a “net” of medicalization.  While medical anthropology has historically 
opposed the lived, active, embodied self to the passive, objective, medical body50, 
here I point to an Occupied Kashmiri body that is doubly medicalized.  I suggest 
that both summer snow and trauma are ways of metonymically linking intimate, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Becker 1997; Csordas 1994; Merleau-Ponty 1964. 
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bodily suffering to Kashmir’s larger political and social turmoil.  However, there 
are two key differences between these epistemologies.  While “summer snow” 
and its effect of bodily weakening (kamzori) are absent from authoritative 
accounts of suffering in Kashmir, the language of trauma and PTSD is 
foregrounded.  In addition, while both perform this metonymic link between the 
individual and social, I argue that there are different ethical stakes involved in 
each.  In moving between “summer snow” and PTSD here, I also hope to provide 
a taste of the kind of analytical labor I will be performing in this dissertation. 
First, let me properly introduce one of the most “visible” forms of 
suffering in Kashmir: trauma and PTSD.  Within media, humanitarian, and 
human rights accounts, trauma and PTSD are clearly foregrounded as the most 
urgent and knowable forms of suffering.  This is one example from a piece on 
Kashmir commissioned by Time magazine: 
In the space of 20 minutes, psychiatrist Arshad Hussain has taken a 
call on his cell phone from a suicidal patient and handed a box of 
pills to a woman who thinks her murdered brother follows her 
around. A former detainee, too scared to stay home alone, wants to 
consult with him, as does a widow who faints at the memory of her 
husband’s shooting. Meanwhile, several men desperate to refill 
their tranquilizer prescriptions are trying to barge into the office…. 
Last year, Dr. Hussain and his small staff received 100,000 visitors, 
most of whom exhibited classic symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder: panic attacks, flashbacks and nightmares….  What 
happens when an entire society is suffering from PTSD?51  
 
 According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostics and 
Statistical Manual (DSM), PTSD is defined by two major criteria: an exposure to a 
traumatic event and a set of psychiatric symptoms that occur (or recur) after the 
event.  The traumatic experience is defined in the DSM-IV as an event involving 
“actual or threatened death or serious injury or a threat to the physical integrity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Matloff and Nickelsberg 2009.  
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of self or others.”52  After such an experience, a person meets the criteria for the 
disorder if symptoms from each of three general categories are present: (i) re-
experiencing the traumatic event through nightmares, flashbacks and/or 
intrusive thoughts or images related to the event; (ii) symptoms of hyperarousal, 
such as difficulty falling or staying asleep, difficulty concentrating and 
exaggerated startle response; (iii) symptoms of withdrawal such as avoidance of 
reminders of the event, emotional numbing, or feelings of detachment.53  When 
Kashmiri mental health experts actively drew on the PTSD diagnosis, they did 
not use trauma in the psychoanalytical sense of an unspeakable narrative, but 
rather, as what humanitarian organizations refer to as “emergency-induced” 
problems.54  
The anthropologist Joshua Breslau has argued that PTSD is unique among 
mental illnesses in that its source external to the individual confers innocence on 
its victims, dissociating them from the taint of other psychiatric disorders.55  In 
Kashmir, this was not so much a factor for patients as much as it was useful for 
mental health experts.  I argue that the instrumentalization of PTSD served two 
important purposes for Kashmiri experts: it allowed them to fashion themselves 
as “global” experts, as drawing on a diagnosis that conferred innocence on the 
sufferers of trauma, without having to directly confront its underlying causes.   
This was particularly valuable given that most mental health experts were Indian 
government employees.  As such, it enabled Kashmiri practitioners to reconcile 
their positions as pro-independence, good Kashmiri nationalists, while keeping !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 American Psychiatric Association 1994: 427. 
53 Breslau 2000: 115. 
54 These include grief, non-pathological distress, depression and anxiety disorders, including 
PTSD  (IASC Guidelines 2007: 2). 
55 Breslau 2000: 117. 
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their day jobs as doctors in government-run hospitals.  Nonetheless, as I will 
show, the instrumentalization of PTSD was also fraught in a number of ways and 
was not neutral in its universality.  As such, I argue against Didier Fassin’s 
contention that “the intelligibility of the conflict” and history itself is lost when 
one “speaks of trauma and the victim.”56  Rather, I suggest that attending to the 
double binds that constitute psychiatric practice in Kashmir, particularly in cases 
of trauma and PTSD, can itself be revelatory of an alternative history (see 
Chapters One and Two). 
 The unexpected and multiple uses of PTSD by Kashmiri mental health 
experts also helps explain the disparity between the overwhelming discursive 
representation of trauma in media, human rights and humanitarian reports and 
its relative absence in everyday clinical practice.   During my fieldwork at the 
psychiatric hospital’s Out Patient Department, I expected to meet scores of 
traumatized patients, an “entire society suffering from PTSD,” as the Time 
magazine article described.  When I confessed my difficulties of locating PTSD 
patients to Dr. Arshad Hussain, one of my closest psychiatric interlocutors, to my 
surprise, he agreed with me.  He said that he had noted the decrease in PTSD 
patients to the hospital and had pointed this out to Kashmir’s BBC correspondent 
at that time.  In December 2009, the correspondent had published a story on the 
BBC’s website entitled, “Kashmir coming out of conflict trauma.”  The article 
described a “sharp decline” in the number of PTSD patients in Kashmir, and 
quoted Dr. Arshad57 as having said, “Today we see hardly one fresh case of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Fassin 2011: 220. 
57 Most doctors in Kashmir, unless very senior, were referred to as “Dr. + first name” rather than 
their last name.  
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PTSD a day.”58  Yet, Dr. Arshad felt that this story had not made a dent in the 
public focus on trauma and PTSD because it metonymically implied an 
improvement in the overall political situation in Kashmir—a position that was 
untenable.   
 I was puzzled as to how I could make sense of this discrepancy between 
the discursive production of PTSD and its clinical absence without falling into 
the problematic position of denying continued, systemic violence in Kashmir.  
Eventually, I began attending to not only the “practices, technologies, and 
narratives that glued together PTSD” 59 and the ways in which it was diagnosed, 
treated, and represented by various interests, but also, the experiences, practices, 
and narratives that were concealed by this object.  To do this, it was necessary to 
bring kamzori into focus and make PTSD fuzzy.   
The majority of patients I met both inside and outside the hospital spoke 
about somatic distress, including kamzori (weakness).  Patients described their 
kamzori as due to tensions with husbands or wives, mothers or fathers-in-laws, 
money troubles, difficult children, and the absence or loss of employment or 
land.  In other words, they pointed to some of the structural effects of long-term 
violence on intimate relations.  Unlike the symptoms of PTSD – such as 
nightmares and reenactments – which were somewhat unusual in the clinic, 
complaints of weakness proliferated widely, both within and outside of the 
clinic.  In fact, the vast majority of patients who came through the Out Patient 
Department (OPD) of the psychiatric hospital as well as the other sites of mental 
health care where I did fieldwork complained of an overall sense of weakness.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8320178.stm). 
59 Young 1995: 5. 
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While clinicians often understood kamzori as a symptom of depression, they 
generally did not understand it as a consequence of trauma.  This was perhaps 
due to the fact that kamzori was not traceable to a specific, external occurrence, 
but existed within the continuous space of troubled familial and social relations.  
Kamzori also accompanied a number of other diseases – from cardiovascular 
problems to arthritis to depression.  As Lawrence Cohen has noted in another 
north Indian context, a speaker’s fears and understandings of kamzori dovetailed 
with other local meanings of weakness.60  In Kashmir, while kamzori sometimes 
referred to a loss of bodily strength and decay, such as in the aging bodies Cohen 
studied,61 it also indexed a wide range of existential, moral and psychological 
suffering, not limited to the physical loss of strength.  For example, I frequently 
heard Kashmiri women, in particular, complain about the accumulated effects of 
years of housework on their fatigued and weakened bodies.  
In addition, kamzori also had ambiguous moral and ethical valences.  
Kamzori could be an effect of immoral behavior, such as a mother not properly 
following ritual procedures after the birth of her child, resulting in the 
transmission of flawed bodily substance from mother to child.   Kamzori could 
also signify male impotence.  Long-term psychiatric patients often complained of 
kamzori as both a cause and effect of psychiatric illness and treatment.  One 
woman told me how constant worry (pareshani) about her illness had weakened 
her body, making her susceptible to further illnesses.  In some cases, kamzori was 
also a way for patients and kin to refer to a weak brain (dimag), suggesting a lack 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Cohen 1995: 320. 
61 Cohen 1998: xv. 
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or loss of intellectual ability.62  Yet the language of kamzori was also a way to talk 
about a “weak” or overly sensitive disposition.  In chapter 3, I quote Saira as 
complaining that her heart is kamzor, that she felt unable to bear emotional pain.  
While experienced somatically, then, kamzori was not reducible to individual 
bodily pain. 
One reason why it is useful to think of trauma and kamzori in tandem, I 
think, is the fact that patients sought biomedical treatment for kamzori, and it was 
a persistent complaint in the clinic.  As I show in chapter 4, even when patients 
saw symptomatic improvements in other aspects of their illness, they rarely 
reported being free of kamzori.  Given the virulence and frequency of such 
complaints, doctors could not ignore them entirely, so they did the next best 
thing: use placebos.  As standard practice, doctors doled out Vitamin B12 tonics, 
multivitamins, and advised their patients to read the Qur’an to combat kamzori.  
Doctors often glossed the multivitamins as “medicine” (davai) for their patients 
and told me that patients could not differentiate between multivitamins and their 
regular medicines.  Many patients, however, could discern multivitamins from 
‘real’ medicines based on the spiral packaging that was unique to multivitamins.  
Thus, some patients felt cheated when they received multivitamins in response 
to their complaints of kamzori and referred to these as rubbish medicines (bakvas 
davai). 
Given the dismissal of kamzori as a legitimate ailment, it was not 
surprising that it was rarely written down on the medical card, and thus, not 
officially treated.  Nonetheless, this does not mean that kamzori and trauma !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 As Lawrence Cohen points out, however, “the epistemology of weakness seldom presumes a 
marked distinction between the mental and the embodied life.  The weakness of dimag (brain) is 
usually but one of many forms of the weakened body” (Cohen 1995: 319). 
! 29 !
belonged to mutually exclusive epistemological domains.  On the contrary, I 
argue that kamzori functioned as an analogical concept to trauma for patients in 
the sense that it was a means of connecting individual subjectivity with broader 
social and political ill health, just like PTSD was for doctors.  Just like PTSD, 
individual patient complaints of kamzori were immediately linked to the social 
and political context of Kashmir.  45-year-old Bashir Ahmed, who I interviewed 
in the waiting room of a government-run Unani clinic, explained the epidemic of 
kamzori in Kashmir thus:  
Even people with minor heart and kidney problems routinely go to 
Delhi. Don’t we have an Institute [a tertiary care facility]63 here? 
Why do they go to Delhi? Because they don’t get better here. 
Tensions are high, so illnesses are also high. A mother whose son 
might be out of the house is worried that he might be caught in 
cross firing, so naturally she is tense.  This tension makes her weak 
[kamzor].  After militancy, we have more illnesses [Personal 
communication, May 7, 2010]. 
 
In this narrative, Bashir pointed to existing “tensions” in Kashmir as 
directly responsible for producing illness.  However, unlike humanitarian and 
psychiatric epistemologies, in which violence was directly linked to 
psychological suffering, in Bashir’s narrative, the “tension” experienced by 
Kashmiris manifested itself first in a general bodily weakening, which then 
facilitated the onset of more serious, somatic illnesses, such as heart and kidney 
problems.  Even when Kashmiris sought treatment for other medical conditions, 
kamzori was usually still left over.  Bashir’s narrative also showed the 
vernacularization of biomedical concepts in Kashmir through his use of the 
English-language term “tension.”  However, rather than referring to a clinical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 In India, tertiary care facilities are known as Super Specialty hospitals.  Since the 1990s, Super 
Specialty hospitals, as high-end privatized medical establishments, have been the sites of major 
investment and foreign monetary exchange.  As Cohen (1999: 680) has described, new public-
private assemblages have emerged linking medical institutions to politics and capital.    
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diagnosis of hypertension or to stress, Bashir used “tension” in the sense of the 
weight of troubles on the body and mind.  In contrast, to feel happy, in Kashmiri 
and Urdu, means to feel “light” (halka), almost weightless.   
As such, like PTSD, kamzori was also a means of collectivizing illness, of 
recognizing the cumulative effects of political stagnation in the bodies of 
individuals.  While the presence of kamzori was not viewed as a “morally 
legitimate”64 form of suffering by clinicians, it nonetheless continued to be a 
pressing concern for patients.  In particular, I suggest that the language of 
kamzori was also a way of speaking to the fact that Kashmiri bodies had been 
weakened, just as the dream of a Kashmiri nation had been weakened.  It 
indexed a loss of agency on both an individual and collective political level.  In 
this sense, similar to what Sherine Hamdy has described in the case of poor 
dialysis patients in Egypt, ill bodies were revealed as effects of an ill political 
past, present, and future.65  When I asked drug users in their early twenties about 
whether the “problem” of Kashmir would be solved in the future, many laughed 
and shook their heads.  “This problem will never be resolved,” one said, 
“because neither India nor Pakistan will let it go.  It will continue on like this.”   
Despite their similarities as political etiologies, PTSD and kamzori 
circulated differently and also did different kinds of ethical work for the experts 
and patients who experienced and used them.  Ultimately, as clinical diagnoses, 
trauma and PTSD were ways of localizing or containing violence.  Not only did 
PTSD point to a specific external event as a cause, it also located suffering within 
a particular set of symptoms and determined those to be urgent and legitimate.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Ticktin 2011: 19. 
65 Hamdy 2008.!
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Kamzori, in contrast, refused to be limited to specific diagnoses or individual 
bodies: it was revealed as disrupted relations, whether signifying a lack of 
balance within the body or the family.  While consistently seeking treatment for 
kamzori, patients also situated it in the realm of chronicity.  Bodily kamzori made 
visible familial kamzori, which, in turn, made visible the weakened dream for a 
Kashmiri nation.  As such, unlike PTSD, the work of kamzori actually broadened 
and made diffuse the effects of violence and medicalization.  It refused to heal, 
and in so doing, was a powerful reminder of the history of disenfranchisement 
that Kashmir had, and would continue to, experience.66   
In drawing attention to kamzori and PTSD as analogous forms of 
medicalization, I want to show how these dovetailed to ensnare Kashmiris 
within a “net” of ill health in Kashmir.  To remember a time when the valley was 
not afflicted with disease, one had to go all the way back to when the Mughal 
emperor Akbar crossed the Pir Panjal mountains into Kashmir in 1586, that is, 
prior to any period of colonization in modern history.  As I recount in chapter 
four, one of the psychiatrists I worked with told me a story of how, when Akbar 
crossed the mountains, he felt himself suffering from a severe headache.  He 
asked some farmers who were tiling the saffron fields near Pampore if they had a 
cure.  They responded, “What is a headache?”   
Narratives such as this one produced a hegemonic sense that in Kashmir, 
all diseases had a political etiology.  They were part of “third-person 
knowledge,” in C.S. Peirce’s terms, a logic that operated in the form of rationality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 In this sense, kamzori was different from the Open Mole disorder which Sharon Abramowitz 
has described in the Liberian context.  While Open Mole is transformed from a culture-bound 
disorder to a gateway diagnosis of PTSD-related mental illness, I suggest that psychiatrists are 
unable or willing to operationalize kamzori in this way (Abramowitz 2010). 
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or common sense.67  Within this framework, the only way to escape the 
corrupting, corrosive effects of violence was to physically leave Kashmir and 
seek health elsewhere, which those who could afford it did with greater 
frequency.   
Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation responds to three framing questions: (i) What is 
humanitarianism in the context of an intractable political conflict, such as 
Kashmir, where questions of life and death recede to the background?  (ii) How 
have Kashmiri mental health experts and patients translated and used the 
language and tools of biomedical and humanitarian knowledge and to what 
ends? (iii) What kinds of subjects are created at the intersection of liberal 
humanitarian projects which foreground psychological and psychiatric 
suffering?  
Together, these questions acknowledge the intensive linguistic and 
conceptual labor required by both mental health experts and patients to make 
biomedical and humanitarian encounters useful.  They show the ways in which 
biomedical tools, rather than curing suffering, have become ways of living with 
suffering.  A key way of understanding what humanitarianism is in this context 
is by thinking about who is counted as an expert.  In focusing on the work of 
Kashmiri mental health experts, following Peter Redfield, I argue that the image 
of humanitarianism as an “emergency-room ready team” of doctors does not 
adequately capture the everyday work that occurred within these spaces of 
care.68   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Daniel 1984; Cohen 1995: 319. 
68 Redfield 2010. 
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In bringing Kashmiri experts into focus, I also challenge anthropological 
critiques that humanitarian practice rests on a binary between peripatetic 
expatriates who save and immobile victims who are saved.69  Such critiques often 
minimize the role played by local staff who increasingly do the brunt of work 
within humanitarian organizations, including Kashmiri psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and social workers.  Generally, local staff are underrepresented 
both within the public profiles of humanitarian organizations and in 
anthropological critiques. In the case of MSF, for example, the organization has 
two, distinct classes of personnel: “international volunteers” composed mainly of 
Euro-American expatriates and “national staff” who are hired in support roles at 
specific sites.  However, as Redfield notes, although “national staff” outnumber 
expatriates in MSF about 9:1, they rarely appear in the organization’s media 
profile or internal governance structure.70 
When local staff do appear, they are often viewed as instruments of 
humanitarian knowledge, used to “manag[e] the culture ‘problem.’”71  As Sharon 
Abramowitz and Arthur Kleinman have argued, for example, “through ‘local 
staff,’ local cultures and contexts can be learned, integrated, instrumentalized 
and redeployed selectively in NGO projects and activities.”72 As anthropologists 
of humanitarianism have begun to recognize, the role of local or national staff 
has grown more significant within humanitarian organizations, particularly as 
these organizations expand their repertoire to include not only medical 
emergencies, but also chronic conditions such as HIV/AIDS and psychological 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Fassin 2007. 
70 Redfield 2012: 360. 
71 Abramowitz and Kleinman 2008: 221. 
72 Abramowitz and Kleinman 2008: 221 
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trauma.  In cases where communication and language skills were central to the 
performance of humanitarianism, local staff shouldered much of the work, 
whereas expatriate staff occupied administrative and supervisory roles. 
However, there is still another factor to take into account, which has a 
bearing on the performance of humanitarianism: how local staff not only shape, 
but are themselves shaped, by NGO projects and activities, and how this process 
may actually impact their ability to act as “native informants.”  In my experience, 
the more Kashmiri psychologists, social workers, and counselors encountered 
and were trained in global, technical, English-language discourses on mental 
health, the less able they were to act as conduits into the ‘local.’  Ironically, some 
of the expatriate staff took on roles as cultural mediators (see Chapter Two).  As 
such, I argue that attention to the movement between universal and particular 
knowledge that constitutes humanitarian expertise also requires us to consider 
what is lost in this movement. 
One of the findings of this dissertation is that humanitarian and 
biomedical tools—including techniques such as counseling and talk therapy, but 
also objects such as medical cards and pills—were plastic in the hands of 
Kashmiri psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, and patients.  There were 
consistent, everyday subversions,“vernacularizations,” and multiple ontologies 
at work which revealed the partiality of authoritative biomedical practices.  For 
one, patient expectations, rather than expert intentions, clearly shaped the 
outcome or use of particular techniques, such as the use of medical rather than 
psychosocial means of care.  Secondly, both experts and patients worked to make 
humanitarian knowledge accountable as a political etiology in Kashmir.  Thirdly, 
authoritative objects of biomedical practice did not retain stable meanings or 
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forms across space and time; rather, they had a “sticky” quality, which enabled 
them to attach and detach with patient and expert relations in unexpected ways. 
First, I argue that patients took ownership of techniques of care in 
unexpected ways that shaped the outcome of particular interventions.  As such, 
they were co-participants rather than simply the victims or objects of 
intervention (see Chapters Three and Four).  By focusing on particular 
biomedical technologies, such as diagnosis, I also show how these worked 
differently for patients and experts.  For example, while experts were deeply 
concerned with and used biomedical diagnoses to understand their own bodily 
distress, patients were rarely told – and had little interest in – what their 
diagnosis was.  This made for a drastically different clinical situation than the 
one described by Miriam Ticktin, for example, where diagnoses can have life or 
death consequences for immigrants to France.73   
In Kashmir, by contrast, the benefits offered to those deemed worthy 
“victims” of violence was limited to either “emergency support” packages, 
consisting of a small supply of household items, such as cooking oil, dal, and rice, 
or “livelihood support,” which at the most, consisted of providing a cow to the 
family in order to generate income.  While I do not mean to diminish the 
significance of these forms of support, during household visits, I heard families 
complain that these benefits were not sufficient and ask the organizations for 
money instead.  In contrast, none of the migrants who were granted legal 
residency in France thanks to the exceptional “illness clause” within French 
immigration law seemed to contest their status as the “wretched of the earth,” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Ticktin 2011. 
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despite the cruel ironies produced by this legal exception.74  While diagnosis was 
secondary to modes of treatment for Kashmiri patients, it was nonetheless a 
significant for experts in both personal and professional capacities.  Experts 
relied on highly technical treatments to treat their own bodily distress, whereas 
patients were highly skeptical of these strategies and expert advice and preferred 
to listen to their bodily distress and widely practiced self-medication (Chapter 
Four).  As such, I argue that experts, rather than victims, were most directly 
effected by certain vectors of humanitarian knowledge and practice.  
Second, I show how competing illness etiologies in Kashmir worked to 
produce a link between ill health and violence in Kashmir; put differently, it was 
the ability of the etiologies to enact this link, which made them culturally 
resonant in the first place.  The example of “summer snow” with which I began, 
for example, shows how ill bodies in Kashmir, even those affected by seasonal 
allergies, are suffused with moral and political concerns.75  As many other 
examples within medical anthropology remind us – beginning with Evans-
Pritchard’s classic example of Azande witchcraft – the explanation for “summer 
snow” is compelling for its ability to respond to the “why” question of illness.  
As Michael Taussig has argued, while biomedicine is remarkably good at 
answering the “how” question of illness, it is not particularly good at the “why” 
(Why me? Why now?)76  However, separating out the “how” from the “why” 
between authoritative and folk discourses reifies a false distinction between these 
epistemologies.  In Kashmir, I argue that such clear cut distinctions between the 
authoritative and folk, the clinical and the anecdotal, are not available since !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Ticktin 2011: 11-12. 
75 See also Hamdy 2008. 
76 Taussig 1980: 7.   
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biomedical and humanitarian knowledge is also expected to respond to the why 
question.  I argue that this is one of the reasons for the traction of trauma as an 
idiom of distress in this region.   
Similarly, Part II of the dissertation focuses on the ‘threads’ of the net – 
medical cards and pills – objects that move to and from the clinic in order to 
highlight the existence of multiple epistemologies and ontologies within the 
space of the clinic.  Rather than view these as incommensurable, I show 
unexpected ways in which local idioms of distress can dovetail with an 
authoritative biomedical language, or alternatively, moments when there is a 
mutual misapprehension between different epistemologies of suffering.   
In this sense, I build on the argument that the global expansion of PTSD 
has had more to do with its ability to connect individual subjectivity with 
questions of political legitimacy and social justice, and less to do with the clinical 
significance of the disorder.77  Thus, rather than trauma and PTSD as forms of 
depoliticizing suffering, as has been shown elsewhere,78 in Kashmir, trauma is 
used to link a person’s illness with external circumstances severe enough to 
qualify as traumatogenic.79  I argue that dominant narratives of ill health and 
conflict create what I call a “net” of medicalization in Kashmir. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Aretxaga 2003; Das, Kleinman, Ramphele and Reynolds 2000. 
78 Malkki 1995: 12-13; 1996; Pandolfi 2011. 
79 Young 1995: 120.  Young argues against the idea that PTSD is a distinctively social diagnosis.  
Rather, he argues that symptoms associated with PTSD – such as insomnia or increased sleep – 
are also associated with other disorders, such as depression.  However, as part of a PTSD 
diagnosis, the symptom becomes part of a clinical narrative in which it is not simply an 
indication of an underlying pathology but an eruption into present consciousness of the 
traumatic event. The narrative in which trauma moves through memory to eruption in symptoms 
depends, in turn, on modern Western conceptions of the self as constituted through continuities 
of memory.  The narrative of traumatic memory,Young argues, gives an alternative meaning to 
observed symptoms: these are not simple symptoms of mental illness, but traces of the traumatic 
event that preceded them (Young 1995 Chapter 4; Breslau 2000: 116). 
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In addressing these nuances of vernacularization, this dissertation resists 
the well-worn critique that  “interventions which build on the idea of universal 
humanity often convey contempt for concrete situations.”80  I argue that such 
critiques conveniently make space for anthropology to provide the necessary 
‘context’ – the cultural or historical specificity – and thereby provide an antidote 
to humanitarianism’s universalism.81  When the work of cultural appropriateness 
is already folded into interventions, as is the case in humanitarian work done by 
Kashmiris, what then, for the anthropologist?  Following scholars of expertise 
who have faced similar situations of collapse between “ourselves and our objects 
of study, between the things studied and the frames we used to study them,”82 
rather than provide an account of how humanitarian ideals fail in practice, this 
dissertation addresses the particular form that humanitarian interventions in 
Kashmir take.  I attempt to go beyond a mere description of this form by 
demonstrating its operation through what I call a “politics of visibility.”  In 
making the multiplicity of biomedical and humanitarian practices visible, I draw 
on scholars of science and medicine who have attended to the “ontological 
politics” at the heart of biomedical and other health interventions.83  I suggest 
that the “ontological politics” at stake here require attention to both how 
problems of violence and mental health are framed by biomedicine, but also to 
how “overlapping and heterogeneous ways of knowing, enacting, and treating 
the body” 84 were available to, and used by, Kashmiris within this frame.  
Outline of Chapters  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Englund 2005: 12. 
81 Fassin 2008; James 2010; Malkki 1995.   
82 Riles 2006a: 3.  See also Choy 2011. 
83 Mol 2002; Langwick 2011.  
84 Pigg 2001: 483. 
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 Each chapter of the dissertation enacts the politics of visibility at the heart 
of humanitarian practice in Kashmir in a different way, while moving through 
the net.   
In Chapter One, I examine ongoing processes of deinstitutionalization in 
mental health care in Kashmir, particularly as they appear in the material 
transformation of the Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital from an asylum 
to a research and teaching hospital.  While processes of de-institutionalization 
are coterminous with increasing out-patient, community-based care, short-term 
stays, and reliance on pharmacological treatment (in other words, an opening of 
mental illness), I suggest that, in Kashmir, processes of de-institutionalization 
have simultaneously resulted in processes of quarantining or attempts to enclose 
mental illness.  I suggest that this politics of visibility is at the heart of de-
institutionalization movements in India and also deeply marks the subjectivity of 
mental health experts. 
 I argue that this “double bind” has produced a paradoxical subjectivity for 
experts, who see themselves as combating “stigma” while also being deeply 
ensnared within a dominant logic of madness as contagion.  While 
anthropologists have effectively used the concept of “double bind” in recent 
years, it is worthwhile to note that a true double bind refers to a situation that 
“requires a choice between two states which are equally valued and so equally 
insufficient that a self-perpetuating oscillation is engendered by any active choice 
between them…  It is the result of the fact that one must choose, and moreover 
choose between incompatible alternatives.”85  In this chapter, I suggest that the 
goals of both de-institutionalization and institutionalization represent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Wilden and Wilson 1976: 276. 
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“incompatible alternatives” for mental health professionals in Kashmir.  This 
chapter thus moves from an account of de-institutionalization—the visible, 
ethical, bureaucratic face of mental health care—to a return to the asylum and the 
logic of visibility that marks it. 
 In Chapter Two, on the production of expert psychiatric and psychosocial 
subjects who staff humanitarian organizations, I engage with literature on the 
anthropology of humanitarianism and expertise.  While local or national staff 
have been almost invisible in both anthropological and humanitarian self-
narratives, I explore the intimate ways in which Kashmiris are engaged in 
various humanitarian projects.   
I argue that psychosocial and psychiatric interventions in Kashmir are 
deeply engaged in discussions about cultural appropriateness, and as such, 
subvert normative critiques of humanitarianism.  I provide two examples of this 
process: discussions over the appropriateness of PTSD therapies practiced on US 
veterans and the spontaneous appropriation of psychiatric practices by local 
counselors in order to make their own practices more culturally legible.  While 
anthropologists of expertise have shown that expert knowledge mediates 
between the particular and universal, I suggest that psychiatric and psychosocial 
experts who acquire supposedly universal knowledge – such as through the 
Diagnostics and Statistical Manual – are actually less able to engage with forms 
of particular, local knowledge.  In other words, the mediation between the 
particular and universal is not a free-flowing movement, but rather, in this 
instance shows how universalistic knowledge is often acquired at the expense of, 
and often obscures, particular knowledge, and vice versa.   
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 Chapter Three similarly examines forms of personhood that are revealed 
and concealed through the medical card, an object which not only mediates, but 
enables relations between experts and patients in Kashmir.  While the card is 
imagined as the extension of state and bureaucratic authority, I show how its 
circulation enables it to be attached and detached to subjects and relations in 
unexpected ways. As I describe, in Kashmir, medical cards are the property and 
responsibility of patients, not institutions.  Unlike other rationalized bureaucratic 
artifacts, medical cards are handwritten, circulate outside of institutional 
settings, and continue to bear the marks of both experts and patients in particular 
ways.  In the case of long-term mental illness, I show how the card emerges as 
the proper object of biomedical intervention, and how the card is separated out 
from the patient.  This raises questions, I suggest, about the relationship between 
the card and the patient (that which it is purported to represent), while also 
contesting medical anthropological understandings of who or what is the object of 
intervention in a humanitarian or biomedical space.   
 In Chapter Four, the materiality of biomedical practice in Kashmir is once 
again foregrounded with attention to pills.  I suggest that, in contrast to mental 
health narratives which celebrate recent scientific developments in 
pharmaceuticals, permitting a more de-institutionalized care, from beyond the 
clinic’s view, pills have multiple ontologies in Kashmir.  In particular, I show that 
pills are objects towards which Kashmiri patients express deep ambivalence: 
they are powerful but simultaneously dangerous.  I suggest that the distrust 
Kashmiris exhibited towards pills reflects the ways in which interpersonal 
relations – which are also deeply suspect - have also been remade in the context 
of long-term violence.  I argue that in their use and appropriation of pills as a 
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technology of care, as well as in expert responses to this appropriation, patients 
shape the outcome of everyday clinical interactions and outcomes.  
 Lastly, in Chapter Five, I examine the production of PTSD as an object of 
humanitarian and biomedical intervention, including in the context of 
widespread drug addiction.  Public health and Indian state sources establish 
tightly drawn links between violence, trauma, and addiction, I argue, but 
ethnographic attention to the narratives of drug users reveals that “everyday 
occupations,” such as heartbreak and romantic love, are the sites of persistent 
psychic wounds.  Rather than read these stories as symptoms of displacement, 
however, I suggest that they are worthy of ethnographic attention in and of 
themselves.  In particular, I show how “lateral” attention to love stories as 
ethnographic artifacts allows us to see how former drug users use the language 
of intoxication (nasha) to carve out an alternative ethics and subjectivity, that is 
not available through either biomedical narratives of addiction or mainstream 
Islamic ethics.  
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CHAPTER ONE: ARCHITECTS OF MENTAL HEALTH 
 
“The people of Jammu & Kashmir have faced immense mental stress 
during the past 15 years of militancy and cross-border terrorism.  It is, 
therefore, unfortunate that large parts of the State are without even basic 
mental health facilities.  The mental hospital at Srinagar has had an 
unfortunate history…  Training facilities for mental health personnel are 
deficient and urgent steps are required to augment the same.  Considering 
the special status of this disturbed State, the case for implementing the 
DMHP [District Mental Health Program] in as many districts as possible 
needs to be supported strongly”  
 
– National Survey of Mental Health Resources, 2008 
 
Saiba:  So, what are the most challenging aspects of practicing psychiatry? 
Dr. Zaid:  Psychiatry is nobody’s child.  From pirs86 to doctors, everyone 
is practicing psychiatry.  Patients come to us after a long time, after they 
have visited every other expert.  People don’t reach the person who is 
supposed to treat them – they get here a year or two later than they should. 
Introduction 
This chapter explores recent shifts in mental health in care in Kashmir and 
more broadly in India, with attention to how these transformations are expressed 
through, and affected by, specific embodiments of psychiatric expertise.  I argue 
that psychiatric expertise in Kashmir is constituted through a particular “politics 
of visibility” where the incompleteness of de-institutionalization married with 
the tainted nature of asylums, a sense of biomedical crisis but lack of 
employment opportunities, and professional commitments to combat the 
“stigma” associated with mental illness while living with ongoing sense of 
madness as contagion.   
I extend the term “double bind” to understand the conundrums faced not 
only by patients of severe mental disorders – as in Gregory Bateson’s original 
term which referred to the schizophrenic’s psychotic inability to process 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Islamic healers. 
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conventional order in the world87 – but to experts as well.  In recent years, 
anthropologists have used the term to describe the form of contemporary social 
and political movements, including humanitarianism.88  As Peter Redfield has 
noted, “the double bind…is not quite the same as a structural binary, a dialectic, 
or even a dilemma.  It lacks stability and motivates by a desire to satisfy 
competing injunctions, thus precipitating a problem of choice, rather than 
necessity.”89 
From frustrated expressions such as Dr. Z’s above to seemingly 
nonchalant claims that psychiatry is “like an office job,” that I also heard, 
individual psychiatrists offered radically different propositions for choosing 
psychiatry.  While some cited their interest in psychiatry as based on the fact that 
the stakes were lower than other medical specializations—as one psychiatrist put 
it, “no one dies on my table”—others highlighted the challenges of intimate 
cultural knowledge that psychiatry required as the engine for their continued 
passion.90   
Psychiatrists in Kashmir, as elsewhere in the developing world, have 
generally enjoyed greater visibility and status in the last two decades, 
particularly with the growth of international medical humanitarianism.  
Nonetheless, they consistently expressed ambivalence towards the profession as 
well the reasons for what kept them motivated. There was, in fact, a paradox: 
while psychiatrists had gone from being largely invisible to being at the forefront 
of public discussions on the ongoing effects of long-term militarization and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Bateson 1972. 
88 Cattelino 2010; Fortun 2001; Redfield 2012. 
89 Redfield 2012: 361. 
90 This latter position will be familiar to ethnographers of technocracy who have emphasized the 
ways that failures become the engines of more technocracy (Riles 2004). 
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violence, at the same time, they were still marginal to the help-seeking process of 
most Kashmiris.  Almost every patient I interviewed said that they had visited 
one or numerous pirs before entering a psychiatrist’s office, and many continued 
to visit pirs during their medical treatment, despite the advice of the psychiatrist 
to the contrary.   
Further, the transactional nature of the encounter between doctors and 
patients in Kashmir was not merely symptomatic of unequal power dynamics 
between expert and non-expert, but was often a two-way process.  For patients, a 
successful encounter was one where a transaction was successfully completed—a 
card signed, treatment extended, and pills acquired.  This emphasis on treatment 
over diagnosis or explanation, which has also been described by other 
anthropologists of psychiatry in South Asia, often reduced psychiatrists to the 
status of pharmacists, a move that was not aligned with psychiatrists’ own self-
descriptions.91   
One of the everyday “double binds” faced by Kashmiri psychiatrists, I 
argue, are related to the effects of de-institutionalization and humanitarian 
psychiatry.  Kashmiri mental health experts are somewhat unique among their 
Indian counterparts in that they have directly participated in both these distinct 
transnational movements in mental health care.  The Government Psychiatric 
Diseases hospital (GPDH) in Srinagar, where I did over six months of fieldwork, 
was one of the few government-run hospitals in India where humanitarian 
psychiatry was part of the hospital’s very fabric.  For over a decade, Médecins 
sans Frontières (MSF) counselors, not government employees, provided 
psychotherapy and counseling to the hospital patients.  In a 2008 report by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Addlakha 2008; Nunley 1998; Pinto 2012. 
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National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), 78 per cent of mental hospitals in 
India reported providing counseling services, although many had only one 
clinical psychologist or social worker posted to the premises.92  Meanwhile, 
psychiatrists did not receive any classes on counseling or psychoeducation in 
medical school, yet they described “educating the patient” as one of their 
primary goals in the clinic.     
As one of only 37 state mental hospitals in India, the GPDH was also the 
site of major bureaucratic and legal interventions, including efforts to de-
institutionalize mental health care via the National Mental Health Program 
(NMHP) and District Mental Health Program (DMHP).  While humanitarian 
psychiatry is constructed around “emergencies” in the sense of “sudden, 
unpredictable events emerging against a background of ostensible normalcy,”93 
India’s national mental health program is also seen as responding to a crisis, but 
one that emerged from long-term social and economic inequalities, especially 
between the developed and developing world.   
Despite these differences, humanitarian psychiatry and national mental 
health programs also share a goal: to “de-stigmatize” mental illness by de-
institutionalizing mental health care and promoting care ‘in the community.’  
While de-institutionalization or “community-based care” purports to make 
mental health care more “feasible, affordable and acceptable”94—in other words, 
to make care more open—I argue that de-institutionalization also results in 
simultaneous processes of quarantining, which increasingly obscure continued 
forms of institutionalized care.  In addition, while both humanitarian psychiatry !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Nagaraja and Murthy 2008: 91.   
93 Calhoun 2010: 30. 
94 Patel 2007: 87. 
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and Global Mental Health produce biomedicine and medical professionals on the 
side of progress and modernity and patients on the side of culture and 
backwardness through the discourse of “stigma,” this perspective neglects the 
ways in which experts are themselves deeply marked by madness, a contagion.95  
In focusing on the entanglements of different orders of knowledge and 
experience around mental health policy, I view expert knowledge as made not 
only on the level of programs and policy, but also through intimate, embodied 
practices.  
The first part of this chapter challenges the dominant logic that de-
institutionalization produces a more transparent, just, and open regime of care, 
in favor of understanding how it also separates out what I call the ‘inside’ and 
the ‘outside’ of the mental hospital.  The second part of the chapter focuses on 
tensions between the universal diagnostic categories of humanitarian psychiatry 
and the particular concerns of Kashmiri psychiatrists.  My aim is not to show 
how the ideals of universalism fail in practice, but rather, to show how debates 
about cultural appropriateness and the applicability of humanitarian instruments 
to Kashmiri patients are foundational to what it means to be an expert in 
Kashmir.  I thus point to how these tools are “vernacularized” but also show 
how this process of instrumentalization produces particular paradoxes for 
psychiatrists.  Here too, there is a movement of knowledge between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside,’ but this is expressed as the difference between “the ivory tower” and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Daniel 1984: 8.  Foundational work in the anthropology of South Asia has argued that among 
Indians (or Tamils, in the case of Val Daniel), all things are constituted of fluid substances, which 
are in perpetual flux and have the capacity to separate and mix with other substances (Marriot 
and Inden 1977; see also Lamb 2000).  Thus it is possible, or indeed inevitable, for persons to 
establish inter-substantial relationships with other people and the places they live.  While this 
work has focused on Hindu communities and is not fully transposable to the Kashmiri context, 
the idea of fluid or substantially interpenetrative selves is foundational in both Ayurvedic and 
Unani medicine (Zimmerman 1979, 1980). 
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the “OPD,” or between “Kashmir” and bahar or the world “outside.”96  Kashmiri 
doctors told me that if medical experts from the outside world could see what 
they had to go through on a daily basis, they would be “shocked” (hairaan).  Yet, 
despite the desire for more even flows of knowledge, Kashmiri psychiatrists also 
resisted flows from the global to the local in specific ways.  In this sense, they 
were also engaged in a project of “remapping the possibilities” of biomedical and 
humanitarian geographies.97 
Part I:  De-institutionalization, or the abandonment of the asylum 
One of the arguments in this chapter is that the ambivalence Kashmiri 
psychiatrists experience in their everyday work is an expression of 
entanglements between past and future and between competing senses of what 
the hospital is in an era of de-institutionalization.   
First, let me very briefly outline the history of asylums in the 
subcontinent.  Asylums were introduced to British India in the late eighteenth 
century for Europeans and Indian elites, and by the early nineteenth century, 
there were three small institutions in the provincial capitals of Madras, Mumbai 
and Calcutta, with plans for further expansion.98  Nonetheless, as Waltraud Ernst 
has described, British India did not have a period of institutionalization 
comparable to what Foucault described as ‘the great confinement of the insane’ 
in Europe.  While the numbers of asylum inmates during this period is 
statistically insignificant in terms of the total population, Ernst argues that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Kashmiris used the term bahar to differentiate spaces of knowledge and practice from each 
other.  The term bahar can mean immediate outside surroundings, such as “outside the hospital,” 
while also referring to a more abstract sense of the world outside, to be non-Kashmiri, for 
example (Bahar se aana, “to come from outside Kashmir”).   
97 Tsing 2000. 
98 Ernst 1997.  The majority of Indian asylum inmates were mendicants and beggars picked up for 
threatening the public peace and order (Ernst 1997: 160).  
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asylum policies dovetailed with larger colonial arguments for bringing civilized, 
humanitarian, and scientific treatment to the subcontinent.  However, the 
operation of psychiatry as a tool of social control was restricted by the fact that 
institutional practices within the British empire varied significantly from parish 
to parish.  As such, colonial medicine and psychiatry, while “carried along by the 
wave of humanitarianism that had become an important feature among 
Victorians at home and abroad,”99 was nonetheless restricted to the level of 
ideological discourse.    
Today, fourteen of the 37 mental hospitals in India make use of the 
original custodial-style architecture of the colonial period.  No new stand-alone 
mental hospitals have been built since 1960, since mental health care was shifted 
away from mental hospitals to general hospital psychiatric units and later, the 
community.100  While most hospitals were originally built on the outskirts of 
major cities to keep the mad out of public view, with the rapid expansion of 
Indian cities, many hospitals are now well incorporated into urban 
environments.  However, despite the continued use of the asylum structure, the 
Indian medical establishment has shifted significantly in the postcolonial period.  
Post-independence, the Indian medical establishment gradually realigned itself 
away from a British model.  In the 1950s, Indian medical colleges began using 
American rather than British textbooks and medical journals, such as the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), an 
ubiquitous artifact in every South Asian psychiatrist’s office.101  Indian medical 
colleges, such as the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in New !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 Ernst 1997: 171.   
100 Dhanda 2005.  
101 Nunley 1992: 107. 
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Delhi, one of the most renowned biomedical institutions in the country, was built 
using Johns Hopkins University as its model.  However, as Michael Nunley 
describes, in the first three decades after independence, health care was a 
relatively low priority for the Indian government, which encouraged 
organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to play significant roles.  At that time, the 
emphasis in international public health was on campaigns directed at the 
eradication of specific epidemic diseases, primarily through mass inoculation 
programs, which had varying degrees of success.102   
As such, despite its association with biomedicine—which has a powerful 
ideological and material apparatus in South Asia—psychiatry remained marginal 
within the public health system in India until the 1980s, when arguments for de-
institutionalization took hold.  While mental health experts were in agreement 
that mental institutions could not be entirely done away with, trends in Global 
Mental Health (GMH) particularly in what are called Low and Middle Income 
Countries (LAMIC), argued for a diminished role for the mental hospital as a site 
of care in favor of “locally available, affordable interventions in community and 
primary care settings.”103  These reports often pointed to the marginalized role 
accorded to mental health care in the developing world; for example, while the 
developing world accounts for 11.1 per cent of the burden of global mental 
disorders, developing countries, on average, spend less than one per cent of their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 While some of these programs (such as the ones against smallpox and cholera) were quite 
successful, others (against malaria and tuberculosis) were notably less so. 
103 Patel 2007: 82.  In fact, Erving Goffman is often credited as being one of the first social 
scientists to report on the prison-like conditions of mental asylums, thereby helping to create 
momentum for the de-institutionalization movement. Subsequently, anthropological studies have 
critiqued de-institutionalization as well.  See Carr 2011; Davis 2012; Floersch 2002; Goffman 1961; 
Jain and Jadhav 2007; Rhodes 1991. 
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health budget on mental health care.104 Global Mental Health thus represents the 
intersection of discourses on human rights, social welfare, and cost effectiveness 
on a global scale. 
Generally, the Indian and Kashmiri psychiatrists I met celebrated the 
knowledge being produced by Global Mental Health advocates, particularly 
studies that were based on research from low and middle-income countries.  This 
research was viewed as culturally particular and appropriate, unlike studies 
from the resource-rich West, which were perceived as being impractical to 
implement in a country like India.  Vikram Patel, an Indian psychiatrist at the 
forefront of the movement for Global Mental Health, for example, has pointed 
out that despite the fact that low and middle income countries account for more 
than 80per cent of the world’s population, less than 6per cent of global research 
in mental health focuses on these countries.105   
One study which evaluated community-based care for chronic 
schizophrenics in India argued that such programs were “able to reach out to 
people in rural and impoverished communities, providing tangible benefits in 
terms of improved clinical outcomes, reduced levels of disability, and reduced 
family care-giving burden.”106  This body of knowledge states clearly that while 
“care is often compromised by poor standards of care” in large psychiatric 
hospitals, community-care programs “improve the odds that patients who have 
been discharged are able to recover fully and remain in good health.”107  In other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!104!Patel!2007:!81.!105!Patel!2007:!81.!106!Chatterjee!et!al.!2003;!Murthy!et!al.!2005.!
107 Patel 2007: 91. 
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words, community-based treatment is also justified through a humanitarian 
logic.   
Anthropologists have also participated in and contributed to this body of 
knowledge in significant ways.108  For example, the landmark World Mental 
Health Report, which was written by medical anthropologists, argued for social 
factors such as poverty, social exclusion, and gender, to be taken into account as 
determinants of mental disorders.109  In addition to addressing forms of 
structural violence that disproportionately affect populations in low and middle-
income countries, recent reports have also argued for community-based mental 
health care rather than institutionalized care.   
This research builds on earlier research on schizophrenia by the WHO, 
which argued that persons suffering from schizophrenia in the developing world 
had a better outcome and more benign course than those in the developed 
world.110  Scholars were quick to point out the role of the family as a key reason 
for this, a rationale that had been internalized by Kashmiri psychiatrists as well, 
but this time, in regard to PTSD, not schizophrenia.111  As such, anthropological 
knowledge and the movement for de-institutionalization have been closely 
intertwined, both historically and in the contemporary.  In pointing to these 
entanglements, my aim is to show that anthropologists and cultural knowledge 
are deeply implicated in the creation of “double binds” and predicaments for 
mental health experts. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 Murray and Lopez 1996; Desjarlais et al. 1995; World Mental Health Report 2001. 
109 Desjarlais et al. 1995. 
110 Jablensky et al. 1992; World Health Organization 1973, 1979. 
111 Warner 1985. 
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As Elizabeth Davis has argued in the case of Greece, community-based 
treatment constitutes a “decisive new ethical development” in the history of 
modern psychiatry, given its demand for patient responsibility outside the 
hospital.112  Yet despite Kashmiri psychiatrists having significant qualms about 
institutionalization, they did not embrace de-institutionalization in all its liberal 
glory.  For example, as Davis argues, de-institutionalization envisions the patient 
as a “coherent and fully conscious subject, one endowed with legal rights and the 
capacity to enter and uphold agreements.”113  While concerns about individual 
patient rights and responsibility did emerge in the clinic, I found that they 
usually did not override the desires of kin.   
While anthropologists have been advocates for de-institutionalized care, 
they have also written about the unintended effects of “community-based” care 
in the US and elsewhere.  As Sushrut Jadhav and Sumeet Jain have shown in 
their work on community mental health programs in Uttar Pradesh, these 
programs often envision the “community” as being represented by a rural health 
center.  Yet most rural health centers are located on the outskirts of villages, so 
that for those who live in the area, such buildings are always already outside the 
community.  As such, the village itself – the site of the “community” as an 
anthropologist might envision it – continues to be illegible to the bureaucracy.  
Ironically, the “community” concept, brought in from the social sciences, seems 
to have slipped away from anthropology and become an altogether different 
object in public health policy.114     
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Davis 2012: 12. 
113 Davis 2012: 12. 
114 As Harri Englund has similarly pointed out: “The participatory rhetoric of ‘community-based’ 
and ‘grass-roots’ intervention poses a dilemma to the anthropologist, whose engagement with 
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In India, community-based care has been the centerpiece of the National 
Mental Health Program (NMHP) since its inception in 1982.115  Many of the 
initiatives of the NMHP were found to be unsuccessful, however, leading to a 
“restrategized” program being launched in 2002.  In line with the de-
institutionalization thrust and community emphasis of the earlier program, the 
“restrategized” plan focused on improving psychiatric manpower and training 
in medical colleges, “modernizing” and “streamlining” psychiatric hospitals, and 
information and awareness- building programs to encourage “de-
stigmatization.”116  This time, the government also committed significantly 
greater resources to mental health.  Whereas the 9th Five Year Plan (1997-2002) 
budget for the NMHP had been 280 crore117 rupees, in the 10th Five Year Plan 
(2002-2007), the budget was increased to 1900 crore rupees. 
The Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital in Srinagar has embodied 
many of the material, legal, and bureaucratic transformations entailed by the 
NMHP in an era of de-institutionalization.  These transformations also raise 
several ethnographic questions: how has the hospital been reimagined during an 
era of “community-based” care?  What is the place of the institution during a 
period of de-institutionalization?  In my focus on the asylum, my aim is to point 
to certain obfuscations in the unequivocal commitment to the “community” as a 
site of care.  
A “Center of Excellence” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the poor!takes place within the context of a myriad of projects to improve their lot, some of which 
bear uncanny resemblance to the egalitarian principles of anthropology itself” (Englund 2001: 76). 
115 Cohen 2001: 13. 
116 Agarwal 2004: 5.  
117 A crore is equivalent to ten million rupees.  
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The Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital, or GPDH, as doctors refer 
to it, is located next to Srinagar’s famed Badami bagh or Almond Gardens.  Once 
leisurely strolled by tourists and Kashmiris alike, the gardens are now the 
forbidding site of an Indian Army cantonment.   As with other mental hospitals 
in India, the Psychiatric Diseases hospital has had multiple lives: it was 
constructed as an asylum for mentally ill prisoners in 1957 but the building was 
destroyed in a fire in the 1970s, rebuilt again and destroyed again in a fire in  
March 1996.  In 2003, construction was completed for a new hospital building 
with assistance from MSF, and the hospital reemerged as one of the conflict’s 
frontlines.  From the early 2000s on, the hospital became one of the key sites in 
Kashmir for the practice of humanitarian psychiatry, as MSF and other 
psychosocial experts and organizations began working within, or alongside, 
government psychiatrists. 
 Despite these transformations, for ordinary Kashmiris, the hospital 
remained an asylum (pagal khana), and this was the way that people informally 
referred to the hospital during my fieldwork.  Several male Kashmiri friends told 
me that when they were teenagers, they would buy candies and cigarettes from 
the shops outside the hospital and use them to lure patients, from inside the 
hospital’s barred windows.  They would dare each other to touch the hands of 
the mad, but would invariably get scared and run away.  These stories usually 
drew nervous laughter because the hospital was still seen as a forbidding place.  
The asylum had tentacles, despite structural and bureaucratic efforts to clip 
them. 
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In accordance with the re-strategized National Mental Health Program, 
since 2009, the hospital has undergone another round of comprehensive 
transformations.  It is currently in the process of being remade into a “Center of 
Excellence,”118 a training and research institution for psychiatrists, psychologists, 
social workers, and psychiatric nurses.  The aim is to transition away from the 
hospital as a site of treatment to a site where psychiatric and psychosocial 
manpower can be generated in order to address what are seen as chronic 
shortages.119  According to a 2005 report on mental health conducted by the 
WHO, for example, there are 3,500 qualified psychiatrists in India, or about 0.2 
psychiatrists per 100,000 people.  The report noted that this is significantly lower 
than the global average of 4.15 psychiatrists out of 100,000.120   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Sinha and Kaur 2011. 
119 International public health discourse often emphasizes the lack of psychiatric manpower 
available in LAMIC countries.  The crisis has acquired the status of “common sense” among 
mental health professionals in India and was affirmed by a Supreme Court decision to order that 
took place in the aftermath of the Erwadi disaster, a fire that took place in a private mental health 
clinic in 2001.  26 patients died in the fire because they were chained to their beds and unable to 
escape.  The Supreme Court order (12 April 2002), which called for a survey of all public mental 
health institutions, revealed “severe manpower shortages in all categories of mental health 
personnel,” as well as “the uneven distribution of these scarce resources across geographical 
regions and rural/urban settings (Goel, Agarwal, Ichhpujani and Shrivastava 2004: 13). 
120 Kapur 2004.  India has developed several national and district-level programs to address the!
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The Psychiatric Diseases hospital was one of eleven psychiatric hospitals 
in India to be selected for this transformation after a rigorous grant application 
process.  The hospital’s administrators received a prestigious Rs. 30 crore grant 
to upgrade and build new facilities, including an academic block, library, hostel 
for postgraduate students, laboratories, and lecture halls.121  These changes also 
meant that the hospital was under surveillance in ways that it had not been 
before.  For example, after the Erwadi fire in 2001 (see footnote 116), the Supreme 
Court ordered the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to conduct a 
survey of mental institutions once a decade.122  Data from the 2008 survey of 
mental institutions revealed the following facilities at the Government 
Psychiatric Diseases hospital in Srinagar.  The hospital’s facilities qualified it as 
ranking somewhere in the middle of the 36 hospitals surveyed. 
Domains Reported status as of 2008 
Infrastructure An OPD block has been constructed 
with 3 rooms for consultation, EEG lab, 
haematology and biochemistry lab, 
drug counter, 5 emergency beds, a 
Medical Records section and 6 OPD 
cubicles.  There has also been 
construction of two open wards with 
10 and 20 beds each, an ECT theater, a 
faculty block, a recreational hall and 
seminar room, a counseling center, and 
residential quarters for doctors and 
employees.  Medical records are being 
maintained manually. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!mental!health!manpower!shortage.!For!example,!the!National!Mental!Health!Program!(NMHP)!and!District!Mental!Health!Program!(DMHP)!have!both!been!developed!to!address!massive!shortages!in!mental!health!manpower,!particularly!in!rural!India.!The!vast!majority!of!India’s!3,500!psychiatrists!work!at!the!state!level,!in!urban!settings.!The!DMHP!provides!a!threeSmonth!training!course!in!psychiatry!to!doctors!with!MBBS!(Bachelor!of!Medicine,!Bachelor!of!Surgery)!degrees.!For!an!ethnography!of!a!community!mental!health!program!in!India,!see!Jain!and!Jadhav!2009.!121!National!Guidelines!on!Psycho!Social!Support!and!Mental!Health!Services!in!Disasters!Released!!(Ministry!of!Health!and!Family!Welfare!2010).!122!Writ!Petition!(Civil)!No!334/2001.!
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Amenities and facilities There is broadband internet connection 
in the library.  There are facilities for 
toilets and drinking water and a 
waiting hall in OPD.  Wards are well lit 
with attached bathrooms and dining 
hall.  There is also a generator facility 
in case of power breakdown.  There are 
24 hours casualty and emergency 
services as well as telephone and 
ambulance services. 
Diet/kitchen Diet is free which includes two meals, 
dinner, breakfast and evening snack 
Investigations/treatment There is a separate dispensary for dugs.  
Essential drugs are available for OPD 
patients. 
Staff and training There are 8 qualified psychiatrists, two 
GMOs, two clinical psychologists, 10 
general nurses, 1 lab technician, 5 
administrative staff, and 15 ward 
attenders.  There are no psychiatric 
social workers, trained nurses or 
occupational therapists.  As this center 
is associated with a larger government 
medical college, consultants of all 
disciplines are supposed to be on call 
whenever needed.  The Nurse Warden 
and Medical Superintendent stay on 
campus.  
Recreation/Occupational 
Therapy/Rehabilitation 
A new recreation block has been 
constructed.  There is no rehabilitation 
facility. 
 
The transformations of the hospital infrastructure, from asylum to 
community care to “Center of Excellence,” did not occurred in a neat or linear 
way, but rather, overlapped and pressed upon each other.  Thus, rather than de-
institutionalization leading to the closing of mental hospitals, as in the United 
States and elsewhere, in India, the policy reinvigorated the institution, but not as 
a site of care.  This was justified by the argument that because of the scarcity of 
resources, mental health programs in low and middle -income countries like 
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India needed to “piggy back” 123 on existing institutions and programs, rather 
than build from scratch.  
As such, under the revamped NMHP, legislation and bureaucratic 
interventions have focused on strengthening, expanding, and upgrading existing 
mental institutions, while simultaneously advocating for community-based care.  
In this sense, the transformation of the hospital to a research and training 
institute is far from complete—and indeed, the language of the NMHP is also 
ambiguous in this regard.  While the focus was on building short-term wards, 
long-term wards are still present, where patients are often admitted for years on 
end.  I suggest that the simultaneous revitalization of the institution but 
disavowal of it as a site of care has created a politics of visibility whereby the 
“inside” of the hospital – the closed wards where long-term patients reside – are 
increasingly hidden from view, whereas the hospital’s “outside” – its community 
outreach programs, out patient services and research and training – are 
increasingly under routine legal and bureaucratic scrutiny.  This is a quite 
different configuration of the hospital than Foucault’s description of the hospital 
as a site of surveillance where the gaze envelopes and fixes patients.  In the 
psychiatric hospital, certain blind spots, such as the closed wards, were not 
markings of the failure of the “gaze,” but rather, were constitutive of it.    
The NMHP money was also used towards other beautification projects.  
The hospital lawn was manicured and a new board proudly stated “Lawn 
Development: Under NMHP” (see Fig 3).  For much of my fieldwork, the 
flooring in the hallways of the faculty block was redone, and psychiatrists’ offices 
were repainted.  New desks and swivel chairs made their way into these new !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Patel 2007: 81. 
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offices; cheery, printed curtains adorned the barred windows.  Dr. Arshad joked 
that his room had been turned into a bureaucrat’s office.  This was an ironic 
statement, given that bureaucrats were increasingly divorcing themselves from 
mental hospitals, while some psychiatrists were busy bureaucratizing the 
hospital.  
 
 
 
As the library block was being constructed and the lawn manicured, a 
small tombstone appeared at the edge of this construction.  When I asked the 
hospital’s clinical psychologist, Dr. Huda, about the grave, she said that a patient 
from the closed wards had recently died and no one had claimed his body.   The 
tombstone represented the trace of the asylum that persisted within the hospital 
grounds, despite the efforts at “modernization” underway at the front of the 
hospital.  It was also a gnawing reminder of more graves to come.  It marked the 
Illustration 3: Upgraded Library Block 
The newly built library block in the background and “upgraded” lawn in the foreground at the 
Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital.  Covered parking spaces were also constructed for 
doctors’ cars.  
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inability of the hospital to transition smoothly to a “Center of Excellence,” while 
being unable to contend with its status as an “asylum.” 
As the hospital’s ‘outside’ continued to change and emerge – the faculty 
and library block were the first places that a visitor to the hospital would see – I 
argue that there was a simultaneous process of obfuscation that took place in 
regards to the ‘inside.’  As Sarah Pinto has argued about closed, long-term wards 
elsewhere in north India, rather than a “‘zone of social abandonment,’124 the 
wards were a space of “loss,” of “relation unmaking, an extension of ongoing—
and very human—kin-work.”125  While I agree with Pinto that the closed wards 
were not sites of “social abandonment,” I suggest that they were increasingly 
obscured as sites of bureaucratic, material, or ethical intervention in a moment of 
de-institutionalization.  In many ways, my own presence in the hospital 
embodied these subtle shifts: while I was granted access to the closed, female 
ward for the first few months of my fieldwork, I was later told that the wards 
were “no longer open to researchers.”  The closed wards, male and female, were 
located in a courtyard away from the hospital’s dispensary and OPD, where 
most patients gathered.  As such, they were largely hidden from public view; 
aside from the hospital staff who had duties in the closed wards, other visitors 
seemed to stumble into this space accidentally.  
Fortunately, the time I spent in the closed wards provided me with a sense 
of how it was increasingly separated out from the future “Center of Excellence” 
that hospital administrators envisioned.  This was not only a matter of 
differential space, but also differential bodies: patients and kin who could be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Biehl 2005. 
125 Pinto 2011. 
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treated on an out-patient basis were much more palatable within an era of de-
institutionalized care than those unable to bear the burden of at-home care.  
Unlike the short-term wards, which were “well lit,” according to the National 
Human Rights Commission report I presented earlier in the chapter, the closed 
wards had a different ambience. 
The closed wards were spaces of low visibility, with low lighting and a 
small television that flickered on mute at all times.  The beds were arranged 
dormitory style, and the strong smell of urine and disinfectant mingled together.  
In addition to a few of the female patients, I also befriended the two female 
“wardens” that were in charge of the female ward.  One of them, a recent 
divorcee, was flirtatious with the hospital’s male staff and wore shockingly 
bright red lipstick, which created a stark contrast with her black headscarf.  I 
heard some of the doctors jokingly say behind her back that she was “suffering 
from mania” and “should be admitted to the ward as a patient.”  This was a 
reference to one of the long-term, in-patients in the ward who had also been 
diagnosed as manic and who would reportedly “roam around” her village and 
surrounding areas without the accompaniment of kin.  It was not clear to me 
whether doctors believed that the warden had transmitted her mania to the 
patient, or vice versa.  What was clear, however, was that even for post-medical 
school psychiatrists, notions of madness as contagion were still present.   
In addition to the dilemmas they faced around the democratization of 
expertise through programs such as the NMHP, Kashmiri psychiatrists were also 
deeply affected by the ways in which madness (mot) and politics were 
intertwined in Kashmir.  For instance, while international public health and 
humanitarian accounts encouraged mental health experts to occupy a position 
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that is outside of specific cultural and historical understandings of madness and 
politics, most Kashmiri experts believed that madness was contagious and acted 
in ways that reinforced processes of quarantining it.126     
The days for the female in-patients were punctuated by the call for a 
midday meal, medication, and an evening meal, and in between these times, the 
wards were locked.  During sunny days, sometimes the women were allowed to 
sit on the grass outside for a few minutes before their midday meal.  The contrast 
between the darkened, closed wards, located in the hospital’s innermost region, 
and the brightly lit, “bureaucratized” space of the faculty block was not a subject 
that many psychiatrists spoke about, yet it was a part of the increasingly 
disjointed structure of the hospital.  Many of the senior psychiatrists avoided 
visiting the closed wards altogether, letting the junior residents do sporadic visits 
to the closed wards if and only if there was a medical emergency.  Most of the 
junior residents expressed little hope that any of the long-term patients would 
show an improvement in their condition and were usually astonished when it 
did happen.  During my fieldwork, Zeenat, a nineteen-year old, highly articulate 
female patient who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, made a 
complete recovery and was discharged from the hospital.  When her family 
refused to collect her from the ward, Zeenat filed and won a case for legal 
emancipation.  The doctors who were dealing with Zeenat’s case were shocked, 
but took her to be a miracle rather than an example of what was possible for in-
patients. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 While the Global Mental Health movement often describes stigma as a problem common to 
developing countries, it is perhaps not surprising that stigma is both culturally specific and not 
limited to the non-West.   Jean Jackson (2005), for example, has argued that the uncertain 
ontological status of the chronically ill can incite stigmatizing reactions in North American 
contexts.  This is a rather different manifestation of stigma than the sense of contagion that I have 
identified in the South Asian context. 
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While there were spirited interactions in the closed ward between female 
patients, the wardens and the patients, and occasionally MSF counselors and 
patients, doctor-patient relations were generally minimized.  The lack of 
interaction in the wards became astonishingly clear to me when, while browsing 
some of the closed ward patients’ medical files, I noticed pages and pages of the 
notation, “CST” (Continue Same Treatment), followed by quick signatures.  
When I asked one of the postgraduate psychiatric residents who had signed the 
files about this, he blushed and said that he had not felt the need to go to the 
wards himself—and none of his supervisors expected that of him.  The 
assumption in “continuing same treatment” was that patients in the wards were 
chronically ill, with little scope for improvement.  Their daily needs were taken 
care of by the “wardens” and medicine dispensers.  While long-term residents of 
the hospital received infrequent visitors from kin, the Family Ward – a place of 
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short-term stay – bustled with the presence of kin, many who stayed by the 
patient’s bedsides for the duration of their stay (see chapter three). 
Within the history of mental health legislation in India, closed wards have 
emerged as objects of intervention only in exceptional circumstances, such as the 
filing of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) in the Indian Supreme Court from the 
1980s onwards.127  Amita Dhanda, a legal scholar, has traced Supreme Court’s 
“micromanagement” of mental institutions across the country and argues that 
while there were “umpteen examples of individual beneficiaries of the court’s 
intervention…the statutory regimes allowing for large-scale deprivations were 
not subjected to constitutional scrutiny.”128  The filing of PIL is somewhat of a 
scandal or interruption for hospital authorities, and the Government Psychiatric 
Diseases hospital in Srinagar has also faced the brunt of one such inquiry.   
In May 2012, the Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission 
(SHRC) sent a report to New Delhi over the “messy state of affairs” in the 
Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital.  Among the critiques in the SHRC 
report was the negligence of patient welfare – the poor quality of food was 
mentioned – while “much attention [was being] paid to the office room of the 
Medical Superintendent and labs and lakhs of rupees were spent on it.”129  While 
such reports usually shook up the hospital administrators for a short period of 
time, they did not address the larger structural inconsistencies that produced this 
problem in the first place.  In addition, hospital administrators usually found 
ways of circumventing these periodic injunctions. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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129 Wani 2012.  
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As I have argued so far, the simultaneous existence of high tech 
equipment and labs, on the one hand, and the relatively unchanged confinement 
of the in-patient wards, on the other, helps explain the persistence of cultural 
signs such as the asylum, in spite of efforts to mainstream mental health.  I 
suggest that a regime of de-institutionalization does not mean the retreat of the 
mental hospital, but rather, a selective spotlighting of it, including the marking of 
certain subjects as more worthy of care than others.  In this sense, the asylum was 
not an archaic figment of people’s imagination or continued “stigma,” but 
continued to be part of the new “Center of Excellence.”  In the second part of the 
chapter, I turn to how psychiatrists grapple with these uneven transformations in 
their everyday work.  
Part II:  Embodiments of Expertise  
The processes of de-institutionalization that I described above presented 
certain difficulties for psychiatrists in their everyday work.  First, despite the 
emphasis on modernizing and streamlining the institution, psychiatrists had to 
continue working with long-term patients, who were increasingly eclipsed in the 
move to community-based care.130   
In addition, the turn to “community-based” care was also potentially 
troubling for psychiatrists, for whom this meant a further dilution—or 
democratization—of expertise.  This was because one of the provisions in the 
District Mental Health Program (DMHP), a corollary to the National Mental 
Health Program, called for doctors with MBBS degrees (Bachelor in Medicine, 
Bachelor in Surgery) to be trained in basic psychiatry over a three-month period.  
This was to enable the early detection and treatment of psychiatric disorders at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 World Mental Health Report 2001: 49-51. 
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the primary health care level, a move supported by NMHP provisions to supply 
primary health centers (PHCs) with psychotropics—one of the recommendations 
of the 2001 World Mental Health Report.  In other words, psychiatric expertise 
was democratized through prescription practices, specifically through the 
materiality of the pill.131  As medical anthropologists of South Asia have shown, 
the power to prescribe is a particularly sensitive issue for Indian psychiatrists, 
given that most psychiatric drugs make their way to Indian consumers through 
non-psychiatric and non-expert channels.132   Pills are also significant boundary 
markers between psychiatrists and other mental health professionals, such as 
clinical psychologists and social workers, who work within a team structure but 
do not have the power to prescribe. 
 For psychiatrists, the uneven outcomes of de-institutionalization were 
revealed in fissures between the practice and administration of mental health 
care.  Psychiatrists and bureaucrats each positioned themselves as committed to 
different prongs of the new mental health framework. While most Kashmiri 
psychiatrists supported the upgradation of mental hospitals under the National 
Mental Health Program (NMHP), others were skeptical of the project of 
democratizing expertise under the District Mental Health Program, which might 
lead to a further marginalization of their expertise.133   
One psychiatrist I worked with argued that rather than a form of 
democratization, as was intended, the DMHP trainings only exacerbated existing 
social inequalities, since those who were targeted for the program were doctors 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 Jain and Jadhav 2007. 
132 Ecks and Basu 2009. 
133 The District Mental Health Program was implemented in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 
July 2008. 
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with MBBS degrees, considered at the bottom of the medical hierarchy.  Doctors 
with MBBS degrees were generally viewed as ‘village doctors’ whereas urban, 
middle-class doctors aspired to advanced degrees.  As one of the psychiatrist 
residents I interviewed put it, “An MBBS degree is like a high school degree.  It 
means nothing.”  While psychiatrists expressed ambivalence about the treatment 
of psychiatric disorders by non-specialists at the primary care level, time and 
again, mental health bureaucrats argued that this was necessary for the delivery 
of community-based care.   
Health bureaucrats, meanwhile, were far more skeptical of the “Center of 
Excellence” project than psychiatrists.  Specifically, the bureaucrats I spoke to 
argued that the hospital’s past as an asylum could not be erased.  The nodal 
officer of the NMHP in Kashmir, for example, a psychiatrist-turned-bureaucrat 
named Dr. Wani, pointed out that not just the Psychiatric Diseases hospital, but 
even “prestigious institutions like IHBAS [Institute of Human Behavior and 
Allied Sciences] in Delhi were still stigmatized as the pagal khana [asylum].”  He 
described a past experience of being in Delhi and unsuccessfully trying to direct 
an auto-rickshaw driver to take him to IHBAS.  “I kept saying, ‘IHBAS,’ Dr. Wani 
began.  “But it was only when I said, ‘take me to the pagal khana’ that the driver 
understood.”  Dr. Wani’s comparison to IHBAS was intended to reveal just how 
ossified the idea of the mental asylum was in the minds of ‘ordinary’ people and 
how difficult it would be to replace it with the idea of a “Center of Excellence.”  
His point was made even more forceful by the suggestion that this incident had 
occurred in Delhi, a place generally viewed by Kashmiris as representing a 
future modernity. 
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These tensions between bureaucratic and psychiatric approaches to 
mental health care were also evident at the higher levels of government.  On a 
foggy morning in late January 2010, I attended the first National Consultation on 
the National Mental Health Program (NMHP) since it was re-strategized under 
India’s 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) at the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MOHFW) in New Delhi.134   This meeting, which was chaired by the 
then Secretary, Sujatha Rao, a Harvard-trained product of the Indian 
Administrative Service, brought together mental health activists, NGO 
representatives, academics, and bureaucrats working in the field of mental health 
together under a government ambit for the first time.  While the meeting itself 
was an ethnographer’s delight in terms of the dramaturgy (tamasha) that 
unfolded, there was one moment in particular which captured the ways in which 
psychiatrists and mental hospitals were being undermined by new policy and 
legislation.   
One heated exchange took place between a junior-level health bureaucrat 
and Dr. Vikram Patel, a WHO consultant and a professor at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, on the question of manpower shortages.  In 
response to the bureaucrat’s declaration that “we need to flood the country with 
psychiatric experts: psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and psychiatric nurses,” 
Dr. Patel made a passionate case for abandoning this plan in favor of “skilling 
up” grassroots health care activists (anganwadi workers).  To my surprise, the 
Secretary vigorously nodded along.  In fact, as the meeting progressed, I became !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134!Under!this!“reSstrategization,”!the!District!Mental!Health!Program!(DMHP)!was!expanded!to!over!one!hundred!districts!in!India!and!grants!were!released!for!the!“upgradation”!of!psychiatric!wings!in!Government!Medical!Colleges!(GMC)!and!the!“modernization”!of!26!mental!hospitals!in!the!country.!!
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aware of the new alliances that were being forged between NGOs and the central 
government. At one point, one of the NGO representatives from Karnataka said 
that she had filed a Public Interest Litigation against the State Mental Health 
Authorities in her state since they were ineffectual, which the Secretary 
applauded.  “Yes, you must be very aggressive with them,” she commended the 
NGO representative.   The instrumentalization of the “community” by the WHO, 
as well as the condoning of legal tools to be used to hold local governments 
accountable, exemplified the “ironic alliances”135 forged between social scientists, 
governments, and international public health institutions in India’s liberalizing 
economy.   
 At the end of Dr. Patel’s plea to skill vertically instead of laterally, the 
Secretary put her hands up in the air and said, “So I am going to ask a question: 
and perhaps the sarkari [government] folks won’t like it, but do we still need these 
mental institutions?”  While the bureaucrats and the psychiatrists present 
vehemently objected to the Secretary’s suggestion, the fact that such a claim 
could be publicly voiced revealed the entrenchment of a ‘community-based’ 
model and the devaluation of psychiatric expertise.  This discussion made 
manifest one of the “double binds” at stake in de-institutionalization: a choice 
between the scaling up of expert knowledge in the form of greater 
pharmaceuticalization and diagnosis at the local level, or the lateral development 
of psychiatric expertise in the form of more specialized professionals, and thus 
the reproduction of existing socioeconomic and geographic inequalities.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!135!Riles!2006a:!2.!
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While bureaucrats seemed ready to divorce themselves from the 
institution, the hospital was an “object multiple”136 for the psychiatrists who 
worked there.  For example, although the upgradation of the hospital to a 
“Center of Excellence” was designed to be transformational, it was focused on 
select material and infrastructural projects that were monopolized by senior 
psychiatrists.  In particular, the grant specifically provided for structural 
developments for the hospital staff, not patients.  Out of the 30 crores that the 
hospital received, 18 crores were earmarked for infrastructure, including 
building a hostel for residents and interns.  Under the guidance of Dr. Mushtaq 
Marghoob, the Head of the Department of Psychiatry for most of my fieldwork, a 
new faculty block and library were constructed, along with a behavioral genetic 
and molecular neurobiological research laboratory, advanced Chemistry lab, and 
an area for psychodiagnostics.  While some psychiatrists celebrated these 
changes, others were critical of how the money was being used.  Some argued 
that these changes were personally beneficial to Dr. Marghoob, whose older 
daughter ran the psychodiagnostics lab, while the younger one, a newly-minted 
PhD from Jammu, was hired to run the new, plush, high-tech neurobiological 
research lab.  Some junior psychiatrists complained to me that the money had not 
been dispensed in a transparent manner and that it was being wasted on 
superfluous changes.   
Wounded Healers 
 Another major concern for mental health experts was related to financial 
constraints.  Despite the increased public focus on mental health care, Kashmiri 
psychiatrists suffered the combined effects of low government salaries and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 Mol 2002. 
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stunted employment opportunities due to the conflict.137    In healthcare, as with 
almost every other industry in Kashmir, the government was by far the largest 
employer, with about 20per cent of the state’s educated workforce being 
employed by the state government.138  Meanwhile, the private sector has been 
tightly regulated by the central government.  While most post-MBBS doctors 
supplemented their government salaries with private employment, private sector 
jobs were consistently thought of as secondary to the security and status of a 
government job (sarkari naukri).   
Despite the low salaries, government jobs of all kinds were highly desired 
for the life-long stability and pension benefits they offered.  As such, public 
sector jobs were highly competitive, given the high rates of unemployment 
among the educated.  As Justine Hardy has pointed out, while Kashmiris are 
among the most well-educated in India because of the central government’s 
attempt to “buy the love of the Kashmiri people” through state education, the 
state has produced “thousands of graduates full of ambition but with very little 
employment to temper their expectations.”139  Jammu and Kashmir is also the 
only state in India that has made education free to all its citizens at all levels, 
although literacy at 54 per cent, lacks behind the national average of 65 per 
cent.140   
On a larger scale, official budget figures show that the Jammu and 
Kashmir state government is deeply dependent on the central government for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 In the decade from 1980-1990, that is, the pre-conflict period, the state domestic product grew 
by only 29.5 per cent, whereas the comparable figure for India as a whole was 71.9 per cent.  The 
Ministry of Finance gives a 2001-2002 estimate of per capita net state product at Rs. 13,320, which 
is 33 per cent below the all-India figure for the same year and represents a significant 
deterioration since 1993 (Ministry of Finance 2005). 
138 Schaffer 2005: 27. 
139 Hardy 2009: 27. 
140 Schaffer 2005: 10. 
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funds.  68 per cent of the state government’s revenue receipts in 2003-2004 were 
granted through aid from the central government, a figure that is in line with 
other insurgency-affected states in India.  The controller and auditor general’s 
report estimates the state’s financial liabilities at Rs. 130,380 million in 2004—
over 150 per cent of total annual state expenditures and 63 per cent of gross state 
domestic product.141  In addition to financing state government expenditures, the 
central government has also committed substantial federal funds to revive 
‘normal’ economic activities.142  In outlining these statistics, I want to note, 
however inadequately, the ways in which the Kashmiri economy is deeply 
dependent on the central government of India, a move that is clearly intended to 
delegitimize claims for self-determination. 
Government jobs also required long periods of waiting: waiting for 
examinations, waiting for results, and waiting for job openings that may or may 
not be posted.  This process was exacerbated during the conflict years.  During 
the 1990s, for example, during the darkest days of the insurgency, no state 
medical school examinations were held for seven years consecutively.  As Craig 
Jeffrey has argued in the case of rural unemployed youth in the north Indian city 
of Meerut, waiting required an amount of cultural capital: “the ability to wait 
patiently before cashing in on a social connection or to wait for sons to acquire 
urban jobs depended on people’s knowledge of how fields operated.”143 As 
Jeffrey also points out, however, these tenuous waiting strategies were not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2003.  
142 The Rs. 85,190 million package ($1.76 billion) announced in 2002, for example, included 
funding for railways, roads, support for traditional handicrafts, support payments to military 
and police families, raising two additional reserve battalions, support for Hindu Pandit families 
who were displaced during the early years of the conflict, and economic development in the 
border areas (Schaffer 2005: 13).  
143 Jeffrey 2010: 33-4. 
! 74 !
always successful.  Many Kashmiri doctors I spoke with complained that the 
gaining government employment was not based on merit, but on personal 
networks and connections.  Dr. Surrayah Qadeem, a female doctor I met who 
worked with the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on a contractual basis, told 
me that she had not been confirmed by the Public Service Commission for a 
government job, even though she had “topped” her interviews because her 
father had refused to pay a bribe.  
 Doctors, including psychiatrists, were also confronted with the sense that, 
while illnesses were everywhere, their employment opportunities were severely 
curtailed.  This was a moment of “biomedicine’s inability to address the very 
crises that constitute it.”144  One doctor told me, “Look at the situation we have 
here.  On the one hand, we have qualified doctors who are sitting unemployed, 
and on the other hand, we have posts just lying vacant.”  This was taken as one 
example of the kind of structural madness that had been unleashed in Kashmir 
since 1989.  In one of the district hospitals I visited, for example, there were over 
forty posts that had not been filled because they had not been publicly 
advertised.  The hospital’s only surgeon told me that he worked 48-hour shifts 
and that he had once conducted two operations simultaneously, moving back 
and forth between two etherized bodies.  There was no cleaning staff either, and 
the hospital’s toilets were entirely dysfunctional.  When I asked the 
superintendent of the hospital why the vacant posts had not been advertised, he 
shrugged his shoulders and gave the same explanation that is provided for 
everything that doesn’t work in Kashmir: “Political reasons.  I don’t know why.” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Some of these grievances came to public attention in October 2009, when 
700 junior doctors in Kashmir, members of the Junior Doctors’ Association (JDA), 
decided to strike.  One of their arguments was that while junior doctors in other 
states received a salary of 60,000 rupees, doctors in Kashmir only received 16,000 
rupees a month.  Dr. Anand Singh, a psychiatrist in his early 30s and member of 
the JDA, explained that the JDA had been given written assurance by the state’s 
Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, that the problem would be redressed.  That was 
back in 2005.  Yet no one was surprised when nothing was done.   
The doctors had gone on a “warning strike” two months earlier, but to no 
avail.  This time, the JDA board’s decision to strike indefinitely was unanimous.  
The strike both tapped into – and made visible – a sense of doctors as a 
victimized community.  In this sense, the strike and its pre-existing conditions 
countered humanitarian and Global Mental Health (GMH) assumptions that 
experts were somehow outside of, and apart from, constraints that kept 
communities from developing more ‘modern’ attitudes towards mental health.  
Those narratives did not take into account the ways in which experts were 
deeply affected by the sociopolitical realities unfolding around them.  
The JDA strike galvanized under the slogan of ‘wounded healers.’  
Although the phrase was intended to describe the plight of doctors during the 
strike, it was notable for capturing the state of doctors in general, as working 
within an ongoing – and potentially unending – political crisis.   
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These sentiments were given shape through the speeches given by 
members of the JDA board during the strike: 
“Doctors are not demi-gods.  We are crippled by our workload”-- 
“We’re giving patients the best healthcare, but we cannot continue to give it 
unless the welfare of doctors is also taken care of”-- 
“We sacrifice our health for their health”-- 
“During the 2005 earthquake, people were running for their lives in other parts 
of the state, but we did not run.  We stayed with our patients.” 
“Let any politician or bureaucrat sit with us for just one night in Lal Ded 
hospital!”145  
“We have reduced the number of graves in Kashmir.” 
 “Although we are doctors first, we didn’t do an MBBS degree to work for 
peanuts [lit. to sell chickpeas] outside the houses of bureaucrats”--  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 Kashmir’s only government-run maternity hospital. 
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In contrast to the media coverage of the strike as primarily about equal 
pay, the doctors I met insisted that their intention was not simply to gain 
compensation, but rather, to redress structural concerns.  Dr. Heena, an 
anesthesiologist, told me bluntly: “This is a corrupt state – from the CM [Chief 
Minister] to the MS [Medical Superintendent].”  Heena was also referring to a 
recent study, widely publicized in the Kashmiri media, by Transparency 
International India and the Centre for Media Studies, which ranked Jammu and 
Kashmir as the second most corrupt state in India.146   
Nonetheless, her statement was immediately tempered by another 
colleague, Dr. Ambar, who stated, “But, if we ask ourselves, what would we do if 
we were in those positions [of authority]?  Would we also be corrupt?  I mean, 
we’re not alone either, right? We have families too.  So I don’t think we would 
fight or try to change the system.”  She said all this with an outright frankness 
that made us laugh.  Nonetheless, I think that Ambar and Heena’s position 
captured another “double bind” for doctors in Kashmir: an acute sense of 
injustice married with a sense of commitment to existing structures of hierarchy.  
In other words, it was the sense of being caught in between two unappealing 
choices.  
A few days into the strike, Dr. Anand, one of the junior psychiatrists I 
knew from the hospital, drove me to Srinagar’s Government Medical College 
(GMC), which was being used as the headquarters of the strike.  The strike was 
covered on the front pages of all the major Kashmiri newspapers.147  Doctors 
milled about on the lawns of the medical college, listened to speeches, chatted, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Schaffer 2005: 27. 
147 See for ex. Bhat 2009. 
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and made posters.  I asked Dr. Anand how he and other doctors were coping 
with the ethical dilemma of striking, given that medical emergencies never 
stopped.  “Of course it is a dilemma,” he said, “Unfortunately, patients suffer the 
most…” Then he added, “But emergency services are still on,” perhaps 
reassuring himself as well as me that doctors had not entirely abandoned their 
patients.   
Dr. Anand suggested that we go to the college canteen for a cup of coffee 
and the interview.  The canteen was a bustling, large hall, with sea foam green 
walls and red upholstery and curtains, a classically Kashmiri color combination.  
We sat on a table in the corner, where the remnants of an earlier meal were still 
present: crumbs and splotches of spilt chai.  I asked Dr. Anand more about his 
background.  Unlike most of the other psychiatrists, he was a Hindu – not a 
Kashmiri Muslim – from the city of Jammu.  He was not a native Kashmiri 
speaker and said that he had learned it while in the OPD.  He described his 
comprehension at “about 70 per cent.”  He had moved to Srinagar about three 
years ago, after successfully qualifying to specialize in psychiatry.148  He was one 
of only six psychiatry postgraduates selected in the state that year.  I asked Dr. 
Anand how medical specializations were allocated, and he said that they were 
offered according to merit, and individuals were ranked in state and national 
medical exams.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 Students choose their specializations based on their scores in an all-India medical exam, 
conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), or in state-level entrance exams, 
conducted by individual state administrations.  As such, specializations are decided on scores, 
not necessarily personal preference. The CBSE exam, which takes place in April/May, is 
extremely competitive and takes only 2,500 applicants out of approximately 200,000 who 
compete every year.  
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Radiology was the most popular specialization, Anand said, because, “It is 
very easy.  All you have to do is look at an x-ray and say, ‘Yes, his leg is 
fractured.’  And the machine does everything else.”  Pediatrics and psychiatry 
were also relatively popular, he said, because they were perceived to be like 
office jobs, from “10 am – 4 pm.”  When I asked Anand if this was the reason 
why psychiatry had appealed to him as well, he agreed, “To tell you very frankly, 
I am satisfied with my work because no one dies from a psychiatric illness.  They 
might die from a medical illness, but we can sleep well because we know that 
none of our patients faces mortality.”   
While Anand described psychiatry as a “10 am – 4 pm” job, this was not a 
description that all psychiatrists agreed with.  Others often emphasized what 
happened between 10 am and 4 pm as far more stressful than other medical 
professions.  In particular, while most medical professionals in Kashmir 
described themselves as working within a context of triage in the sense of 
diminished resources, large numbers of patients, and bodily ailments that 
biomedicine could not completely cure, psychiatrists had the additional burden 
of working in a profession that was still marked by “stigma.”  In Kashmir, as 
elsewhere in South Asia, psychiatrists were sometimes called pagalwalé doctors, 
meaning doctors who are “associated with madness.”  This deliberately 
ambiguous term meant that the doctor treated patients who were mad and that 
the doctor him/herself was mad.149   
Medical anthropologists have described medical school as an immersive, 
totalizing process of subjective transformation,150 and many Kashmiri !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Nunley 1992: 206.  
150 Good 1994. 
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psychiatrists described a similar process whereby their earlier prejudices about 
madness melted away.  When I asked a 27-year old postgraduate, Mohammed 
Farooq, about his first impressions of psychiatry, he responded:  
I had mixed feelings about it.  I think I was carrying some stigmas 
associated with it.  I remember seeing a schizophrenic patient for 
the first time and feeling afraid of his disease.  I wanted to protect 
myself from it.  As a doctor, these fears gradually went away and I 
began to understand psychiatry as a very important branch of 
medicine.  Society is full of psychiatric problems, but we see only 
the tip of the iceberg…  
 
For Mohammed, the initial apprehensions towards madness that he carried with 
him could only be overcome by understanding mental illness through the 
biomedical model of disease.  For Mohammad, as for the psychiatric residents 
Tanya Luhrmann worked with, psychiatry provided both a glimpse of, and relief 
from, “exhilarating, terrifying ecstasy and strange irrationality.”151   
Nonetheless, the continuing “stigma” that psychiatrists experienced as an 
outcome of their work became visible in intimate matters, such as marriage talk.  
Their narratives of seeking appropriate marriage partners were contrary to the 
rosy language of progress and modernization that marked the bureaucratic 
future of Indian mental health.  For example, when I asked why there were no 
female psychiatrists in Kashmir, I was told that this was because of “stigma” and 
that a female psychiatrist would have difficulty getting married.  Similarly, 
several male psychiatrists also told me that when they had chosen psychiatry as 
their specialization, members of their family had discouraged them from doing 
so, for the same reason.  As such, stigma was not only located in the lives of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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patients, to be beaten out by progressive doctors, but rather, also intimately 
affected the personal lives of doctors.   
As Michael Nunlely and other anthropologists of South Asia have 
described, this sense of contagion and madness-by-association that psychiatrists 
and patients both experienced emerges from a sense of self that is permeable to 
the moral qualities of others.152 Some of the former drug users with whom I 
worked at the De-Addiction Clinic in chapter five I knew had been forcibly 
admitted to the Government Psychiatric Diseases hospital as patients and 
described how they resented being clubbed together with “mad people” (pagal 
log).  They described feeling that rather than getting better, the madness of others 
would “rub off on them” (hum bhi pagal ho jayenge).  Psychiatric work, whether as 
doctor, patient, or even observer, was polluting.  The lady who ran the guest 
house in Srinagar where I stayed told me, gently but repeatedly, “not to spend 
too much time at the mental hospital.”  As one female doctor who had interned 
at the psychiatric hospital (she eventually chose not to do psychiatry as her 
specialization) told me, “People think it’s contagious.  Pagal log [crazy people] 
and all that.”  Similarly, the vivid memories that my Kashmiri interlocutors told 
about the mental hospital as teenagers, along with the continued presence of 
long-term patients in the psychiatric hospital, suggested that madness needed to 
be continually quarantined.  The mental hospital could be opened, but only 
selectively so.   
Conclusion: The Human Touch 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 By way of conclusion, I want to reflect on one final “double bind” for 
psychiatrists in Kashmir: the sense that while they had a special role to play in 
mitigating the effects of violence, that they were not exceptional, or apart from, 
other healers, such as pirs.  In other words, psychiatrists had to navigate a 
complex landscape where, despite coming to the fore in public debates about 
conflict and trauma, they were marginalized by both bureaucratic regimes of de-
institutionalization and by the help-seeking behavior of their patients.   
Many of the psychiatrists I interviewed drew strength from the growing 
legibility of mental illness in Kashmir and the opportunities that this offered.  
“There has been such a surge in these kinds of problems in our society,” one said; 
and “my interest in this grew because of the current turmoil and the high 
numbers of depressed patients and those suffering with PTSD,” said another.   
Most spoke of violence in the abstract, but Dr. Majid, a 39 year-old MD, 
was one of the few doctors to describe his intellectual journey as a deeply 
personal one.  He told me how, in 1998, four of his neighbors in Bandipora were 
killed one night.  One of the survivors was a three year old girl who lost her 
father, grandfather, and two other relatives. “Her name was Khushboo,” he told 
me quietly.  Khushboo in Hindustani means fragrant.  “And she went into 
mania,” he said and told me that the family was still suffering.   Witnessing this 
tragedy up close had encouraged Dr. Majid to specialize in psychiatry.  I asked 
Dr. Majid what qualities a good psychiatrist needed.  He said that they needed 
the “human touch.”  They needed to, “see the patient as his brother, sister, 
father.”  This knowledge did not come from psychiatric textbooks, he noted, but 
from a person’s own disposition and experiences.  “My parents separated when I 
was three months old,” he said.  “I never saw them together.  My Mamaji 
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[maternal uncle], I owe him everything.  I use my experience as a tool; I am an 
example of someone without a mother or father who has come so far.”  
Nonetheless, Dr. Majid also acknowledged that his approach did not 
happen overnight.  He recalled his days as an intern at the psychiatric hospital 
with a mix of shame and amusement: “ We [the other interns and I] would crack 
jokes and laugh about the patients because we could not understand their 
suffering.  Initially, we had a sense of humor about their problems.”  But later, he 
said, “the issue would trouble us: why are they here?”  Similarly, Dr. Arshad also 
described his days as an intern as puzzling, thereby piquing his interest: 
An an intern, after the initial period of training, I began seeing a lot 
patients with my mentor, Dr. Zaffar.  We saw a lot of patients who 
would come with complaints of headaches.  We would do 
neurological exams, CT scans, you name it.  But the results of these 
tests wouldn’t show anything.  It would have been very easy to say 
to the patient, ‘You’re fine.  You don’t have anything.’  But 
somehow, I was never satisfied with that answer.  How was it that 
a man came all the way from Gurez [a valley about four hours by 
road from Srinagar] to this hospital and he has nothing? 
While other medical specializations could rely on medical tests or technology to 
figure out what was wrong, psychiatrists described their work as much more 
challenging given their reliance on the subjectivity of patients and their kin (see 
chapter three).  Many described history writing as an “art” and said that this was 
the main distinguishing feature between psychiatry and other specializations.   
In addition, psychiatrists also emphasized that they were in the unique 
position, as doctors, of having to practice a “culturally-approved” medicine.  In 
this sense, psychiatrists recognized themselves as competing with other 
practitioners who dealt with the intersection of bodily and mental distress.  
While they were winning this contest from the perspective of science, the 
! 84 !
behavior of their patients suggested otherwise.  This was, again, an 
incommensurable position with the idea that mental health needed to exist above, 
or outside of, specific cultural and political contexts.  Like madness itself, 
psychiatric expertise could not quarantined within the realm of science, it was 
drawn into comparisons with other healing techniques.   
 When I asked psychiatrists about the role of other practitioners in mental 
health – particularly pirs – I received the same answer again and again.  
Psychiatrists regaled me with stories of “quack” pirs, those who had allegedly 
claimed that they could cure HIV or cancer with a single touch.  In general, 
psychiatrists agreed that, “pirs do more harm than good,” that they encourage 
patients to stop taking medication, particularly anti-psychotics, which have dire 
consequences.  Nonetheless, patients continued to visit pirs with aplomb; they 
merely refrained from speaking to their doctor about such visits.  In this sense, as 
much as psychiatrists tried to distance themselves from their patients, they were 
pulled into the same web of contagion, entangled by the same practices they 
sought to eliminate.  Somehow, they were forced into a subject position that 
argued for their indispensability and marginality at the same time.  
As I described earlier in the chapter, Kashmiri psychiatry is unique in its 
location at the intersection of two, transnational movements in mental health: de-
institutionalization/Global Mental Health and humanitarian psychiatry.  I have 
hopefully made clear what is at stake in the move to de-institutionalize and 
democratize psychiatric expertise in contemporary India.  In the next chapter, I 
foreground some further paradoxes of expert subjectivity brought on by the 
introduction of humanitarian psychiatry in Kashmir. 
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CHAPTER 2: LOSS IN MOVEMENT: NEGOTIATING KASHMIR AND THE ‘OUTSIDE’ 
 
Introduction: Beyond “Unshaven, Cigarette-Smoking Frenchmen” 
The image with which I begin this chapter—that of “unshaven, cigarette-
smoking Frenchmen”—comes from an a moment in Peter Redfield’s 
ethnography, in which an Asian-American MSF volunteer expresses her 
frustration toward the distorted image of the humanitarian ideal.153  In this 
chapter, I too provide a counterpoint to the image of the exemplary 
humanitarian as a white, European male who is performing emergency medical 
relief in an “out-of-the-way place.”154   
As anthropologists have noted, in recent years, the constitution of medical 
humanitarianism has shifted significantly to focus increasingly on trauma and 
chronic conditions such as HIV/AIDS.  For example, Didier Fassin and Richard 
Rechtman have described how discourses and practices around trauma 
dovetailed with a rights-based regime in Euro-America, particularly for veterans 
and victims of gender-based violence.  They argued that such convergences, in 
turn, led to the development and globalization of post-traumatic stress disorder 
as a taken-for-granted dimension of humanitarian assistance on a global level.155  
While medical humanitarianism continues to justify its raison d’etre as the 
mitigation of political crisis, natural disasters, and other emergencies, what are 
deemed as necessary within these contexts increasingly includes “psychosocial,” 
not just emergency medical care.156  Thus, psychosocial care, while increasingly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 One of Peter Redfield’s interlocutors, an Asian American former volunteer with MSF, 
describes her frustration toward the distorted image of MSF as a collectivity of (French and male) 
doctors (Redfield 2012).  
154 Tsing 1993. 
155 Fassin and Rechtman 2009. 
156 As Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman have shown, the growth of humanitarian psychiatry 
has been triggered by three major events: (i) the development of psychiatric victimology and 
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identified as part of “emergency” relief, nonetheless requires new rubrics and 
guidelines, both in terms of the length of intervention and measurements of 
success.  In other words, as the gifts of humanitarianism diversify to include 
technologies such as psychosocial care, I suggest that this has radical 
implications for how we understand encounters between experts and victims o 
violence.  
This new modality of humanitarianism in the form of non-emergency care 
thus presents challenges for an anthropology of humanitarianism, which has 
thus far hinged on questions of biopolitics, life, and death.157  This work draws on 
Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt in understanding humanitarianism a space 
of exception in which sovereign power is played out.  In this understanding, 
sovereign power is manifest as the power to give life social and political 
definition, while abandoning other forms of life outside the law as ‘bare’ and 
unqualified.158  While anthropologists have questioned whether people are 
actually reduced to ‘bare life,’ they have documented the ways in which medical 
humanitarian interventions strip people of their political, social, and cultural 
particularities in various contexts.159  
In this sense, the anthropology of humanitarianism is one subfield where 
ethnographic knowledge clearly lags behind humanitarianism in its ability to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
intervention on the scene of assaults and accidents, hostage-taking incidents and natural 
disasters, and the establishment of emergency medical and psychological units in France; (ii) the 
work of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and Médecins du Monde (MDM) in the aftermath of 
earthquakes and wars; (iii) NGO operations in the psycho-traumatology of exile, particularly 
among asylum seekers and victims of torture (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 7-10).   
157 Although questions of life and death have been central to classic topics within anthropology—
including politics, ethics, kinship and religion—in recent years, secular domains of inquiry such 
as ecology, human rights, and humanitarianism have also emerged as key sites for the 
investigation of the construction of valued life.   
158 Agamben 1998; Schmitt 1985.  See also Ticktin 2005. 
159 Malkki 1995; James 2010.  
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conceptualize new formations of intervention and care.  As Nicolas Guilhot 
similarly asks: “the question is…whether the temptation to accuse 
humanitarianism of, alternatively, imperialism or depoliticization simply means 
that we have not yet developed the proper conceptual tools for analyzing politics 
once it is translated into biopower.”160  It is somewhat ironic that the turn to 
humanitarianism by anthropologists may itself be an effect of “a more general 
anxiety regarding the incongruity between the temporal orientation of 
[anthropological] knowledge and that of the changed or changing world.”161  One 
way through this quandary seems to be to transform the temporality of 
anthropological knowledge from a ‘vertical’ to a ‘lateral’ engagement, as 
Miyazaki does in his work.   I attempt to perform a similar analysis in this 
chapter by examining the ways in which humanitarianism is knitted together 
through its more visible (unshaven, cigarette-smoking Frenchmen, emergency 
care, universal knowledge) and less visible (Kashmiri psychosocial workers, 
psychosocial care, particular knowledge) constituent parts.     
While the forms of psychosocial care I describe in this chapter may be new 
to Kashmir, medical humanitarianism is not.  As such, I think it is helpful to 
identify some of its historical precedents.  What I am interested in is thinking 
about how psychosocial humanitarianism is “new” and in what ways it 
resonates with older interventions in the valley?  In responding to this question, I 
want to present the Kashmiri body(politic), as a site of accumulated suffering, in 
the manner that Kashmiris themselves understand their political situation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Guilhot 2012: 99. 
161 Miyazaki 2003: 255.  As Hiro Miyazaki has argued, the quest for novelty on the part of 
anthropologists, whether “through new research objects” or as a move to “put knowledge in 
perpetual motion through open-ended modes of inquiry,” emerges from “an anxiety about being 
behind (Miyazaki 2003: 255). 
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Despite the many differences between humanitarianism as a handmaiden to 
colonialism and its current transnational form, I suggest that a foray into the 
nineteenth century also helps us better understand how medical 
humanitarianism constructs its object of intervention. 
The Adventures of Medical Missionaries  
“Nor does nature, who presents so fair and smiling a face to the 
summer visitor, always treat the inhabitants kindly.  From time to 
time, disastrous fires have swept the city, which, with its wood-
built houses and narrow alley-ways, presents similar opportunities 
for the easy spreading of an outbreak of fire to that afforded by the 
London of the seventeenth century.  Earthquakes occasionally 
occur, floods, with famine in their train, have caused serious havoc 
and much loss of life more than once, while cholera and smallpox 
have decimated the people upon several occasions.  These 
visitations, together with the grandeur of the scenery in which they 
live, have kept the might of natural forces before the eyes of 
Kashmiris and have fostered their apathetic and fatalistic attitude 
of mind.” 
 
-Dermot Norris, Kashmir: the Switzerland of India: A Descriptive Guide 
with Chapters on Ski-ing and Mountaineering, Large and Small Game 
Shooting, Fishing, etc. Newman and co, Limited: Calcutta, pp. 7. 
 
“With all this light there is a deep shadow.  And why should I stop 
and hesitate to mention and to repeat that which comes up first into 
my mind—the disgraceful oppression of the people [of Kashmir].  
Yes, disgraceful to us English, for we sold, literally sold, the country 
into the hands of its present possessors; and selling it; sold with it 
the flesh and blood of thousands of our fellow creatures, --sold 
them into a perpetual slavery”  
-- An anonymous article written in the Christian Intelligencer, 
March 1871162 
While the British refrained from official intervention into the princely state 
of Jammu and Kashmir, the beauty of Kashmir first entered the European 
imagination through the publication of Lalla Rookh, Thomas Moore’s ‘Oriental !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 Elmslie and Thomson 1876: 76. 
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Romance,’ in 1817.163  However, as Ananya Kabir has argued, it was the 
development of photography and its intertwining with colonial imperatives of 
commerce, nostalgia, and control, that transformed the valley from “landscape to 
fantasy” in the middle of the nineteenth century.164   
In 1866, Samuel Bourne, a photographer-adventurer traveled to Kashmir 
and took hundreds of photographs, many motivated by a sense of nostalgia for 
England that the Himalayan landscape inspired. “The freshness, fertility, 
verdure, and sylvan beauty of Kashmir is very great, and seems to remind one 
very forcibly of the hills, and valleys, and green fields, parks and pastures of 
England,” he wrote in one of his weekly Himalayan journal entries.165  Bourne’s 
photographs, which were highly fêted in Europe, are credited with creating a 
taste for Kashmir in the colonial imagination.  Yet Bourne was not the first 
photographer of Kashmir; the British government had used the camera in the 
region earlier for pragmatic purposes, in order to seek alternative routes to 
Chinese Turkestan, which was the source of the highly coveted pashm wool, from 
which Kashmiri weavers then made pashmina shawls.166  These missions had 
limited success, however, since Maharaja Ranbir Singh (1857-1885) jealously 
guarded the trade routes.  As such, colonial interest in Kashmir in the mid 
nineteenth century was marked by a growing interest in high altitude landscape 
photography and adventure tourism combined with excitement over the Great 
Game—competing British and Russian interests over Afghanistan and Central 
Asia in the nineteenth century.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Rai 2004. 
164 Kabir 2004: 71. 
165 Bourne 1866. 
166 Kabir 2009: 66. 
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It was into this milieu that the first British missionaries entered Kashmir.  
Several of the early missionaries to Kashmir are remembered as brave 
adventurers; Robert Clark, for example, who is credited with planning the 
“Kashmir Mission,” was reportedly one of the first Europeans to explore the 
entire region, including Ladak and Baltistan, in 1854.  Clark was also the first 
missionary to the Afghans and had worked for many years in Peshawar.167   
While the Church Missionary Society in Amritsar did not receive official 
government funds for their Kashmir Mission, several governors, including 
Montgomery (1859-1865) and McLeod (1865-1870), privately funded the 
establishment of a dispensary.  At the time, globally, the medical auxiliary of the 
Church Missionary Society was still a fledgling enterprise, with only half a dozen 
hospitals in different parts of the world, most of them manned by a single doctor.  
The Kashmir Mission Dispensary, which Rev. Clark established in 1862, faced 
not only financial difficulties, but also significant opposition from the Maharaja, 
who was highly suspicious of the presence of foreigners in Kashmir, not entirely 
without reason.  For example, until 1872, the Maharaja decreed that all 
Europeans had to leave the Kashmir valley from October to April.  As such, the 
dispensary had to be dismantled after every season and the medicos had to make 
the treacherous journey through the Pir Panjal mountains from Kashmir to 
Punjab biannually.  In addition, the missionaries had to renegotiate a new place 
for their dispensary every year and then had to spread the word about their new 
location to patients.        
 Dr. William Jackson Elmslie, who worked as a medical missionary in 
Kashmir as Rev. Clark’s successor, from 1864-1872, described how other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 Neve 1911: 4-5. 
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limitations were also placed on patients who visited the dispensary: “Sepoys 
were placed at the entrances of all the avenues leading from the city to the 
European quarters…  Some [patients] were allowed to pass on, after giving the 
sepoys some money; others who were caught coming to me were rough handled 
and beaten, some were fined and others were imprisoned.”168  At other times, Dr. 
Elsmlie found himself the victim of rumors intended to curtail patient visitations, 
including that his medicines were made of “swine’s flesh and blood.”169  Elmslie, 
on his part, was also critical of the Dogra regime’s policies towards its Muslim 
subjects—and of British tacit tolerance of this policy—in his diary; as he noted: 
“the Maharaja keeps up an army so utterly disproportionate to the size of his 
country.  He must grind the faces of the poor to sustain such a large permanent 
force.”170 
Despite these rather severe restrictions, Dr. Elmslie’s biography indicates 
that while the missionizing end of things was not particularly successful, a large 
number of Kashmiris received biomedical care during this period.  As he 
describes at the end of the season in 1868, for example, “a period of five months 
and four days, 4161 individual patients have received medical and surgical aid at 
the Mission Dispensary.”171 
From 1872 on, official Dogra policy permitted non-government Europeans 
to remain in the valley for the winter months.  This move helped the Kashmir 
Mission gain credibility and permanence than they had earlier. While Dr. 
Elmslie’s dispensary had been rather basic, with no facilities for in-patients for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 Elmslie and Thomson 1876: 194.  
169 Elmslie and Thomson 1876: 212. 
170 Elmslie and Thomson 1876: 76. 
171 Elmslie and Thomson 1876: 221.  
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example, by the time his successor, Dr. Arthur Neve, arrived in Kashmir, there 
had been significant improvements to the establishment.  A permanent hospital 
structure had been built and had already “made a great reputation” and “spread 
into many channels.” 172  Neve was also impressed with the hospital’s location, 
“perched on an outjutting spur of the Takht-i-Suliman…[it] commands a view of 
the vale of purple glens and snow-cold streams.”173    
 
 Nonetheless, despite the hospital’s location, Neve found the infrastructure 
wanting.  The hospital buildings were “quite unsuitable for big surgical work,” 
the few “string charpoys were hopelessly unsanitary and most patients lay in their 
own garments upon mats on the floor,” and “the assistants were untrained.”174  
Nonetheless, relations between the Dogra regime and British government also 
improved by 1885, when Ranbir Singh’s son, Pratap Singh, acceded to the throne.  
In 1889, the British dispossessed Pratap Singh of his right to rule over Jammu !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Neve 1911 [1984]: 29. 
173 Neve 1911 [1984]: 28. 
174 Neve 1911 [1984]: 32. 
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and Kashmir and established the State Council to administer the State under the 
direction of the British Residency.  Although British involvement in Kashmir was 
far from altruistic, extensive reports about the mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims 
at the hands of their Hindu rulers had mad their way into the British-Indian 
press, enabling the British government to justify this move as a humanitarian 
one.175  In addition, as Chitralekha Zutshi has argued, due to subsequent reforms 
of the land revenue system, including the granting of occupancy rights to 
Kashmiri cultivators, the Residency’s intervention was read by many as being on 
behalf of Kashmiri Muslims.176 
This period of increased British influence in Kashmir coincided with 
Neve’s tenure, a significant portion of which consisted of upgrading the hospital, 
including rebuilding the entire structure in the aftermath of a devastating 
earthquake in 1885.  However, Neve also had to contend with the devastating 
effects of the Great Famine of 1887-89, which ravaged much of the subcontinent.  
In his memoir, Thirty Years in Kashmir, Neve recalled that the scars of the famine 
were still visible on his arrival in Kashmir: “Those who had been through it had 
terrible stories to tell of the suffering, and sinister rumors as to the malignant 
influences at work, intensifying the trouble.”177  Neve’s memoir reveals the ways 
in which the famine and its effect were not understood through the lens of 
contingency, but rather, as part of nefarious government policy to deliberately 
weaken the population and then hide the evidence from public view.  Neve 
recalls one particularly horrifying rumor that did the rounds: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Zutshi 2000: 114. 
176 Zutshi 2000: 114.  
177 Neve 1911 [1984]: 30. 
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There was…a rumor that some hundreds of starving people had 
been purposely drowned in the Wular Lake, to which colour was 
lent by the sudden death of an eye-witness and informer within a 
few hours of making the report.  Though I subsequently met those 
who believed it, the story always appeared to me incredible: but it 
pointed to an alienation of sympathy, and to an intensity of sinister 
suspicion which boded ill for the relation of the poor 
Mohammedan cultivators and weavers with their rulers.178  
 
The account refers to subsequent protests against the Dogra regime which, by 
1911—the year Neve published his memoir—had come to the political forefront 
in Kashmir.  In addition to the “sinister rumors,” Neve also reported on the grim 
aftermath of the famine, evident in the “very scanty ragged garments” worn by 
weavers, the “emaciated bodies of many of the poorer classes,” and the “half-
naked corpses that…[were] lying by the roadside even in the European 
quarter.”179   
In the narratives of both Dr. Elmslie and Dr. Neve, then, the suffering and 
weakened bodies of Kashmiris were on full display, stark in the face of 
inadequate biomedical provisions.  The sense of “urgency” in these accounts—
Elmslie also wrote extensively about the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in the 
1860s—is palpable, and made even more acute by the fact that missionaries felt 
that they were one of the only sources of relief for the ill masses.  Yet, at least 
during Elmslie’s term, their work in Kashmir was constantly curtailed.  During 
the 1876 cholera outbreak, for example, Elmslie recalls visiting “the city almost 
daily, and [doing] what I could to alleviate the suffering of the miserable 
inhabitants, many of whom are daily carried off with cholera.”  Yet when Elmslie 
reaches out to the Maharaja’s representative (Diwan), in the form of “a most 
polite letter, in Persian…expressing my sorrow at the heavy calamity that had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Neve 1911 [1984]: 11. 
179 Neve 1911 [1984]: 31. 
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fallen on his people, and offering him my professional advice, and personal 
assistance, in this trying emergency,” he never receives a response to his offer.180  
As such, despite seeing medical emergencies unfold before them, missionaries 
had to learn how to navigate a tenuous political situation.  Their own mission 
was consistently undermined by the relative success of biomedicine and the lack 
of success of their missionizing endeavors, as well as by ongoing tensions with 
both the British government and Dogra regime.   
 In Neve’s memoir, the post-famine years were focused on rebuilding the 
Kashmir Mission hospital, which took another twelve years and eventually 
included a 140-bed facility, an out-patient building with three operating rooms, a 
bacteriological laboratory, and two consulting room.  Demand for biomedical 
services steadily grew, according to Neve, who described visitations to the 
hospital as a form of “pilgrimage,” comparable to the “great days to which the 
people…look keenly forward” of visiting the Hazratbal shrine, a holy site in 
Srinagar where a hair of the Prophet Mohammed is displayed.181  Neve also 
enjoyed a certain lavishness of detail in his account of the hospital, which 
reminded me of contemporary media descriptions of the Government Psychiatric 
Diseases hospital: 
There is a second pilgrimage center with a special attraction for the 
many who have sore eyes or various surgical complaints, namely 
the Mission Hospital, and the waves of the rising tides begin to lap 
at the gates.  It is scarcely the busiest season, but already 135 beds 
are occupied, and all these in-patients have been personally seen 
before 10 am…  By 12:45 pm, everything is once more in full swing; 
and in one room some private paying patients, including a high 
state official, are being attended to, while operations are being 
performed simultaneously in two other rooms…  By 230 pm, most 
of the out-patients have been treated…and the European members !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
180 Elmslie and Thomson 1876: 196. 
181 Neve 1911 [1984]: 301. 
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of the staff take a hurried lunch… Then again we plunge into 
operating: so far six major and forty minor operations have been 
done… A bad smash is brought in after ten days’ journey, from a 
town where there is a doctor.  “Why did you come?”  “Oh, sahib!  
The doctor wanted to cut off my boy’s leg, and we heard that you 
save legs.”  An antiseptic leg-bath was ordered, splints were 
applied after removing some bone, and the leg was kept on (He 
was able to walk in two months).  And so the hours passed.  By 4 
pm over 350 patients had been seen; but it was getting on for seven 
o’clock before our last operations were finished…  Well, it had been 
a good day’s work.”182 
 
By 1905, another hospital called Elizabeth Newman hospital for women 
was also built, in addition to the Mission Hospital.  The missionary imprint is 
still evident in contemporary Kashmir, as elsewhere in India, through the 
establishment of schools, which are still considered the most elite educational 
institutions in the valley. However, while missionaries clearly identified the 
traction of biomedicine in Kashmir as an effect of the efficacy they provided, a 
retired octogenarian doctor I interviewed in Srinagar, Dr. Naseer, provided a 
somewhat different explanation.  For Dr. Naseer, the ability of Kashmiris to 
embrace biomedicine was linked to a culturalist explanation related to the 
flexibility of religious practices that had historically developed in this region.183  
The same cultural flexibility which had allowed Kashmiri Muslims to worship 
“in both shrines and temples” until early in the twentieth century had also made 
them amenable to new healing techniques, he argued.  
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182 Neve 1911 [1984]: 302-303. 
183 The majority of Kashmir’s population converted to Islam from Hinduism in the fourteenth 
century, and Sayyid Adbur Rahman, who is said to have introduced Islam to Kashmir, belonged 
to the Hanafi order, a school of Islamic jurisprudence that follows the legalist interpretations of 
Imam Abu Hanifa (699-766 AD), who was considered a champion of leniency.  Most Kashmiri 
Sunni Muslims are of the Hanafi persuasion.  However, as Chitralekha Zutshi (2000) has argued, 
schisms between the ‘Hanafi’ and ‘Wahabbi’ first appeared in the 1880s and continued on well 
into the twentieth century.!
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Despite the different interpretations for the traction of biomedicine in 
Kashmir, my aim in presenting these narratives is to suggest the ways in which 
the logic of intertwined bodily and political fate is evident in two, distinct 
historical moments.  However, these two moments also stand in contrast for 
what they reveal about the ability of biomedicine to ultimately save lives.  While 
the missionaries’ attempts to save lives were thwarted by nefarious political 
games and not due to any failure of biomedical technology, in the turn to 
psychosocial care, biomedicine no longer saves lives, but only suggests ways to 
endure suffering.  The language of suffering in Neve’s account of the famine is 
quite different—the emphasis on “emaciated bodies,” for instance—from 
contemporary accounts of trauma in Kashmir—yet there is a sense that 
chronicity is located in the landscape.  In this sense, I want to propose that this 
particular illness-politics etiology might thus be read as the accumulation of 
suffering over time, rather than the sole product of the recent insurgency.  
Psychosocial Healing 
As with medical missionaries who operated in a highly competitive 
market—in which Muslim and Hindu communities each had their own healers 
(hakims and vaids, respectively)—humanitarian organizations offering 
psychosocial care in contemporary Kashmir also have to contend with the 
popularity of other forms of healing.   
The first psychosocial organizations entered Kashmir in 2001-2002, and 
since then, the discourse and techniques of psychosocial care have proliferated 
widely.  Several local NGOs have incorporated a psychosocial agenda into their 
work, whether their focus is on rehabilitating widows or educational and 
funding opportunities for orphans.  The forms of psychosocial care being 
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practiced in Kashmir include psycho-education or awareness-raising programs 
such as public health initiatives and camps, counseling and psychotherapy, 
psycho-diagnostics, such as IQ testing, and more technical psychological 
treatments such as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT).   
These efforts are expressly non-medical technologies of the self.  According 
to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health 
and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, the terms psychosocial 
rehabilitation or psychosocial treatment generally describe non-biological 
interventions for people suffering from mental disorders.184  Globally, these 
treatments have been used to help individuals cope with the emotional and 
interpersonal impact of painful wartime experiences185 or to “re-engineer” selves 
or societies in the aftermath of devastating violence186 or mass political 
upheavals.187  In Kashmir, psychosocial programs have also been adapted to 
supplement state mental health services, which have remained within a 
predominately pharmacological, biomedical psychiatric model.188   
In highlighting psychosocial and psychiatric care as emergent 
humanitarian forms in Kashmir and elsewhere, I am careful to mark them as 
distinct from what Miriam Ticktin calls “regimes of care.”  In Ticktin’s account, 
the “regimes of care” that come into focus are humanitarian exceptions in French 
immigration laws, which give legal residency papers to immigrants who have 
pathologies of life-threatening consequence, if they are unable to receive proper 
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treatment in their home countries.189  The texture of Ticktin’s account is different 
from what I present here, partly because the effects of medical humanitarian 
practices such as diagnosing vary significantly across contexts.  In addition, 
following Sarah Willen, I prefer the language of “deservingness” over care to 
understand relations between Kashmiri experts and their patients, particularly 
since “care” is located within a legal regime, whereas deservingness claims are 
articulated in a “vernacular moral register that is situationally specific and often 
context-dependent.”190  
For example, while diagnoses are matters of life and death for the 
immigrants Ticktin worked with, in Kashmir, patients or clients of humanitarian 
organizations were rarely told their diagnoses and the benefits that these 
diagnoses accrued were also relatively limited.  As I will show, forms of 
psychosocial humanitarianism were not particularly effective as “modes of 
subjectification” or technologies of the self.191  Rather, in practice, both experts 
and recipients of aid curtailed these effects in key ways.   
In April 2010, I accompanied a survey team that had been hired by Action 
Aid, an international psychosocial organization, to evaluate the impact of their 
work on their “beneficiaries.”  One of the houses we visited was in a village near 
the town of Traal, about forty kilometers away from Srinagar.  It was a rainy, 
cold afternoon, and I remember being grateful for the local knowledge of the 
“para counselors” who worked in the area, as we trudged through muddy 
paddy fields and narrow alleyways.  On this day, the team consisted of five male 
consultants, two Action Aid counselors who were from the area, and me.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The house we visited looked well built.   The “beneficiary,” a middle-aged 
woman with sharp features named Saleema, led us to a small shed at the back of 
the house used for grain storage.  We all crammed inside the shed, which was 
already occupied by bags of rice.  Only once we were inside did I notice that the 
walls were ridden with bullet holes.  Saleema told us that this was the place 
where her husband had been killed in an “encounter” killing a few months 
earlier.  Sajad, the head of the survey team, began asking Saleema the standard 
survey questions, which first began with details of her family, and then moved 
on to questions about what kinds of violence Saleema had witnessed while living 
in the village.     
Although Sajad was looking for specific signs that would suggest Saleema 
was traumatized—he probed for symptoms such as disturbed sleep, nightmares, 
headaches, and anxiety—I was surprised by how Saleema managed to maneuver 
the conversation away from the narrow survey guidelines to her own matters of 
concern.  For instance, after Sajad began questioning Saleema about the status of 
her daughters’ education, Saleema interjected: “Actually, we would like to 
receive some thing.”  A little taken aback, Sajad responded, “We are not a 
government agency or anything like that.”   
When Sajad moved on to specific questions about Action Aid’s role in the 
aftermath of her husband’s death, Saleema responded that the organization had 
given the family rice, dal, and blankets.  She did not mention any of the 
counseling that the family had received, even though the counselors had 
previously visited the family were present during this interview.  When Sajad 
finally explained what we were all doing there—that the team was here to 
survey “the damage done”—Saleema pointed to the wall behind her.  “See, this 
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wall, it is like a sieve,” she said. “The question is, do we fix this wall or do we 
take care of our children?”  To this, Sajad replied, “Thank Allah you are alright.”  
This again seemed like a diversion from Saleema’s direct inquiry about financial 
assistance to help repair the wall. 
Saleema, dissatisfied with Sajad’s response, continued: “There is no door, 
there are no windows, nothing is intact.”  After the interview was over, when we 
were back in the car, Sajad confessed that he did not think that Saleema was a 
“worthy victim” because “she was not needy enough.”  His judgment was based 
on the size and the good condition of her house, he said.   
This encounter was striking for a number of reasons.  Both Sajad and 
Saleema were using non-psychological signs to assess claims for the worthiness 
of their cause.  Neither Saleema nor Sajad followed the script of humanitarian 
testimony in the sense of a “subjectivity without a subject” (Saleema) or a 
neutral, impartial witness (Sajad).192  In other words, Saleema refused to be the 
figure of the witness inspiring pity, and instead, insisted on an account of what 
she had suffered on her own terms.  (Unlike Fassin, I do not necessarily think 
that this is an “objective truth of the event” as much as an alternative one).193  
Rather than an incommensurability between recipient and giver, they 
misapprehended each other over the same criteria: the issue of the gift, expressed 
through material benefit.  Saleema deemed the organization “unworthy” in 
terms of what they had offered her; Sajad deemed Saleema unworthy due to her 
relative economic well being.  In leading us into the shed—the very site of 
violence and loss—Saleema challenged the organization to confront her legacy, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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her definition of what had been lost—something that the team was unable to do.  
In pointing to the bullet holes in the wall and her graying hair, Saleema also 
indicated that for her, trauma was located in the “visible” materiality of house 
and body, not the domain of psychological suffering.    
Saleema was not alone in deeming the gifts of humanitarianism 
inadequate.  During visits to the homes of other Action Aid beneficiaries, this 
was a common refrain: the sense that while the organization had provided 
something, much more was needed.  Rather than the survey team dictate these 
encounters, I witnessed benefactors find ways to ask for further assistance, 
particularly monetary and livelihood support.  During this visits, what also 
became apparent to me were the ways in which the organization’s primary 
goal—of providing psychosocial care—was consistently viewed as secondary or 
almost inconsequential in the minds of benefactors.  Thus, in contrast to the gift 
of citizenship that legal exceptions in Europe offered, the most common forms of 
humanitarian assistance given to those diagnosed with PTSD or traumatic 
symptoms in Kashmir were free counseling and medication, emergency relief 
packages, and livelihood support.  None of the immigrants in Ticktin’s account, 
for example, questioned the gift of legal residency, even though this gift 
demanded that they remain debilitated.  In contrast, benefactors like Saleema 
actually refused these gifts.  
Perhaps because psychosocial humanitarianism offers victims of violence 
limited gifts in Kashmir, for those who are performing this work, it requires 
intensive intellectual, linguistic, and pragmatic skill.  Psychoscial care is 
distinguished from other kinds of medical humanitarianism (i.e. emergency 
relief) by the fact that it is much more difficult to measure than a tally of lives 
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saved.  Survey rubrics such as identifying sleep disturbances on a scale of 1-10 
did not translate well in the sessions I observed.  Psychosocial care is also mostly 
performed by national or local staff.  Not only do local or national staff work as 
translators within medical humanitarian organization, but they increasingly 
work as counselors and psychosocial workers—the very doers of 
humanitarianism.194  In an organization such as MSF, for example, national or 
local staff now account for 90 per cent of the total workforce.  In addition to 
disrupting the smoking Frenchman cliché, this development also disrupts the 
assumptions that humanitarian action pivots on “lives to be risked”—expatriate 
humanitarian workers—and “lives to be saved”—local clients or patients.195      
As Didier Fassin and Peter Redfield have both noted, many aid, 
developmental, and humanitarian organizations distinguish between 
“expatriates” and “nationals.”196  In the case of MSF, for example, expatriates 
come almost exclusively from Western countries as volunteers of the 
organization, whereas nationals are local agents who are often considered “mere 
paid employees.”197  While “expatriates” enjoy the freedom of mobility and 
international travel and thus embody the “sans frontières” of the organization’s 
name, “national” employees generally remain immobile, attached to the specific 
context in which they work and live.198  Further, Redfield writes that, “locals 
remained relatively invisible in the group’s public profile, in contrast to the 
international participants who enjoyed ample media attention.”199   
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Unfortunately, anthropology has largely mirrored this politics of visibility.  
When local or national staff do appear in anthropological accounts, they are often 
described as the conduits through which “local cultures and contexts can be 
learned, integrated, instrumentalized and redeployed selectively in NGO 
projects and activities.”200  In this chapter, I argue that local staff are more than 
instruments through which local cultures can be accessed for humanitarian 
organizations.  Rather, they play crucial roles as middle figures in shaping 
humanitarian and medical epistemologies and ontologies on the ground.201  
Further, ethnographic attention to their micro-practices also disrupts critiques 
that humanitarian actors are inattentive to “concrete situations”202 and only show 
concern for universal conceptions of humanity.203  
I argue that the engagement of local and national staff in psychosocial care 
has fundamentally altered the texture of humanitarian practice and expertise.  
Rather than view local or national staff as somehow corrupted versions of the 
expatriate ideal, I am interested in how they make psychosocial humanitarianism 
“land.”  I borrow the metaphor of “landing” from Tim Choy’s ethnography of 
environmental expertise in Hong Kong, as I understand it as capturing the idea 
that expert knowledge is marked by its ability to both travel and somehow 
remain intact.204  In this sense, I am interested in the intellectual, affective, and 
physical labor required to transport knowledge and practices such as “talk 
therapy” across contexts and professions without assuming that they are intact 
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or pure anywhere.  Following my interlocutors, I read this labor through the 
difference between ‘Kashmir’ and the world ‘outside’ (bahar).205  
As with the government officials with whom Tim Choy worked, Kashmiri 
psychiatrists were also acutely aware that, to be credible, their expertise needed 
to “bear universalizing and particularizing marks simultaneously.”206  For 
government officials in Hong Kong, knowledge or statistics about air pollution 
produced in Western metropolitan cities did not sufficiently explain or account 
for Hong Kong’s poor air quality or how to measure it.  As Choy shows, to 
convince the Hong Kong government, international environmental consultants 
needed to embody a truth that  “[scaled] down—particularize[d]—at the same 
time as it scale[d] up—universalize[d].”207  As such, it was not enough to have 
mastery over technical discourse.  Expertise also needed to “land” in order to be 
recognized as legitimate.   
I find the lens of Kashmir and the ‘outside’ useful in thinking about the 
negotiations of scale and the translations required to make humanitarian 
knowledge locally salient.  However, where I depart from Choy is in my 
understanding of the effects of this movement, particularly on experts 
themselves.  Specifically, I argue that what is at stake in the formation of 
psychosocial expertise is not merely a movement between the particular and the 
‘outside,’ but rather, the loss that happens in this movement.  In this sense, I see 
the movement between Kashmir and the ‘outside’ as asymptotic.  In other words, 
in the reach for worldly knowledge, I show how the particular is eclipsed, and at 
times, lost.  Rather than science and medicine be viewed as value neutral or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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objective tools, their use raised questions about personal integrity and existing 
commitments to the particular conditions of Kashmiri psychiatry.  
I note this loss-in-movement in both the practices of psychiatric experts, 
who questioned the use of PTSD therapies on the basis of their cultural 
appropriateness, and in the labor of psychosocial workers, who aspired to highly 
technical, medical forms of care.  In so doing, I point to two constitutive 
paradoxes of psychosocial humanitarianism: first, that the inclusion of national 
or local staff as the doers of humanitarianism depends on their estrangement 
from the particularities of local knowledge—the very reason why they are 
brought in; and second, that the “landing” of the psychosocial actually depends 
on a loss of its form or intactness.  Among the psychosocial workers with whom I 
did fieldwork, for example, I found that while their growing familiarity with 
diagnostic categories and technical, English-language terms enabled counselors 
to perform an expertise that their peers would recognize, it also made it 
increasingly difficult for them to communicate and empathize with their patients. 
However, before I reflect on what was lost in the movement of expert 
knowledge from the ‘outside’ to Kashmir and vice versa, I want to foreground 
how psychosocial and psychiatric knowledge are made to “land” in Kashmir.  I 
want to highlight one of the paradoxes I pointed to earlier, namely the ways in 
which using local or national staff for psychosocial work ends up inhibiting their 
ability to act as cultural mediators.  
During one of my final days of fieldwork, I interviewed Imran, a 
counselor at a local humanitarian organization that specializes in providing 
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psychosocial treatment to victims of violence.  I asked Imran how he would 
improve his practice as a counselor.  He responded, “I would like to prescribe 
medication.” Imran’s statement was surprising because he worked for an 
organization that was committed to providing non-pharmacological care to 
victims of violence.  While Imran’s perspective was fairly common among 
counselors in Kashmir, it was far removed from the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee guidelines on psychosocial treatment. 
One of the enduring challenges for psychosocial workers in Kashmir was 
the fact that their tools – counseling, psychotherapy, and talk – were not 
recognized as legitimate or efficacious modes of care.208  As such, I argue that one 
of the ways in which psychosocial workers succeeded in making this technology 
“land” in Kashmir was through the promulgation of a medical model of care, in 
other words, through an eschewing of psychosocial practices.  In other words, 
counselors appropriated the practices of medical practitioners, not to enhance 
their own prestige, but to make their treatments legible to patients.  In this 
scenario, biomedicine—having already been vernacularized—acted as a more 
culturally familiar buffer to psychosocial knowledge, which was newer and less 
recognized.209   
Specifically, I argue that psychosocial workers spontaneously 
appropriated key practices normatively associated with medicine: diagnosing, 
“(mis)reading” the medical card, and choosing technical, biomedical treatments 
over psychosocial ones.  While these practices were deviations from the standard 
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norms of counseling, they were an instantiation of “ordinary ethics…relatively 
tacit, grounded in agreement rather than rule, in practice, rather than in 
knowledge or belief, and as happening without calling attention to itself.”210  
Further, counselors chose not to use psychosocial tools on themselves, but 
consistently and actively elicited biomedical technologies to understand and 
treat their own (ill) bodies.  In this way, biomedicine cast a long shadow over 
psychosocial humanitarianism, obscuring its potentialities.   
Like psychosocial workers, Kashmiri psychiatrists also developed new 
techniques and debated issues of cultural particularity, especially those 
therapeutic tools that were seen as coming from ‘outside’ Kashmir.   In so doing, 
they were also engaged in making knowledge around trauma and PTSD “land” 
in Kashmir.  Nonetheless, rather than humanitarian knowledge being 
understood as “antipolitics” or as a neutral or universal good, it was questioned 
precisely for its ability to mesh with local systems of patronage and politics.  In 
this sense, those who were seen as overly driven by such ‘outside’ knowledge 
were cast as circumspect in terms of their motivations and as no longer qualified 
to speak of the particular.  Here too a crucial occlusion occurred.  
A Space to Intervene  
As I described in the Introduction, in recent years, in media and human 
rights reports, Kashmir has emerged as a zone of mass psychological suffering.  
Media reports highlight the fact that Kashmir has one of the highest rates of 
PTSD in the world, with approximately one-third of the population exhibiting 
traumatic symptoms.211  Kashmiri psychiatrists have reported exponential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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increases in the numbers of patients visiting the psychiatric hospital in Kashmir, 
from 1,000 per year in 1989 to 100,000 per year in 2009.  Similarly, a 2006 report 
by Human Rights Watch entitled, “Everyone Lives in Fear,” described an 
“epidemic of trauma” underway because of sustained human rights abuses.  
Local human rights NGOs have also emerged as important actors in this space, 
both for producing knowledge about ongoing suffering and victimization and 
linking this to Kashmir’s quest for self-determination.212 
In response to the ongoing “epidemic of trauma,” organizations such as 
MSF—which worked in Kashmir from 2001-2012—and Kashmiri psychiatrists 
alike have conducted epidemiological studies on PTSD and developed 
psychosocial programs to identify and treat Kashmir’s traumatized population.  
In 2006, to identify “needs and support project planning,” MSF conducted a 
survey consisting of 510 semi-structured interviews in two rural districts in 
Kashmir.213  Also in 2006, Kashmiri psychiatrists conducted a survey of four 
districts in Jammu and Kashmir and found a lifetime prevalence of traumatic 
events in 59 percent of the population.214  These reports legitimated PTSD as the 
recognized marker of suffering, and produced Kashmir as a particular 
humanitarian “hotspot,” in need of intervention.215  In other words, in Kashmir, 
as elsewhere, the accumulation of scientifically validated data allowed the 
transformation of trauma from a subjective experience to a “public health crisis” 
worthy of intervention.216 
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In addition to prominent international humanitarian organizations, 
including MSF, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Action 
Aid International, local Kashmiri organizations and the Indian state have also 
developed psychosocial programs for traumatized populations.  As I describe in 
Chapter Five, for example, the Jammu and Kashmir police has established 
several drug and alcohol de-addiction centers across the Kashmir valley, as well 
as a stress management telephone hotline.  Rather than governmental and 
nongovernmental trauma healing efforts occupying completely distinct spheres 
of action, there was significant ideological and personnel traffic between them.  
Humanitarian experts—both local and expatriate—frequently attended 
consultations and meetings with local, state, and national health officials, and 
national staff often switched employment, moving between state and non-state 
organizations.  Given the overwhelming preference for government 
employment, however, most Kashmiris recognized NGO employment as 
unstable and temporary, a fact that was compounded by the fact that most 
humanitarian organizations had a limited mandate, though the contours of this 
mandate were not always clear.  Nonetheless, I heard MSF staff consistently 
affirm their public commitment to not “create a parallel system of government.”  
This was nonetheless sometimes a jarring argument to sustain given the 
significant institutional presence of MSF in Kashmir, the fact that they had 
employed and trained over one hundred local staff, and the amount of time they 
had been in Kashmir (more than a decade). 
Despite the frequent contact between state and non-state officials, many 
administrators of humanitarian organizations—both expatriates and Kashmiris—
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expressed “moral outrage”217 at the state model of mental health care and defined 
their model of “psychosocial” care in explicit contrast to the state model.  A 
senior staff of Action Aid, for example, described their approach as “de-
centralized, de-stigmatized psychosocial care,” contra the institution-based, 
pharmacological model offered at the Psychiatric Diseases hospital.  This Action 
Aid staff member described the woefully long lines at the OPD of the state 
hospital and the fact that many psychiatrists lacked empathy for their patients, 
spending only a few seconds or minutes with them. 
In addition to quantifying and evaluating the extent of psychological 
trauma in Kashmir, psychosocial organizations and experts also had the added 
task of “awareness raising,” that is, introducing concepts such as trauma, 
depression, and talk therapy, to the Kashmiri public.  In this case, trauma and 
mental health had to be first created as ontological entities—different from 
Kashmiri concept of madness (mot) or suffering (pareshani)—before they could be 
intervened and acted on by these organizations.218   To this end, in 2005, MSF 
began producing a Kashmiri radio soap opera called “Hello, Brother Hello” 
(Alaw Baya Alaw) that focused on raising awareness about mental health issues in 
Kashmiri society, which ran until 2012.  MSF also held annual camps in public 
parks on World Mental Health Day (October 10), which included a staged 
performance and poetry and drawing exhibits by school children.   
In terms of treatment, in 2001, MSF also began offering psychological and 
counseling treatments at the state psychiatric hospital, which were hitherto 
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nonexistent.  The hospital authorities provided MSF with a counseling cell, but 
counselors continued to be dependent on psychiatrists for referrals.  Many of the 
hospital psychiatrists were skeptical of the efficacy of psychotherapy, and, thus, 
referred patients only occasionally.  The enduring tensions between the 
medically dominated “outside” of the hospital and the counseling-dominated 
“inside” of the counseling cell led MSF to ultimately abandon its mission at the 
hospital in July 2011.  However, they continued to do counseling in their own 
standalone clinic in the district of Kupwara until May 2012.  In an interview with 
a Kashmiri journalist, the project coordinator of MSF provided a somewhat 
cryptic explanation for MSF’s departure from Kashmir: “We do see there are still 
needs to be met.  It’s not that we’re saying that everything’s perfect in Kupwara 
district.  But sometimes we have to make difficult decisions.”219  As with MSF, 
Action Aid also attempted to strike a balance between working within and 
outside state institutions.  Although Action Aid deputed counselors to various 
district hospitals, they also had a cadre of 60 “paracounselors” doing door-to-
door counseling and providing emergency aid relief kits in local communities, 
such as the ones who had worked with Saleema.   
Other experts trying to fill the gap in psychosocial care delivery attempted 
to bypass the psychiatric establishment altogether.  Justine Hardy, a 
psychotherapist specializing in conflict trauma, who has a deep personal 
attachment to Kashmir, established an NGO called Kashmir Life Line and Health 
Center in 2009.  She located the organization explicitly “outside” the medical 
domain.  Her organization’s website states that psychiatrists were simply 
“medicating” the problem of trauma, “literally, with very high doses of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tranquilizers, sedatives, anti-psychotics, and anti-depressant drugs.”220  In 
addition to face-to-face counseling, Kashmir Life Line also began offering 
telephonic counseling.  There were no psychiatrists involved in the daily 
functioning of Kashmir Life Line—unlike the other NGOs such as Action Aid 
and MSF.  The two staff supervisors, who I will introduce later in this chapter, 
were a Unani doctor and a Swiss psychotherapist.   
Further, to remove all traces of the medical, Hardy renamed the eleven 
counselors who worked for Kashmir Life Line “listeners,” because she felt the 
counselor label was already too formal and professionalized.  This chapter draws 
on fieldwork conducted with the listeners of Kashmir Life Line, because this 
organization was explicitly envisioned as being outside of the psychiatric 
domain, yet it shows the ways that the medical model asserts itself in 
psychosocial care, even in cases in which psychiatrists are not directly involved.  
 
One of the most obvious and tangible effects of the production of a mental 
health crisis in Kashmir was a newfound demand for individuals with 
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psychology or social work degrees who could be employed as psychosocial 
workers in humanitarian organizations. Typically, the job postings for 
psychosocial workers in humanitarian organizations required an MA in 
Psychology or a Masters in Social Work (MSW).  Administrators of psychosocial 
programs often lamented the difficulty of filling these positions with qualified 
persons, although it appeared that disciplines such as psychology and social 
work were gaining in popularity.  This also represents a major shift in 
humanitarian practice, away from a cadre of volunteers to a professional 
workforce.  Although counselors staffed the bulk of psychosocial organizations, 
when compared with psychiatry, counseling was still a new and relatively 
unknown profession in Kashmir.  This was one of the reasons why psychosocial 
workers experimented with medical techniques in their everyday work and felt 
that it may make their practice more culturally familiar. 
The Heavy Diagnosis 
One of the medical or psychiatric practices most borrowed by 
psychosocial workers was the act of making diagnoses.  In this context, 
psychiatric diagnoses were objects of concern not only for psychiatrists, but for 
other mental health experts as well.  However, for counselors, the diagnosis cut 
both ways—it could be empowering or disempowering, an avenue for agentive 
action or the curtailing of it.  The diagnosis was a heavy presence, sitting like a 
stone on the front of a person’s medical card. 
Dr. Arshad, an M.D. in Psychiatry who I introduced earlier in the 
dissertation, has trained Action Aid’s counselors in Kashmir since 2002.  He told 
me that he had trained Action Aid’s counselors to become “barefoot 
psychiatrists.”  He told me proudly that one of the senior psychiatrists from the 
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hospital had gone to visit Action Aid’s PTSD clients, but the doctor had been 
unable to change a single diagnosis.  “All 23 PTSD cases were correctly 
diagnosed by the counselors,” Dr. Arshad said triumphantly.  He described the 
senior psychiatrist’s chagrin when he found that he did not need to change a 
single diagnosis.  For Dr. Arshad, diagnosing was the accomplishment of a 
complicated hermeneutic process, usually acquired after years of medical 
training.221  That the counselors had gained this skill without formal medical 
training suggested that they were “really something,” as Dr. Arshad put it.   
I had the opportunity to witness one of Dr. Arshad’s training sessions, in 
which he attempted to impart the art of diagnosing to Action Aid’s counselors. “I 
know what the DSM [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] 
says about depression,” he began, “But what do people say?”  The counselors 
had offered some responses—heart palpitations, aches and pains, headaches, 
which Dr. Arshad had written on the whiteboard. Looking at the list, Dr. Arshad 
had said, sounding very much like a medical anthropologist: 
So, it is clear that no one comes to you with depression as it is 
defined in the DSM-IV. No one comes to you and says, “Doctor, 
I’ve had depression for two months.” No. People will talk about 
somatic complaints; they will describe themselves as physically ill 
… Then, the question for us really is, how do we explain this 
somatization of mental health? Why do people talk in somatic 
symptoms? [Long, silent pause] You see, to explain oneself 
psychologically, you have to have an in-depth understanding of the 
psyche, which is absent in Kashmiri society … and secondly, the 
language of distress in our culture is somatic.222  
 
In this explanation, Dr. Arshad called for counselors to put aside their careful 
study of the DSM, that is, textbook knowledge, in favor of attending to what 
would be present in the clinic: the language of the body.  Imparting this “clinical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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intuition”223 to counselors—and thus potentially rendering psychiatrists 
redundant—did not make Dr. Arshad particularly popular among his peers.  As 
such, Dr. Arshad viewed himself as a Promethean figure, wrestling psychiatric 
knowledge away from psychiatrists and potentially paying a high price for it. 
This was a case in which a particular psychiatric skill—diagnosing—was 
deliberately passed on to counselors to enhance their practice.  However, there 
were other cases in which the diagnosis did not play such an empowering role in 
the lives of counselors.  At other times, the diagnosis was deliberately kept in 
view, even if it meant that counselors had to curtail their own interventions.   
One such incident occurred at the Stress Management Helpline, which 
was inaugurated in March 2011 as an extension of psychosocial services offered 
by the Jammu and Kashmir Police.  As I describe in chapter 5, since 2008, the 
Jammu and Kashmir Police have been running a Drug De-Addiction Clinic as a 
public outreach initiative.  Although the clinic was located within the auspices of 
the police headquarters, the clinic’s staff attempted to maintain a sense of 
independence from the police through methods such as guaranteeing patient 
confidentiality.  Both the staff and senior police administration believed that the 
telephone helpline, as opposed to an in-patient treatment center, could provide 
greater anonymity for those suffering from mental illnesses, and that the helpline 
could reach a broader base of people, not just those struggling with substance 
abuse problems.  Maintaining anonymity was of great concern to those suffering 
from mental illnesses, given persistent stigma attached to certain forms of 
madness. This was made more difficult by the fact that caring for a sick person 
was usually a relational matter, involving both immediate and extended kin !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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networks.  For example, it was extremely rare that a person would come to a 
mental health center alone.  
The Stress Management team—those running the telephone hotline—was 
comprised of a number of counselors and was managed by a clinical 
psychologist, Dr. Muzzafar Khan. The counselors had M.A. degrees in 
Psychology and had each received a short course in telephonic counseling.  
Although the emphasis was on building empathetic listening skills, the 
counselors would often draw on medical or psychiatric knowledge.  For 
example, during one of the weekly review meetings, one of the counselors, 
Mudasir, described an hour-long phone call he had had the previous week.  The 
caller, a young woman, had detailed a nine year long and troubled history of 
mental health problems. Over the years, she had received a number of different 
diagnoses, including depression, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  She had been treated by the most famous 
mental health experts in Kashmir, including the current Head of the Department 
of Psychiatry at Kashmir’s Medical College, and even by Mudasir’s supervisor, 
Dr. Muzzafar Khan.  She had also had nine rounds of electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT).  Yet she felt no improvement in her condition. As he was relaying this 
information to the other staff members, Mudasir’s voice dropped. “I told her I 
could not do anything for her,” he said.  At this point, the caller hung up. 
The discussion following Mudasir’s narration was led by a visiting expert 
from Mumbai, a female counselor with over ten years of experience with 
telephonic counseling. She thanked Mudasir for sharing his case, and told him 
that he had ended the call long before the caller had actually hung up. “You 
checked out of the conversation as soon as this woman told you her diagnoses,” 
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she said.  Using Mudasir as an example, the visiting expert encouraged all the 
counselors to treat each phone call as “a fresh case,” because by “focusing on 
past treatments and diagnoses, they were blocking their own capabilities as 
counselors.” Yet while the visiting expert saw Mudasir’s gesture as a mistake, 
Mudasir argued that his refusal had been a deliberate calculation. 
For Mudasir, this young woman’s psychiatric history was 
insurmountable.  In a later interview with me, he explained: if these other 
experts—people he admired—had failed to help this woman, what could he 
possibly do?  In this act, Mudasir operationalized a particular schema of the 
mental health field, in which psychiatry and clinical psychology occupied higher 
positions than counseling and social work.  This hierarchy of knowledge was 
reinforced by the fact that psychiatrists and clinical psychologists tend to have 
greater educational qualifications than counselors and social workers and also 
earn significantly higher salaries.  In this sense, while the telephone helpline may 
have shaped the subjectivity of Mudasir and the caller, it did not produce a new 
set of skills or capabilities as Vinh-Kim Nguyen has described in West Africa, but 
made counselors more attune to their own limits.224  
As Renu Addlakha has shown, although mental health professionals in 
South Asia privilege the multidisciplinary model of mental health care in theory, 
in practice, this model is often subverted and debated.225  However, while 
Addlakha argues that it is often psychiatrists themselves who “cut into the 
collaborative work culture of the clinic,”226 the example of Mudasir is useful in 
showing how those on the “lower” rungs also hold up the hierarchy.  In this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
224 Nguyen 2010: 47.  
225 Addlakha 2008. 
226 Addlakha 2008: 3. 
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sense, given that both psychiatric and psychological knowledge had failed to 
help this young woman, Mudasir chose to avoid what he felt would inevitably be 
another disappointment in a long history of failed treatment.  Rather than read 
Mudasir’s decision as simply checking out or a refusal to treat, then, I would 
argue that, in not acting, Mudasir understood himself to be behaving in an ethical 
manner.  This example also complicates the category of “lives to be saved”227 in 
the sense that not all lives are worthy of being saved.  Mudasir did not refuse to 
save a life; rather, he saw himself as helpless to act. 
The Art of “(Mis)Reading” 
A second medical practice that was actively emulated by counselors in 
Kashmir was the act of “(mis)reading” patients’ medical cards.228  I call this 
process “(mis)reading” to highlight the fact that there was something missing for 
counselors in the act of reading: comprehension.  Although counselors 
themselves were unable to read or comment on patients’ medical cards, they 
mimicked the reading practices of doctors because they recognized that this was 
a significant yardstick of biomedical care for patients.  As a result, this 
performance of psychiatric expertise was an attempt to make non-biological, 
psychosocial interventions more legible to those they were treating by 
incorporating aspects of the medical model within them. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
227 Fassin 2007. 
228 As I describe in chapter 3, each hospital produces its own medical cards, which are slightly 
different from each other. Medical cards have to be bought by patients for a small sum, usually 
between two and five Indian rupees. The cards are generally blank, except for the name, age, and 
place of residence of the patient written on top by an administrator. Generally, doctors will write 
patient complaints (“c/o”) on the card, diagnoses (tentative or established), and the prescriptions 
and ongoing treatments. Patients are expected to carry these cards with them for follow-up visits 
as doctors encourage patients to maintain a paper trail. 
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During the course of my fieldwork, I accompanied the listeners of 
Kashmir Life Line to a district hospital, about an hour’s drive from the capital, 
Srinagar, where they had been provided with a small, dingy room to do 
counseling.  There were two counselors who shared this room at any given time, 
and they were dependent on doctors in the OPD for patient referrals.  The slow 
trickle of patients led one of the listeners to comment, “I bet even the doctors 
don’t know what counseling is.”  The other counselor described how, a few days 
earlier, a fellow passenger in the communal SUV-taxi to the hospital had asked 
her what she did.  When she had said that she was a counselor, the man had just 
“looked at her blankly.” 
Both these statements reveal counselors’ self-perceptions about their work 
and its illegibility in the Kashmiri context.  According to the first counselor, 
many doctors themselves were ignorant of what counseling is, making it all the 
more frustrating that psychosocial workers depended on doctors for referrals.   
This illegibility and lack of trust between psychiatrists and psychosocial workers 
also came to light within the space of the psychiatric diseases hospital, where 
humanitarian psychiatry – in the form of MSF’s counseling cell – was a troubling 
presence.    
For example, Kashmir Life Line, the psychosocial organization started by 
Justine Hardy, had its roots at the psychiatric hospital, where she began a trauma 
healing project in the winter of 2009.  She brought two Reiki healers from the UK, 
and in collaboration with the psychosocial organization Action Aid, worked with 
patients who had been diagnosed with PTSD.   
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However, when I asked hospital psychiatrists what they thought of Hardy’s 
project, they were mostly cynical.  One described it as “placebo effect.”  When I 
cited the fact that some patients had experienced a significant improvement in 
their symptoms, another said, “Well, who wouldn’t want to be treated by a white 
lady doctor?”  Eventually, Hardy parted ways with the psychiatrists of the 
psychiatric diseases hospital, and decided to establish her NGO without the 
collaboration of any psychiatrists, a decision that no doubt made her work in 
Kashmir significantly more difficult.  Given the historical and contemporary 
meddling of outsiders in the affairs of Kashmiris, all non-Kashmiris, particularly 
Indians and foreigners, were automatically suspicious in this context.   
The refusal of patients to recognize non-pharmacological treatments as 
legitimate forms of care compounded the difficulties that psychosocial workers 
faced.  Counselors routinely complained that in addition to the difficulties of 
working with trauma survivors, they also had to deal with everyday, persistent 
communicative difficulties generated by the fact that most patients were 
unfamiliar with counseling techniques or the English language.  In particular, the 
Illustration 
6:  Hardy 
giving 
Reiki 
healing to 
a patient 
at the 
hospital, 
December 
2009. 
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high level of client participation expected in psychotherapy was in sharp contrast 
to the much more culturally familiar mode of passively receiving biomedical or 
religious treatments or cures.  Further, in addition to the struggles of translating 
somatic distress into psychiatric symptoms, counselors also struggled to translate 
technical, English-language concepts like “cognition” or “emotion” into Kashmiri 
or Urdu.229   
As Stacey Pigg has described in the case of HIV/AIDS awareness 
programs in Nepal, activists and NGO workers expressed a preference for 
English-language terms over their Nepali equivalents because English was 
considered the appropriate and transparent medium to explicate a theory of 
disease.  Further, when English terms were translated into Nepali, Sanskrit-based 
neologisms were used rather than colloquial Nepali, thus creating a third, 
entirely new idiom to communicate (although most did not understand this 
highly technical Nepali) HIV/AIDS to a Nepali audience.  In Kashmir, while 
there was not the creation of a “third” language, nonetheless, I noticed how 
English language terms such as “stress” and “tension” made their way into 
everyday Kashmiri parlance, sometimes with quite different meanings than what 
counselors meant by them.230 
  In many of the sessions I witnessed, counselors gave up trying to find 
vernacular equivalents of these words and continued to say them in English, 
even though patients did not understand.  Several also verbalized a preference 
for working with English-speaking clients, for whom they did not have to engage 
in such elaborate translation.  With first-time clients, the situation was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
229 For a similar struggle over translating terms associated with HIV/AIDS in Nepal, see Pigg 
2001. 
230 Cf. Halliburton 2002.  
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particularly difficult.  One counselor described the experience like this: “Even 
after spending a precious half an hour or hour explaining counseling to a patient 
and doing a session with them, they turn around and say, ‘Okay, we can do all 
that. But can I have my medicine now, Doctor Sahab (Sir)?’” In calling all mental 
health professionals by this name, “Doctor Sahab,” patients situated doctors and 
counselors within the same category of medical professional and, thus, probably 
expected similar outcomes.  Rather than contest this categorization, most 
counselors allowed themselves to be called “Doctor Sahab” or “Doctor Memsahib” 
and tried to incorporate more doctor-like practices (daktari kam) into their 
counseling. As Amar Dhand has pointed out in his study of NGO interventions 
around heroin addiction in New Delhi, the English word ‘doctor’ has a range of 
meanings, spanning from medical professionals in government and non-
governmental settings to intravenous drug users (IDUs) who are particularly 
skilled with needles.231 
For these reasons and more, counseling at district hospitals was an 
extremely challenging task.  Because counselors were dependent on doctors in 
the OPD for referrals, they spent a long time waiting.  When patients did wander 
in, many of them did so accidentally, looking for the OPD or dispensary.  When 
psychosocial workers received a patient referral, they were often not told why or 
were given incomplete information.  During one of my visits, for example, the 
hospital’s pharmacist brought in a distraught fifteen year-old girl from an ethnic 
minority (Gujjar) community and said, “She has ingested poison,” and left.  
Initially, the Kashmir Life Line counselors panicked, thinking that she needed 
immediate medical attention.  It was only after questioning her for a few minutes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 Dhand 2006; Pinto 2004. 
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that they learned she had consumed rat poison three days earlier.  This radical 
uncertainty further encouraged counselors to rely on what was tangible and 
written: the medical card. 
While the interaction between psychiatrists and patients was usually 
focused on the medical card (see Chapter Three), in the training sessions I 
observed, psychosocial workers were actively encouraged to literally, put aside 
the medical card.  They were taught to take the first few minutes of the session to 
greet the patient, make eye contact, and embody an empathetic listening posture.  
Although such guidance was rigorously reinforced in training sessions, which 
often included role play, the reality of counseling sessions was quite different.  
As they were accustomed to doing with doctors, patients would usually hand 
over their medical cards to counselors first, while expecting little or no verbal 
communication.  Rather than putting the card aside as they had been instructed, 
however, counselors would attempt to read the card, thereby replicating the 
familiar encounter between doctor and patient.  Listeners “(mis)read” the card, 
as they could not follow the messy, shorthand scribbles of doctors.  As 
elsewhere, in Kashmir as well, doctors’ handwriting veered toward the illegible. 
In a group discussion with listeners from Kashmir Life Line, I asked them 
what would happen if they did not read the card.  One of the counselors piped 
up: “We can’t do that!” he said, shaking his head vehemently. “But you can’t 
understand what the card says?” I asked again.  The counselor spoke again, this 
time more slowly. “No, we must show them [the patients] that we are reading it.  
They want us to read it.  Otherwise they’ll think that we don’t care.”  The 
counselor equated the practice of “(mis)reading” the medical card as a practice of 
care, directed not toward enhancing his own knowledge of the patient’s history 
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but toward improving the patient’s perception of the encounter by changing its 
aesthetic form.  In other words, listeners diluted their own counseling techniques 
in favor of a biomedical performance they felt patients would prefer.  This move 
resonates with Michael Nunley’s insight that mental health experts in India feel a 
greater need than experts elsewhere to satisfy client expectations, particularly 
because of the general lack of recognition of mental health care vis-à-vis more 
established biomedical practices. 232  At the same time, my research also updates 
some of Nunley’s findings, particularly in showing how the dovetailing of client 
expectations and practitioner practices have cemented a particular form of 
biomedicine in South Asia: one that is deeply material, enacted through receiving 
biomedical treatments, rather than through Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), 
for example, which stresses a person’s ability to modify his or her own behavior.  
In the counseling sessions I observed with the clinical psychologist, Dr. 
Huda, at the hospital, for example, she would often draw out what she called the 
“logic of CBT” for her patients, particularly those who were less educated.  While 
the drawing was meant as a communicative aid, it exemplifies some of the 
communicative difficulties experienced by professionals such as Huda in 
navigating between English and Urdu/Kashmiri concepts: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
232 Nunley 1996. 
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In the drawing, the upward curves represent the “irrational” [Eng.] urges 
felt by a patient suffering from OCD, for instance, the desire to wash hands 
repeatedly.  The desire, Huda explained, keeps rising until it reaches a point of 
intolerability (nahin bardash).  However, through practicing restraint—that is, if 
the person did not give into the “irrational” desire to wash—the urge would 
gradually dissipate.  The curves in the drawing get smaller to represent the fact 
that every time a person is able to withhold the urge to wash, the strength of the 
desire is itself reduced.  While I could not assess the efficacy of the drawing as a 
teaching tool in Huda’s sessions with patients, the language used, particularly 
the combination of English and Urdu (“situation” and “nahin bardash”) suggested 
that it was best suited for middle-class patients, who were familiar with both 
teaching aids such as graphs and charts, as well as the seamless combination of 
English and Urdu. 
Treatment Potentialities 
How did psychosocial workers come to produce a form of psychosocial 
care that was paradoxically medicalized?  This process was neither entirely 
spontaneous nor planned, based on my observations of the group sessions I 
Figure 3: Nahin bardash 
 
Huda’s drawing of the 
CBT model to a patient 
suffering from OCD.   
 
Nahin bardash is an Urdu 
phrase which means 
unable to tolerate. 
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observed.  Nonetheless, there was an undeniable tug towards technical, 
biomedical practices that the listeners seemed drawn to, despite receiving advice 
to the contrary.   
To better illustrate the dramaturgical aspects of this meeting, I provide an 
excerpt from my field notes.  The two supervisors of Kashmir Life Line 
mentioned are Dr. Arif Khan, a doctor of Unani medicine, and Christine 
Huettinger, a Swiss psychotherapist who has been living in Kashmir for the past 
eight years.  
The Kashmir Life Line and Health Center is located in an upper-middle 
class, residential neighborhood in Srinagar. The doors of the house are 
painted red and the walls are powder blue. I can still smell the paint, the 
whiff of newness. Dr. Arif, one of the supervisors of Kashmir Life Line, 
receives me at the door and we go upstairs to a room where I find 
Christine and the listeners sitting in red plastic chairs arranged in a circle. 
Dr. Arif tells me that the listeners are in the process of making their case 
presentations of patients they saw the previous week. All the presentations 
are in English. 
 
The first speaker, Nafisa, begins her presentation in a loud and clear voice. 
She says that she will discuss “MDD” [major depressive disorder]. She 
lists a range of symptoms associated with MDD—decreased motor 
activity, lack of modulation in voice, suicidal thoughts, and decreased 
appetite. These she divides into two categories, the “affective” and 
“physical.” In the “affective,” she lists pessimism, self criticism, and 
worthlessness, amongst other examples. In “physical” symptoms, she lists 
loss of pleasure, crying, and indecisiveness. She ends the presentation by 
saying that for severe depression, the appropriate intervention consists of 
medication and CBT.  The next presentation, which is about drug 
addiction, follows a similar format. The listener uses “affective” and 
“physical” symptoms to structure her presentation. She also ends by 
offering CBT as the appropriate intervention. Both presentations sound 
like they are straight out of a psychology textbook. 
 
After the presentations, everyone claps. Dr. Arif opens the floor up for 
questions. Christine, the other supervisor and a trained psychotherapist, 
begins. “Both of you mentioned CBT in your presentations. What is 
CBT?” she asks the whole group. One of the male listeners answers, 
“Cognitive Behavioral therapy?” “Yes, that’s right,” Christine says. 
“And how do you use CBT?” 
 
The listeners are silent and some of them respectfully lower their gazes, 
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blushing. No one responds. Christine continues, making her tone more 
gentle, “Both of you said CBT. We don’t have to just say CBT. There are 
lots of other therapies and methods we can use. Remember the woman who 
we saw at the hospital [the woman with the MDD diagnosis]? Remember 
the expression on her face when we spoke about her deceased husband? She 
smiled and remembered him fondly. We can use that memory positively to 
get her out of this state. We don’t always have to go for the most technical 
treatment.” 
 
At this point, Dr. Arif interjects. “So, no knows the different steps of 
CBT?” he asks.  “Go and read up on it tonight.”  He turns to Christine 
and me with a look that says, “Problem solved.” 233 
 
This somewhat uncomfortable friction of knowledges was striking for 
several reasons.  For one, it demonstrated the ways in which psychosocial 
workers in Kashmir navigated psychosocial and medical knowledge in ways that 
were quite different from someone like Christine, who embodied aspects of 
Kashmiri-ness that the counselors were themselves unfamiliar with.  Since her 
marriage to a Kashmiri eight years earlier, Christine had been living in a remote 
village in Kashmir.  She had gained fluency in Kashmiri, learned how to work in 
the fields and take care of a rural household, and had also mastered the nuances 
of a feminine Kashmiri habitus, such as tucking her scarf over her forehead and 
behind her ears.  Given her mastery of these subtle feminine manners, the first 
time I had seen her, I had thought that she was Kashmiri—since her light skin 
tone and eyes did not necessarily disqualify her.  It was only once she began 
speaking English that her German-tinged accent gave her away. 
Christine felt more Kashmiri than the counselors, the majority of whom 
were from urban, middle class backgrounds and had been educated in English-
medium schools.  She joked that they could not understand her Kashmiri 
because it was “too colloquial” and “rustic.”  In private conversations, Christine !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
233 Field notes, June 6, 2011. 
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also expressed her worry that the counselors were being drawn into medical 
idioms, despite her best efforts to point them to simple, psychosocial techniques, 
such as empathetic listening.  She was protective of the Kashmiri life that she 
knew and experienced, while also being aware of the class and geographic gulf 
between her and the counselors.  In other words, her imagination of the 
particular was fundamentally different from how the counselors understood 
‘Kashmiri culture.’      
Meanwhile, the counselors and Dr. Arif seemed surprised by Christine’s 
contestation of CBT as an appropriate therapy for cases of depression.  What was 
more recognizable and appealing to them was to acquire—rather than avoid—
specialized biomedical and psychological knowledge.  As Pigg has similarly 
described in the case of Nepalese HIV/AIDS workers who seemed to cling on to 
arcane scientific facts about the virus, scientific knowledge is the “magnetic north 
toward which all compasses are now compelled to point, no matter which forests 
of meaning people may be dwelling in.”234  There was pleasure to be had in the 
pursuit of esoteric, scientific knowledge; for listeners this came in the form of 
CBT. 
At the time of my fieldwork, there were only two clinical psychologists in 
Kashmir trained to administer CBT, one of whom was Dr. Huda.  CBT had cache 
power, and the listeners expressed their desire to possess it.  Although this desire 
was in line with global trends in psychosocial care, in which CBT has emerged as 
the “therapy of choice” for a number of mental illnesses, including depression, 
eating disorders, and OCD,235 I argue that this was also in line with “local” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
234 Pigg 2001: 510. 
235 Holmes 2002: 288.  However, some practitioners have argued that the popularity of CBT 
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demands for technical, biomedical treatment.  In this sense, in encouraging the 
counselors to “go read up” on CBT, Dr. Arif was arguing that psychological or 
psychiatric knowledge should not be confined to particular individuals but, 
rather, should be shared.  From this perspective, learning CBT would make them 
better counselors, just as learning symptomatology from their U.S. psychology 
textbook would help them understand the workings of Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD).   
Nonetheless, my observations of counselors in the clinic did not 
necessarily suggest that the familiarization with technical terms or therapies 
made listeners more patient or empathetic.  Rather, it seemed to have the 
opposite effect.  As counselors became more conversant in the technical, English-
language of their textbooks, the desire and ability to translate those concepts into 
Kashmiri or Urdu were less appealing.   In other words, as they continued to 
perform biomedical authority in a way that their clients would recognize, the 
more they desired biomedical languages and techniques, not psychosocial ones.   
Counselors were not alone in their negotiations of intimate and ‘outside’ 
knowledge.  In describing the epistemological transformations necessary to make 
psychosocial care land in Kashmir, I also tried to show how national staff play an 
increasingly important role in the making of humanitarian and biomedical 
knowledge.  However, entry into this technical language not only structured 
relations with clients, but also the ways in which psychosocial workers 
understood their own ailments.  For Kashmiri counselors, exposure to the 
psychiatric or psychological models of disease and treatment were just as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
should not be mistaken for its higher effectiveness vis-à-vis other therapies but, rather, because of 
its more successful “manualization” as compared to other psychotherapies (Holmes 2002:288). 
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transformative as an anatomy class is for medical students.236  In Kashmir, the 
biomedical model is the language through which counselors not only understand 
their clients, but the way that they relate to their own bodies and ill health. I take 
an example from my field notes: 
One of the listeners, Noor and I shared a ride to Kangan [District 
Hospital] in a “Sumo,” a communal SUV-taxi service. We arrived at the 
hospital at 9:30 am, and I am surprised when Noor stopped at a corner 
shop near the bus station to buy a large packet of Lays Sour Cream and 
Onion potato chips. During the first two hours, no one came to the 
counseling room—so we had an opportunity to chat. 
 
Sensing a slow morning, at 10 am, Noor rolled her eyes, which she had 
artfully painted with thick black eyeliner and tore open the packet of chips. 
“I’m so hungry,” she said. “I shouldn’t be eating these … .” Thinking that 
she was referring to junk food, I agreed, “These chips are really addictive.” 
Noor shook her head and said that she has “stomach problems.” She 
described her long history of stomach ailments and said she has seen many 
doctors. Finally, she visited the most famous gastroenterologist in 
Kashmir, who told her that her problems were related to acidity caused by 
junk food. He encouraged her to change her diet. 
 
“I used to be a lot worse,” Noor continued, “I would eat oily samosas off 
the roadside. But now I only eat one packet of chips per week when I come 
to the hospital.” (From Noor’s mischievous smile, it seemed that this was a 
slight understatement.) 
 
Although she had visited the best specialist, Noor wasn’t totally convinced 
by the gastroenterologist’s explanation that her stomach problems were 
simply reducible to acidity. She said that although she has been taking the 
medication he’s prescribed her—and somewhat altered her diet—she 
doesn’t feel healthy. “I still don’t feel totally okay.” I asked her what would 
convince her that she was okay, and she said, her eyes brightening, “What 
I really want is an endoscopy. Not just any endoscopy, but a digital 
endoscopy. Then I will really know if I am sick or not.” As our 
conversation continued, Noor laughed and said, “I don’t know what’s 
wrong with me. I have this feeling like I’m dying or something—that there 
is a cancer growing inside me—or that I am really, really sick for some 
reason. I don’t know why!”237  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
236 Good 1994. 
237 Field notes, July 24, 2011. 
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Like Imran, with whom I began this chapter, Noor expressed her desire 
for health and wellbeing through the language and technology of biomedicine.  
A digital endoscopy, which she believed would reveal the truth of her illness, 
was a technology not yet available in Kashmir; she would have to travel to New 
Delhi to avail herself of it.  I read Noor’s appeal to an expensive, out of reach 
technology—rather than the gastroenterologist’s suggestion to change her 
dietary habits—as part of a local medical ontology, which both psychosocial 
workers and patients draw on.  In particular, this ontology was defined by the 
sense that medical science was not “outside” of the environment in which it was 
practiced but, rather, deeply influenced by it.  For Noor, for example, a digital 
endoscopy was appealing precisely because it existed outside of Kashmir, and 
thus was not likely to be contaminated by the ongoing climate of sociopolitical 
uncertainty and violence.238   
Those Kashmiris with the financial wherewithal increasingly travel to 
New Delhi or other metropolitan areas to achieve a purer context for care—and 
by extension, a better—treatment.  Many use tertiary care centers (called Super 
Specialty Hospitals) for even routine check-ups, despite the fact that the cost of 
treatment is prohibitively high in these private centers.  Although this pattern of 
behavior is likely to be found in other parts of the global South, my interlocutors 
always reminded me that the need to seek treatment elsewhere was because of 
immediate concerns that it was impossible to be healthy in Kashmir.  I 
understand this logic as a “net” of medicalization that encloses Kashmir in 
illness. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
238 Hamdy 2008. 
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In the following section, I describe how questions of Kashmir and the 
‘outside’ were also central to negotiations between psychiatrists. 
Making PTSD 
While some Kashmiri psychiatrists—as Kashmiris in general—held 
outsiders in a gaze of suspicion, many had also gained a degree of celebrity in an 
era of medical humanitarianism.  Organizations including Save the Children, 
Action Aid, the ICRC, and MSF, frequently called upon local psychiatrists to 
work as consultants on projects and train psychosocial workers.  In 2010, Dr. 
Arshad traveled to international psychiatric conferences in Lisbon and Kobe, 
where he had won a prestigious award for his research on PTSD in Kashmir.  
While such travel was not unusual for Kashmiri businessmen, it also impressive 
for someone like Dr. Arshad, who would have been subject to a cumbersome 
regime of bureaucratic passport control. 
However, while psychiatrists publicly instrumentalized trauma and 
PTSD, behind closed doors, the concept remained controversial.  One of the 
critiques presented to me by psychiatrists themselves was that the diagnosis of 
PTSD said more about the person wielding the tool than for those for whom it 
was supposedly being wielded.  This was remarkably similar to critiques that 
anthropologists have made about humanitarianism, that it “indicates more about 
the moral sentiment of the witness than about the experience of the victim.”239  
Put another way, while the global mobility and celebrity that the diagnosis of 
PTSD offered to psychiatrists was undeniable—“PTSD is our bread and butter, 
”Dr. Arshad once said to me—its deployment was not viewed as apolitical.  As !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
239 Fassin 2011: 204.  Nicolas Guilhot (2012: 94) also questions whether this problem may well be 
common to all historical interpretation.  
! 134 !
such, I argue that attention to the micro-politics of PTSD and its attending 
therapies, and not just its deployment as a clinical diagnosis, reveal deep ethical, 
intellectual, and generational differences between psychiatrists.  It also reveals 
the ways in which a humanitarian sensibility has become a necessary component 
of the self-presentation of Kashmiri psychiatrists.  
 While anthropologists of trauma and humanitarianism have provided 
rich literature on the effects of the deployment of a diagnostic category like 
PTSD, we know less about the intricate micro-politics involved between experts 
as, or before, the clinical definition becomes a tool.  One of the questions that 
motivates me here is: what is at stake in the transformation of PTSD as a tool of 
practice?   
Some scholars have pointed to the fact that the globalization of PTSD 
depends upon its successful appropriation into local political agendas,240 
however, I am interested in how Kashmir and its ‘outside’ are implicated in these 
discussions.  Finally, these debates center on questions of cultural 
appropriateness, and so doing, challenge conventional anthropological critiques 
of humanitarian knowledge. For example, questions of what to adopt from bahar 
or “outside” Kashmir appeared frequently in discussions about knowledge and 
therapies around trauma, as well as in the everyday frictions between the 
hospital psychiatrists and MSF staff.  As such, like the environmental consultants 
that Tim Choy worked with, questions of local appropriateness of particular 
technologies were often already folded into discussions around the politics of 
expertise.  
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One chilly morning in December 2009, I arrived at the Government 
Psychiatric Diseases hospital to attend a lecture that was to be given by a visiting 
psychiatrist, Dr. Zaffar Ali.  Dr. Zaffar, a Kashmiri psychiatrist, had been trained 
at the Psychiatric Diseases hospital in the 1990s, but had immigrated to the US 
where he now worked as the Director of Inpatient Psychiatry at the Department 
of Veterans Affairs in the Bronx.  All the hospital’s psychiatrists were present 
and had arranged themselves appropriate to their rank in the office of the current 
Head of the Department (HOD), Dr. Mushtaq Margoob.  The post-graduate 
students sat shoulder-to-shoulder on couches near the far wall, the female staff 
sat at the front of the room and giggled on cue when Dr. Margoob made a joke, 
and the senior-most staff sat closest to the gas heaters.  I made my way through 
the crowded room and sat next to Dr. Huda, the clinical psychologist who also 
happened to be Dr. Margoob’s daughter.  
Dr. Zaffar was clean shaven and wore an olive green North Face fleece.  
His lecture was on the uses of exposure therapy in cases of PTSD, which he 
delivered in perfect English, with a slight American accent.  He explained that 
exposure therapy was the opposite of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), the 
latter’s aim being to “prevent a response [to a stressor].”  In contrast, in exposure 
therapy, the patient was exposed to the traumatic stressor over and over again, in 
order to change their response to the stimuli.  The aim was to address one of the 
main symptoms of PTSD: an increased arousal to (and avoidance of) stimuli 
recalling the traumatic event.  “You have to continually train the brain to accept 
this memory as normal,” Dr. Zaffar explained.  “The aim is to prevent a response 
that is maladaptive to one that is more normal… in other words, to reintegrate 
the act into memory.”  Dr. Zaffar cautioned that exposure therapy was extremely 
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risky and that it may only be appropriate for thirty to forty per cent of PTSD 
patients.  However, he said that he had successfully used exposure therapy to 
treat US war veterans who experienced an intense fear of subway trains in New 
York by encouraging them to ride the trains during the day, when the cars were 
less crowded.   
After Dr. Zaffar’s lecture, some of the senior psychiatrists spoke.  To my 
surprise – since I had not heard many psychiatrists question the authority of 
those more senior to them – their tone was questioning.  Dr. Wani, a consultant-
level psychiatrist interjected first: “You have to consider the particular context of 
Kashmir, and in the case of chronic traumas, exposure therapy can be contra-
indicative.”  Another asked: “If we have a PTSD patient, can we take them to a 
family member’s grave for exposure therapy?”  Before Dr. Zaffar could respond, 
another snorted, “This is what the faith healers are already doing!”  Given the 
derogatory ways that psychiatrists spoke of faith healers – many said openly that 
they thought faith healers perpetuated, rather than abetted people’s mental 
distress – this was a particularly harsh comment.   
The general consensus among the senior psychiatrists seemed to be that 
exposure therapy could not be adopted in Kashmir.  The younger psychiatrists 
sat quietly, imbibing the knowledge of the elders.  Dr. Margoob, who had 
convened the lecture, interrupted and said that, on the other hand, they could 
not afford to reject all knowledge that came from outside.  Rather, the question 
was, as he put it, “how to translate between the ivory tower and the OPD.”  This 
juxtaposition was striking: the “ivory tower” was the place where cutting-edge 
therapies and theories originated, whereas the “OPD” was marked as the ground 
where these theories were enacted, the gritty and more real ‘local.’  On a broader 
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level, the “ivory tower” also marked that which was “outside” Kashmir, whereas 
the “OPD” became a shorthand for Kashmir.  The discussion had moved away 
from being Dr. Zaffar’s lecture about a specific therapy for PTSD to a generalized 
debate about the circulation of biomedical and psychiatric knowledge and 
whether or not this circulation needed to be controlled in particular ways.   
  Later, over cups of hot, milky tea in the hospital canteen, Dr. Arshad, Dr. 
Zaffar and I sat together in a booth, and continued the conversation about the 
politics of knowledge around PTSD.  I knew that Dr. Arshad and Dr. Zaffar were 
close, as Dr. Arshad had told me how Dr. Zaffar had mentored him in his early 
days as an intern at the hospital.  I asked Dr. Zaffar about the reported epidemic 
of PTSD in Kashmir.  He began outlining a history of PTSD as it related to 
Vietnam War veterans in the US and said that the recognition of psychological 
suffering in the form of PTSD was an important step forward for “humanity.”  
However, he also pointed out that important differences had emerged in the 
literature between civilian and combat PTSD:  “Combat PTSD has been shown to 
be a severe illness, producing high levels of irritability amongst sufferers.  In the 
US military, we have seen that the biggest risk takers are usually those most 
prone to developing PTSD.  This has come to be known as a ‘trauma 
personality,’” he explained.  However, in civilians, PTSD was being looked at 
quite differently.  “With civilians, what is often emphasized is the role of culture.  
Earlier in Kashmir, people said that there would not be PTSD because of the 
intense religiosity of the population.  But several standardized assessments have 
shown that PTSD is an epidemic here,” he said, confirming the epidemiological 
studies that Kashmiri psychiatrists and organizations such as MSF had 
conducted.     
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At this point, Dr. Arshad corrected him:  “But Kashmiris who develop 
PTSD tend to do better than those who develop PTSD elsewhere.”  When I asked 
why, Dr. Arshad said that there were probably three reasons.  “One reason is 
social and family support – which is tremendous.  Second, those who develop 
mild PTSD will probably never seek treatment.  Thirdly, people are able to give 
meaning to the trauma,” he said.    “Give meaning?” I asked.  “What do you 
mean by that?” Dr. Arshad answered, “The sufferer thinks of him or herself as 
belonging to a larger society.  There is a sense of identification with others who 
have been traumatized.  There is solidarity among victims.”  This solidarity came 
from the intertwining of a biomedical and political narrative in Kashmir, which 
largely absolved victims of both responsibility and agency and instead situated 
them as being caught within a confluence of malignant forces.  
Dr. Arshad then turned to Dr. Zaffar and said that he would like to use 
the families of disappeared persons241 as a sample group of those suffering from 
“complicated grief.”242  He said he wanted to develop a psychopathology scale to 
assess symptoms that might be particular to this population in Kashmir.  His 
intervention was striking because it went substantially beyond the interventions 
of the psychiatrists earlier.  Rather than simply trying to particularize Dr. Zaffar’s 
supposedly universal knowledge (from the “ivory tower”), Dr. Arshad wanted 
to use a particular phenomenon – Kashmir’s families of disappeared persons – to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
241 According to the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), a Kashmiri NGO, 
approximately 7000 persons are thought disappeared from Indian-controlled Kashmir. 
242 As per psychiatric knowledge, “complicated grief” is a condition in which the symptoms of 
grief and loss may linger or become debilitating with time.  Unresolved, protracted, complicated, 
or traumatic grief as it is called, includes features of both depression and PTSD. The most 
characteristic symptoms are intrusive thoughts and images of the deceased person and a painful 
yearning for his or her presence. Other complications are denial of the death, imagining that the 
dead person is alive, desperate loneliness and helplessness, anger and bitterness, and wanting to 
die. 
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generate a new, universal diagnostic category.  This move is familiar to medical 
anthropologists, who have similarly attempted to empirically test the boundaries 
of “culture-bound” syndromes, for example. 243 
Put together, these moments also suggest that psychiatrists in Kashmir 
have crafted their practice to be distinct from the normative, American 
neuropsychiatric model of disorders found in their DSM manuals.   Although 
they do not use the term “ethnopsychiatry” themselves, in the debate following 
Dr. Zaffar’s lecture, their words suggest an awareness of “psychiatry as a 
historical product, a culturally shaped savoir-faire among others.”244  However, 
given that Kashmiri psychiatrists were not explicitly drawing upon a tradition of 
ethnopsychiatry, it would be unfair to characterize them as practicing a variation 
or derivation of, a more normative, American psychiatry, simply because they 
invoked “culture” in their discussions.  I do not want to imply that.  Rather, 
drawing on the work of Cristiana Giordano, I suggest that, just as the 
ethnopsychiatric project in Italy is haunted by an ambivalence and based on an 
instrumentalization of ‘culture,’ this is also a characteristic of Kashmiri 
psychiatry.  However, unlike the ethnopsychiatrists that Giordano worked with, 
I suggest that Dr. Arshad was able to glimpse the limits of processes of 
translation and instrumentalization of the culture of the ‘Other’ that are at the 
heart of the psychiatric endeavor.  
While the psychiatrists’ rebuttal to Dr. Zaffar’s lecture was based on a 
sense of cultural appropriateness, in this instance, the ‘Other’ who was being 
implicated was not the patient, but the pir (“This is what faith healers are already !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
243 Sushrut Jadhav, a psychiatrist and medical anthropologist has undertaken a similar project 
using the dhat syndrome, an established South Asian culture specific neurosis.  See Jadhav 2007. 
244 Coppo 2005 in Giordano 2011: 236. 
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doing!”).  In other words, the objection was not that exposure therapy was too 
foreign to Kashmir, but rather, that it did not offer psychiatrists enough of a 
distance from the practices of healers, with whom they were in competition.  In 
other words, the problem was not so much about how to make exposure therapy 
more relevant or culturally grounded for Kashmiri patients, but rather, how to 
better distinguish psychiatrists from pirs.  
 As such, there were different stakes involved for psychiatrists in 
comparison to the counselors I discussed earlier in the chapter.  While both 
counselors and psychiatrists were occupied with questions of legibility and 
cultural appropriateness, their response to this puzzle depended on their relation 
to biomedical knowledge.  Counselors were keen to borrow biomedical practices 
in order to make their psychosocial work more familiar and recognizable, 
whereas for psychiatrists, there was a need to maintain a clear demarcation of 
boundaries between religious healers and psychiatrists.  At least some of the 
ambivalence that psychiatrists experienced towards knowledge from the “ivory 
tower” was produced by the uneasy balance between Kashmir and the outside 
that had to be maintained.  To fully embrace “cultural practices,” such as 
encouraging patients to visit the graves of deceased family members, would strip 
psychiatrist of their particular expertise.  At the same time, theories that were too 
rooted in the “ivory tower” were also not useful either; the way that Kashmiri 
psychiatrists had to make use of these tools was fundamentally different from 
the way American psychiatrists like Dr. Zaffar were using them.   Interestingly, 
while psychosocial workers evaluated knowledge on the basis of how their 
clients would receive it, psychiatrists evaluated knowledge based on how 
effectively they could instrumentalize it. 
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In fact, Dr. Zaffar’s own career trajectory embodied some of the tensions 
between Kashmir and the outside that psychiatrists grappled with.  Like the 
counselors I described earlier, whose relationship to technical, biomedical 
knowledge was incomplete, I suggest that for psychiatrists, a similar process was 
at work.  Although Dr. Zaffar had clearly “made it” as a psychiatrist – he lived in 
the United States and worked for the US government, no less – that success had 
also distanced him from what psychiatrists interpreted as “the OPD,” or 
Kashmir.  For example, while Dr. Zaffar expected there to be an epidemic of 
PTSD in Kashmir because “several standardized assessments” had shown it to be 
so, Dr. Arshad qualified this assertion with a more ethnographic account of how 
Kashmiris were coping with their PTSD symptoms, emphasizing the role of the 
family and community and the fact that most Kashmiris who exhibited traumatic 
symptoms went undiagnosed.  These qualifications prevented Dr. Zaffar’s 
knowledge of US veterans from “landing” in Kashmir in a straightforward way.   
Thus, while Kashmiri psychiatrists described PTSD as their “bread and 
butter,” its deployment was much more controversial than what this mundane 
analogy implied.  In addition to the circumspection around particular PTSD 
treatments, the local production of expertise around PTSD could also be viewed 
as an act of self promotion.  One senior psychiatrist – who I will call Dr. X - was 
describing as having an “over-healthy ego” in regard to his work on PTSD.  On 
several occasions, particularly when there was a foreign expert visiting the 
hospital, I, along with all the hospital’s psychiatrists, was called on to witness Dr. 
X’s work on PTSD.  Deeply influenced by a humanitarian ethos, the video closely 
resembled the visual material and podcasts that organizations such as MSF 
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routinely produced to document and promote their work.245  Nonetheless, MSF’s 
videos promoted their work through a “neutral,” informative tone and tended to 
focus less on the acts of any individual doctor or practitioner and more on the 
activities of the team as a whole.  What was surprising about Dr. X’s video – 
aside from the fact that it was the handiwork of one particular psychiatrist – was 
its much more bombastic note. 
   The video began with text informing the audience that, in the winter of 
2005, a village called Wartego in northwestern Kashmir had been devastated by 
an earthquake and severe snowstorms.  The text faded to a summer scene, a few 
months after the disaster.  Amid tall, green grasses and imposing mountains, 
images of children in tattered clothing, wrinkled and tanned men and women 
entered the frame.  This juxtaposition of suffering Kashmiris against a beautiful 
landscape has become a stock image used in media and humanitarian publicity 
tools, the latest in a long history of symbolic appropriation that Ananya Kabir 
has documented.246  
Suddenly, a white SUV appears and a narrator tells us that, “hope comes 
in the form of psychiatrists.”  Four or five psychiatrists get out of the SUV and 
make their way down a slope with big, confident strides.  The narrator continues, 
“The human touch makes its presence felt in the shape of Dr. X.”  Next, we see 
Dr. X sitting on the grass in his pristine white coat, surrounded by a group of 
village children. “A heart-to-heart talk, a laugh – provides the inspiration to 
move on,” the narrator continues.  Next, the camera pans to wide-angled shots of 
the entire village.  Notebooks and medication surround the two other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
245 See for ex. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pb97_Tar--4.   
246 Kabir 2009: 5. 
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psychiatrists, who are also wearing crisp white coats.  This scene of humanitarian 
healing then fades to a flashback of a desolate winter scene of the same village in 
the immediate aftermath of the snowstorm.  The psychiatrists are here again, but 
this time, more warmly clad.  One of the psychiatrists promises a small child that 
he will bring him socks and warm undershirts the next time.  Doctors distribute 
blankets and food to the villagers.  The narrator chimes in: “Just a little 
satisfaction, but the journey continues…” 
 During the times I watched this video, Dr. X usually followed it with 
another, which took on the question of PTSD more explicitly.  The second video, 
which employed the same narrator, began with a question: “Are the 
psychological experiences of disaster universal?”  After a brief pause, the 
narrator responded: “PTSD is one of the most common aftermaths of 
experiencing trauma or disaster.”  The video briefly showed the toll of recent 
disasters in South Asia, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 
earthquake, as well as the 2001 Gujarat earthquake in which approximately 
20,000 people lost their lives.  Then it focused on Kashmir, which “has suffered 
fifteen years of conflict” as well as a devastating earthquake and snowstorms in 
2005.   
The next part was more difficult to watch.  The image showed the 
Psychiatric Diseases hospital, which was presented as an epicenter of treatment 
on PTSD.  First, we see a young girl – perhaps nine years old – who, we are told, 
has lost her entire family in the earthquake.  She is quiet, withdrawn, her head 
bowed down.  In the background, we hear a doctor’s voice – Dr. X – gently 
addressing her as “beti” (daughter), coaxing her to answer questions about her 
age, where she is from.  She does not respond.  After this scene, we are shown 
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another patient, a man in his twenties, with dark under-eye circles and eyes red 
from crying.  Again, the practitioner is not visible, only the patient, who begs the 
doctor to give him some medication – sleeping pills or something.  He pleads 
continuously to be given something.  The scene continues for some time, with the 
young man openly expressing his anger towards the doctors for not alleviating 
his pain.  We are lead to question his sanity, as well as his innocence as he veers 
towards a violent outburst.  His outburst is cut short by the narrator who informs 
us that, “PTSD is not a culture-bound syndrome of the West.  It affects us all.” 
Despite my feelings about discomfort about the videos, I chose not to 
bring the subject up with any of the other psychiatrists, unsure of how they 
would react since Dr. X was, by now, very senior in the hospital hierarchy.  The 
cracks appeared only months later.  Out of the blue, chatting after an OPD 
session, one of the consultant level psychiatrists asked me whether I had seen Dr. 
X’s videos and what I thought of them.  I responded with trepidation that I had 
been quite surprised by them.  The doctor nodded solemnly and said that he 
found them to be a joke.  At another time, one of the psychologists I worked with 
spoke at length about Dr. X: “Some people have become very rich thanks to this 
PTSD thing.  How is it that Dr. X drives a car worth seven lakh rupees, while the 
rest of us are driving cars worth two or three lakhs?”  
How do we make sense of the intense debates surrounding the 
applicability of exposure therapy and the knowledge of an American-based 
psychiatrist, on the one hand, and the blatant promotion of Kashmiri psychiatry 
around a shared concern with PTSD, on the other? I argue that both these 
processes constitute the uneven ways PTSD is approached as an object of 
intervention in Kashmiri psychiatry.  In the first debate after Dr. Zaffar’s lecture, 
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the attempt was to keep psychiatry removed from other practices of healing, 
while the latter case, the example of Dr. X’s videos, were attempts to claim 
humanitarian psychiatry as a Kashmiri practice.   As such, these efforts were 
attempts to keep “Kashmiri psychiatry” at the right proximity from both 
“Kashmir” and the “outside.”  They revealed the precariousness of the 
boundaries between “western science” (the ivory tower) and the “OPD,” given 
that these boundaries had to been continuously negotiated and renegotiated on 
an everyday basis.  The use of videos as a technique borrowed from international 
humanitarianism was thus an instance of psychiatric expertise instrumentalizing 
knowledge in a way that emphasized the universality of Kashmir.  At the same 
time, they also reveal the ways in which expertise required a parsing out of the 
ways in which these tools were being instrumentalized: to what extent they 
served a particular individual and to what extent were they beneficial to 
Kashmiri psychiatry as a whole (i.e. its need to separate itself out from other 
healing practices).   
Conclusion: Beyond a critique of expertise  
While experts, from canoe makers to scientists, have been the backbone of 
anthropological knowledge production, anthropologists have generally been 
critical, or at least ambivalent, towards experts and the effects of their work.247  In 
his study of pandemic planning, for example, Andrew Lakoff argues that the 
historical switch from population security to “vitals systems security” – a 
transformation of an object of expertise, in other words – had dramatic effects in 
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247 Carr 2011; Espeland and Vannebo 2007; Lakoff 2008; Mitchell 2002.   
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how catastrophes are defined and understood.248  Similarly, Tim Mitchell has 
argued that the expertise of modern engineering, technology and economics 
produced gaps between the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional,’ the ‘scientists’ and the 
‘peasant,’ in which experts could then intervene.249  Though recent 
anthropological work on expertise has attempted to go beyond such critiques, a 
deep ambivalence towards experts and technocrats is still embedded within this 
“new” anthropology.  This seems evident in the disproportionate attention given 
to “illicit” discourses and “tacit” knowledges within contexts of bureaucratic or 
modern expertise, re-producing the anthropologist in the role of archaeologist, 
excavating hidden knowledge.250  Similarly, within medical anthropology, Byron 
Good has argued that the “soteriological” is present in medical practice as an 
“irruption into awareness” or when it “cause[s] a breakdown in routinized practice 
[my emphasis].”251  As he describes, moments of soteriological irruption become 
illicit in the life of medical residents, given that their performance of expertise 
requires a “take charge, deep voice” attitude.252   
 While these are important steps towards refiguring an account of 
expertise, I seek to push this literature further by attending to the ways in which 
expert ambivalence towards their own tools is constitutive of their subject 
positions.253  More specifically, I suggest that questions over the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 Lakoff 2008: 422.  
249 Mitchell 2002: 15.  
250 For Doug Holmes and George Marcus, for example, “illicit discourses” consist of those 
practices – such as anecdotes, hype, and intuition – which are “repressed, subordinated, and 
considered slightly illicit” in the work of European central bankers (Holmes and Marcus 2005: 
237). 
251 Good 1994: 80. 
252 Good 1994: 85. 
253 Cf. Miyazaki 2007.  Miyazaki argues that the ambivalence exhibited by Japanese arbitrageurs 
towards the category of arbitrage is a marker of their particular epistemological stance, identity, 
and ethical commitment.  
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instrumentalization of the tools of psychiatry and psychology, as they produce 
Kashmir and the ‘outside,’ are critical to the project of humanitarianism in 
Kashmir.   
This ambivalence is hidden from view when anthropology focuses on the 
ends, and not the means, of expert knowledge, for instance, on the diagnosing of 
PTSD rather than the debates the lead up to its ontological production beyond a 
clinical use.  As Akhil Gupta has argued in the case of development camps in 
India, “one should not confuse the spectacle of disciplinary power with its 
operation.” 254  As Gupta notes, the camp may be a model of disciplinary 
rationality, but its production is highly contingent on uncertain procedures of 
planning and implementation, communication or lack thereof across hierarchies, 
and the rule-following behavior of particular officials. I draw inspiration from his 
analysis and bring into focus those negotiations of knowledge and place not 
normally elaborated in either anthropological or humanitarian accounts. 
While both humanitarian and anthropological knowledge often reduces 
psychosocial workers as the “conduits” through which local cultures are 
accessed, this perspective obscures the ways in which this knowledge acts upon 
and transforms psychosocial workers. This is significant because many 
anthropological critiques of humanitarianism rest on an assumption that 
“victims” of violence or the putative “benefactors” of such interventions are 
primarily affected, while experts are already fully made.  My research suggests 
that humanitarian knowledge and practices, particularly psychosocial care, 
undergoes dramatic transformations from its articulation in the manuals of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
254 Gupta 2012: 13. 
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humanitarian practice to its operationalization in everyday clinical work.  As I 
have shown, the very fundamentals of psychosocial work – such as avoiding 
diagnosis and empathizing through eye contact and verbal cues – are upended in 
the Kashmiri context. Nonetheless, this is not to say that psychosocial workers 
willingly take on these compromises.  I suggest that there is an enduring cost of 
encountering biomedical and humanitarian knowledge for Kashmiri 
psychosocial workers: it distances them from those they purport to treat. 
On my last visit to the hospital, in June 2011, I went to say goodbye to Dr. 
Arshad.  As usual, he greeted me warmly and we chatted about a possible future 
collaboration.  During our earlier visits, we had brainstormed the idea of co-
authoring a piece on “local idioms of distress” and how ghost stories in Kashmir 
had been replaced by stories of real fear once the Indian army had penetrated 
Kashmiri villages.  Unlike the vast majority of psychiatrists in Kashmir and India, 
Dr. Arshad had grown up in a village in Anantnag district, and thus was familiar 
with the ghost stories that used to be told in his childhood, but which had now 
largely disappeared.  Here, ghost stories appeared as distinct from videos in 
terms of the way in which psychiatric expertise was instrumentalized to 
understand this phenomenon: it was another instance where Dr. Arshad was 
keen to raise the status of ‘Kashmiri’ knowledge. 
He told me how he was particularly concerned that many of the Kashmiri 
postgraduate psychiatry students did not have enough of a grasp of Kashmiri 
culture or village life to understand the nuances in the language used by patients, 
most of whom were from rural backgrounds.  During our final conversation, Dr. 
Arshad was more candid than ever.  He expressed his growing ambivalence 
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towards his discipline, an ambivalence which I felt was partly an outgrowth of 
joint ethnographic and psychiatric labor of forced self reflection.  Although I had 
heard him offer an optimistic future scenario for psychiatry in Kashmir to 
younger staff and interns, he described a much bleaker picture to me, where the 
possibility of communicating with patients would no longer be possible: “As 
doctors, you can ignore the pain someone experiences in their heart, but not the 
pain in their soul.  We’re so obsessed with objective science, with doing EEGs 
and other tests, that we’ve forgotten that this is not the patient’s perspective.  We 
don’t look at distress from the patient’s angle.”    
He told me that he felt that cultural approaches had been sidelined in 
psychiatry.  Even postgraduates were alienated from Kashmiri culture and had 
to be “taught what to look at.”  It was not obvious to them.  At the end of our 
conversation, Dr. Arshad said, “I have been involved in the mainstreaming and 
the normalizing of psychiatry in Kashmir, but now I wonder, is it doing any 
good?  Am I doing any good?”  While earlier Dr. Arshad had emphasized a better 
instrumentalization of Kashmiri culture, here was a moment where he 
questioned his discipline as a whole.  Familiar to the anthropologist, it was a 
moment of disciplinary crisis and perhaps, an engine for growth in a new 
direction. 
*** 
While conducting fieldwork, it was difficult to gain a perspective on 
biomedicine since it seemed to operate as a “net” to ensnare Kashmiris.  Both 
mental health practitioners and patients were deeply invested in biomedical 
techniques and cures, and these notions made their way clearly into everyday 
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psychosocial practices.  As I have argued, the effect of such “vernacularization” 
was paradoxical: although it helped psychosocial interventions “land” in 
Kashmir—to be somewhat recognized as legitimate—the vernacularization also 
diluted the mission of many of these organizations, which was to provide a 
viable alternative to pharmacological, state models of mental health care.  As 
such, psychosocial counselors struggled to gain recognition for psychotherapy 
and counseling in a context where pharmaceutical pills (davai) rather than talk 
was the desired treatment.  
I eventually found a small section of people in Kashmir who had recently 
turned away from biomedicine to Unani.9 Many described having “maximized” 
their relationship with biomedical practitioners and had experienced serious side 
effects from pharmaceuticals. I asked one user of Unani medicine—45-year-old 
Bashir Ahmed—to explain why many Kashmiris felt that they could not get well 
in Kashmir. He responded: 
Even people with minor heart and kidney problems routinely go to Delhi. 
Don’t we have an Institute [a Super Specialty Hospital] here? Why do they 
go to Delhi? Because they don’t get better here. Tensions are high, so 
illnesses are also high. A mother whose son might be out of the house is 
worried that he might be caught in cross firing, so naturally she is tense 
and then becomes weak [kamzor]. After militancy, we have more 
illnesses.255  
 
In their statements, both Noor, the psychosocial worker I described earlier in the 
chapter and Bashir pointed to a sense that it was impossible to be healthy in 
Kashmir. As Noor stated, “I have this feeling like I’m dying or something—that 
there is a cancer growing inside me—or that I am really, really sick for some 
reason. I don’t know why!” Noor’s humorous tone indicated that she identified 
the problem as partially in her mind—“I have this feeling” and, thus, following !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
255 Field notes, May 7, 2010. 
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the logic of cognitive behavioral therapy, as something she could rectify.  Yet 
both these statements also clearly posited links between Kashmir’s violence and 
chronic or intractable illnesses. 
This chapter has attempted to chart key ways in which counselors in 
Kashmir take up, borrow, or emulate, the practices and language of medicine, 
specifically psychiatry. Rather than see medicalization or humanitarianism as a 
top-down processes, I argue that, in Kashmir, counselors play crucial roles as 
“gatekeepers”256 in mediating between psychosocial discourses and practices, on 
the one hand, and Kashmiri patients, on the other hand.  Patients and 
psychosocial counselors share an understanding of biomedical treatments as 
superior to talk therapy, and find forms of medical expertise more credible than 
psychosocial ones.  Although this subverts normative critiques of 
humanitarianism—that it is not locally grounded or specific—it raises new 
questions for the future of psychosocial or humanitarian action in Kashmir and 
elsewhere.  In particular, to what extent should psychosocial organizations adapt 
themselves to local contexts? What are the long-term effects of such 
entanglements between psychosocial and medical models of care? 
In Kashmir, doctors frequently complained that pharmaceuticals have too 
much power in this context, such that even doctors are at their mercy. Given this 
influence, rather than impose an unrecognizable form of care on patients in 
Kashmir—such as counseling—counselors take on the practices of psychiatrists 
as a form of “ethical action.”  Although psychosocial programs are increasingly 
designed to be locally and culturally sensitive,257 in places like Kashmir, they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
256 Ticktin 2006. 
257 IASC 2007. 
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must be medicalized to be rendered legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
However, in Kashmir, the blending of the medical and psychosocial models of 
care is neither entirely accidental nor entirely designed; it is borne of individual 
practices and acts that attempt to respond to a powerful local ontology of 
medical care and illness. As a result, the medical model of care is sometimes 
gifted, other times smuggled in, and at still other times, downright demanded. 
 In the next chapter, I begin Part II of the dissertation, which focuses on 
objects that mediate between the space of the clinic and the world outside: 
medical cards and pills.  I focus on medical cards and the ways in which they 
relate to both patient and expert subjectivities.  As objects, medical cards are 
highly visible in the psychiatric domain, yet here I try to show how they both 
reveal and conceal aspects of relations between doctors and patients in 
unexpected ways.  Since they move in and out of bureaucratic settings, I suggest 
that medical cards offer unique orderings of relations that are otherwise not 
possible with documents that remain within official contexts.     
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CHAPTER 3: UNRULY RELATIONS, PAPER TRAILS 
 
Prelude 
 
 A clinical scene:  Patients and their kin mill about in clusters; male doctors, 
distinguished by their Western clothing and white coats, sit side by side on a 
long table.  The soundtrack of the OPD includes the din of multiple 
conversations, the door periodically creaking open and being slammed shut by 
an alert gatekeeper as new patients poured in and those already seen trudged 
out; and occasional spillovers of tension, an angry, loud voice, usually a patient.  
From the outside, patients and kin peer in from the crack in the door, waiting 
their turn.   From 10 am – 3 pm, on what Kashmiris called a “normal” day, that 
is, a day marked by the absence of strikes of curfews, between eighty and 150 
patients go through this routine.  For the doctors inside, the minutes fly by; for 
many of the patients outside, the hospital visit is an expedition that can cost an 
entire day’s house or agricultural labor. 
 Papers are everywhere in the OPD.  A stack of medical cards determines 
the order of patients inside.  Doctors try to honor the order of the stack, but 
sometimes cards get moved around, creating confusion.  Underneath all these 
papers are more paper: pamphlets, cardboard cutouts, and calendars gifted by 
pharmaceutical representatives.  In addition to the medical cards, there are 
prescription slips, known as receipts (parchis)258 strewn about, waiting to be filled 
and then carried to the hospital’s pharmacy.  To write a prescription is called 
“cutting a receipt” (parchi katna).  Here, writing is a form of cutting.  Cutting, like 
writing, is an action, not a substitute for action.259  The language of cutting is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258 Perhaps from the Sanksrit word, paricaya, which also means to acknowledge.  
259 Gupta 2012: 36. 
! 154 !
useful here in thinking about the ways in which patients are separated out from 
his or her medical card, to the point where the card and patient are ontologically 
distinct entities, not necessarily in a referential relation.  
  When a patient’s name is called by the doctor, s/he steps forward with 
kin, while the doctor picks up the card and reads through its contents.  The time 
taken to read the card is sometimes the longest part of the doctor-patient 
interaction and may proceed without any verbal exchange, particularly when a 
patient is “known” (many patients came on the same day of the week so that the 
same doctor was on OPD duty).  A prescription for medication is either written 
within the card or, if medicines are to be collected from the hospital’s pharmacy, 
the prescription is written on a separate slip of paper.  In the case of new 
patients, doctors filled up the biographical details of the medical card first, then 
wait, with their pens poised, as the patient or kin respond to the question: “Tuh1 
kai chu takleef (What seems to be the difficulty)?”  For doctors, the most desirable 
transactions were the ones where familiarity with the patient enabled the card to 
be treated handily.    
Introduction 
 
 So far, this dissertation has focused on the making of mental health 
through the production of expert knowledges and bodies, including psychiatrists 
(chapter 1) and psychosocial workers (chapter 2).  This chapter serves as a pivot 
between part I of the dissertation, on the making of expert subjects and part III, 
on everyday experiences of medicalization, psychiatric care, and violence.  As 
medical cards are objects carried to and from the clinic to the world outside, they 
represent the ‘threads’ of the net, between the visible institutional nodes and less 
visible experiences.  Chapters Three and Four are both concerned with the 
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materiality of biomedical and humanitarian care in Kashmir and build on recent 
work in medical anthropology which has shown the “manyfoldedness”260 of 
singular forms, such as medical cards.  I suggest that the concept of 
“manyfoldedness” allows us to see the ways in which technologies of medicine 
diversely used, producing medicalization as a process that happens both within 
the clinic and outside it.    
 Rather than understand medical cards as emblems of the reach and 
authority of biomedicine,261 however, I am interested in how medical documents 
rework relations between patients, kin, and experts.  While a significant part of 
the anthropology of bureaucracy and medical anthropology has focused on how 
these technologies substitute or stand in for the agency of particular persons262, I 
diverge from this literature in two ways.  First, I show how medical cards 
circulate or multiply in ways that are different from other objects of bureaucratic 
authority, which are stored and often “stagnate”263 in offices, cupboards, or 
archives.  Bureaucratic documents, including medical records, generally move 
within or between bureaucracies, but rarely have a life outside of their official 
contexts.    
 In most South Asian medical contexts, however, patients and kin possess 
their own medical cards, which are carried to and from clinics, homes, and 
laboratories.  During my visits to patient’s homes, medical documents would 
usually be kept in a plastic bag, hung on a doorknob or from a nail on the wall in 
the sitting room.  While doctors sometimes bemoaned the lack of a centralized !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 Mol 2002: 84. 
261 For an argument about documents as an emblem of statecraft, see cf. Navaro-Yashin 2007. 
262 Cf. Dumit 2004. 
263 Hoag 2011; Hull 2012.  While there was a Medical Records section in the psychiatric hospital 
where the files of discharged patients were kept, any patient who was currently being treated 
had possession of their own records.   
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recordkeeping system, treatment was streamlined not by any bureaucratic 
procedure, but, ironically, by the fact that patients kept their own records.  As 
such, unlike what Ramah McKay found in the case of medical records in 
Mozambique, doctors rarely denied treatment on the basis of lost or misplaced 
records since most patients cared for their own records.264  There were, however, 
other consequences of the patient ownership of documents. 
  In particular, I found that the possession of medical cards by patients and 
their “therapy management group”265 enabled the card to circulate in unexpected 
ways, complicating a straightforward referential relationship between the patient 
and his or her medical document.  In other words, to build upon Annemarie 
Mol’s question about ontological choreography, I ask: what practices of 
coordination and uncoordination draw the card and person—both experts and 
patients—into relations?  What does the co-presence of the patient and card 
enable and what are the effects of divergence between the card and person?266     
  I suggest that the card has an ability to both converge and diverge from 
relations with patients and experts in particular ways.  For example, the 
handwritten nature of medical cards and the fact that they circulated freely from 
expert to expert meant that they were read as forms of personalized knowledge, 
rather than the de-personalized conception of bureaucracy in Weberian 
analyses.267  In this sense, in Kashmir, bureaucratic innovations and interventions 
were read and evaluated as emblematic of individual capabilities and creativity.   
As I will show, while the materiality of the card was associated with the patient’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 McKay 2012. 
265 Janzen 1978. 
266 Mol 2002. 
267 Weber argued that as “bureaucracy develops more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the 
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements” (Weber 1978: 975). 
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character in particular ways, there were also key moments of divergence 
between the patient and the card, when the card became an object that was 
treated independently, not in a relation of likeness with the patient.  In this case, I 
show how the card and patient developed independent trajectories; however, the 
co-presence of the card and kin were able to substitute for the patient in the 
clinic. 
 These dynamic relations between the card, patient, expert, and kin could 
also be read as one of the unintended effects of de-institutionalization, in that 
efforts to quickly empty beds force a transformation between objects and persons 
from a relation of likeness (convergence) to one of unlikeness (divergence).  In 
both these moments of partial relationality—convergence and divergence—I 
argue that the ability of the card to reference a bodily truth is secondary; what is 
important is that the card produces its own truth, pointing to itself.268  
Documents in Anthropology 
 Recent social scientific approaches to documents have been deeply 
influenced by Michel Foucault’s analysis of their constitutive effects.269  For 
example, in describing the widespread use of the examination across disciplines, 
Foucault writes: “the examination…places individuals in a field of surveillance 
[while] also situating them in a network of writing: it engages them in a whole 
mass of documents that capture and fix them.”270  Historians and anthropologists 
of South Asia have drawn on this work to show how documents, as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
268 Riles 2006c. 
269 For Foucault, the political function of writing is to constitute individuals as an “effect and 
object of power, as [an] effect and object of knowledge” (Foucault 1977: 192). For an elegant 
critique of this approach, see Reed 2006. 
270 Foucault 1977: 189. 
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governmental technologies, have produced the objectification and reification of 
particular sociological categories, such as caste.271    
 In her study of colonial bureaucratic practices, Bhavani Raman has shown 
how the East India Company introduced “a government of writing” in the late 
eighteenth century to check the abuse of power and facilitate the spread of the 
market under colonial rule.272  The idea that writing could ensure political 
accountability by making actions transparent and legible has been termed 
“papereality.”273  Yet as Raman argues, arguments for “papereality” leave 
unexamined the self-evidence with which writing is associated with legibility 
and longevity.274  Unfortunately, when compared to the rich literature on colonial 
bureaucratic and writing practices, the history of the medical card in South Asia 
remains somewhat oblique.  South Asian twentieth century medical cards have 
not been examined by historians of medicine, while the more culturally ‘thick’ 
domain of Indian psychoanalysis has received significantly greater attention.275  
 Building on Weberian and Foucauldian approaches to documents, 
anthropologists of humanitarianism have focused on the affective quality of 
documents, particularly on those who are undocumented, such as les sans papiers 
in France.276   In the case of asylum seekers in France, Didier Fassin and Estelle 
d’Halluin have argued that the medical certificate – increasingly called upon by 
French authorities to corroborate the narratives of asylum seekers – leads to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
271 Cohn 1987; Dirks 2001; Raheja 1996.  Recent work in South Asian studies has argued that 
rather than its purported aim of producing transparency, official writing often produces opacity 
instead (Hull 2008; Sharma 2012). 
272 Raman 2012. 
273 Dery 1998. 
274 Raman 2012: 3. 
275 Nandi 1995; Kakar 1996.  
276 Fassin and d’Halluin 2005; Ticktin 2011.   
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reification of the asylum seeker’s body.277  Implicit in this understanding is the 
sense that medical cards are significant to the extent that they refer or denote the 
body.278  In much medical sociology literature, similarly, scholars have shown 
how both paper-based and electronic records restrict the patient’s voice and 
individuality, diminishing the patient to a “minor supporting role.”279 
 There have been several critiques to approaching documents in this way.  
Anthropologists have argued that this line of scholarship treats documents as 
“cultural texts,” as “receptacles of (politically or culturally) meaningful 
knowledge to be ‘read’ by the theorist/observer.”280  They argue that in 
foregrounding the textual meaning and content of documents, documents get 
narrowly defined as texts to be interpreted.   In response, scholars have called for 
greater attention to the materiality of bureaucratic practices, arguing that such 
texts are not abstractable from their material forms, whether they be, files, forms, 
reports, or graphs.281  An important insight that has emerged from this body of 
literature has been that documents can be more than representations of, or 
evidence for, things other than themselves.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
277 Fassin and d’Halluin 2005: 598.  While the relationship between bodily truth and textual 
representation is the focus of Fassin and d’Halluin’s work, they also briefly note that not just 
asylum seekers, but doctors also feel reified in this process of legitimation.  Many of the doctors 
they interviewed described feeling like instruments and felt that their medical expertise was 
reduced to the act of writing of medical certificates (Fassin and d’Halluin 2005). This feeling of 
instrumentalization was a similar affective response that I encountered with counselors and 
psychiatrists who felt subordinated to the authority of objects, such as medical cards and pills.  
As you will recall, counselors reported feeling frustrated and dismayed when their labor was 
negated by patients through their desire for pills, rather than talk (Chapter 2).   
278 For more on denotation and reference as forms of representation, see Hull 2012. 
279 Rhodes et al. 2006: 374.  See also Darbyshire 2004; Lee 2006; Rodriguez 2001. 
280 Riles 2006a: 12.   
281 Hull 2012: 253.  Scholars drawing on S&TS, for example, have followed artifacts as they 
circulate within and beyond institutional settings and how their form is used to derive multiple 
meanings for users of these artifacts (Brodwin 2010; Cabot 2012; Heimer 2006; Latour 1992; Reed 
2006; Riles 2001). 
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 Annelise Riles has argued for the primacy that Fijian government workers 
and activists gave to the aesthetics of document production.282  In her analysis, 
Riles draws an analogy between documents and the self-evident geometric 
patterns of Fijian mats; she argues that what mattered was less the content of 
documents, and more of what was “all on the surface, dictated, and known from 
the start.”283  As with the mats, documents were not valued for their creative or 
innovative potential, but rather, for how successfully they could be replicated to 
form a pattern.284  Similarly, in her study of patient consent forms in Israeli 
hospitals, Marie-Andrée Jacob found that these documents were often faded, 
Xeroxed, and of poor quality.  As such, she argues that rather than represent a 
person’s agency – since these forms were often not legible and usually not read – 
they created an alternative form of personhood.285 
 Drawing on these insights, this chapter attempts to think through both the 
referential content and formal meaning of medical cards, and how the card 
entangles or diverges with patients and experts.  In so doing, I attend to the 
material form of documents, while also reflecting on their affective quality, 
following scholars of documents who have emphasized the interplay of form and 
content and cautioned against reifying this distinction.286  Nonetheless, while 
bureaucratic documents are important to “think with” alongside medical cards, I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
282 Riles 2001, 2006b.  
283 Riles 2001: 79. 
284 Riles 2001: 79. 
285 Jacob 2012.  For more work on the aesthetics of document production, see Brenneis 2006; 
Elyachar 2006; Li 2009. 
286 Brenneis 2006.  This relationship is also important in the case of other medical technologies, 
such as pills (see Chapter 4).  As such, I politely disagree with Yael Navaro-Yashin’s argument 
that we treat documents either as “sensual, excessive and affective” objects or by their “form, 
pattern, and designers,” as Riles does (Navaro-Yashin 2000: 21).  Navaro-Yashin’s critique of 
Riles argues that the search for aesthetics and form in the document may involve a sterilization 
and neutralization which distracts the analysis from the excessive potentialities of political objects 
of this genre. 
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attend to the ways in which medical cards are different from other bureaucratic 
artifacts.  The emergence of medical cards coincides with the growth of evidence-
based medicine in the early twentieth century.  As historians of science have 
argued, the patient-centered record replaced the casebook—which had hitherto 
been kept privately by doctors as a diary or journal—and thus symbolized 
medicine’s organization around the patient, rather than around the doctor or 
ward.287  Medical documents have also been viewed as essential to the 
ontological production of disease.288  Within the South Asian context, asylum 
reports and casebooks are the forbearers to the personalized medical record.  As 
Waltraud Ernst has shown, asylum reports from the early nineteenth century 
revealed a concern for the humane and enlightened treatment of inmates, which 
was gradually replaced by “a more pragmatic, narrowly managerial focus on the 
specifics of medical treatment and statistical analysis of institutions’ patient 
populations.”289  
 The relative openness of the medical card as compared to other 
bureaucratic technologies lends it a “sticky” quality, whereby it attaches to both 
psychiatrist and patient in unexpected ways not taught in medical school.  While 
reading the card for signs of a patient’s subjectivity might have an administrative 
purpose, following Matthew Hull, I suggest that these techniques “do not 
converge in a unified set of representations.  They generate ensembles of artifacts 
of limited and differing perspectives.”290  For example, while patient desires to 
have their medical cards written on dovetail with expert psychiatric practices 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
287 Berg and Harterink 2004: 19.  
288 Bowker and Star 1999; Mol 2002.  
289 Ernst 2011: 541. 
290 Hull 2008: 509. 
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that emphasize writing, but this in itself is not evidence of a unified biomedical 
authority.    
 In the second part of the chapter, I argue that medical cards do not always 
operate—and are not always valued for—their ability to refer back to a patient’s 
body.  In this sense, I respond to the critique of the bureaucratization of medical 
practice, which often assumes that the card and person are coterminous. Rather, 
cards can develop their own independent trajectories, which can ultimately lead 
to a separation between the patient and the card, which I call “divergence.”   
Practitioners care for the textual trajectory of the medical card and cultivate it 
over time, until a steady rhythm of intervention is achieved and the card emerges 
as a locus of action, separate from the patient.  This also says something about 
the temporality of treatment: the longer a patient remains a patient, the more 
likely it is that the patient and card will diverge.  
 One of the ways in which medical cards circulated outside of medical 
contexts was when patients visited Sufi elders or pirs, often before or after visits 
to the hospital.  In contemporary Kashmir, pirs were often the connective tissue 
between spaces of medical and religious treatment, both of which are known as 
sites of treatment (ilaj).  Patients who visited pirs also experienced treatments 
where writing was also a central component of healing.291  Flueckiger found that 
the charisma, strength, and authority of pirs derives, in part, from their 
association with the written word:  
The centrality of the written word is striking in the healing room.  
Amma’s primary method of diagnosis is based on the written 
word, as are most of her prescriptions and treatments….  Amma 
writes all day long, opening the ‘mystery of numbers’ (abjad ka phal 
kholna) to diagnose the troubles of a patient and writing out !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
291 Messick 1993; Flueckiger 2006; Metcalf 1996; Schimmel 1970; Qureshi 1996.  
! 163 !
prescriptions…  Amma’s fingers are ink-stained, and her desk is 
covered with slips of paper on which mathematical calculations 
have been made, stacks of amulets upon which magical squares 
and Arabic letters and numbers have ben written, a clipboard, and 
an inkpot.292  
 
This description suggests that despite the best efforts of psychiatrists to mark 
their space as apart from, and outside of, spaces of religious healing, the 
continuities between the healing room and psychiatric OPD were made apparent 
by the circulation patterns of patients.  
 Anthropological work on Islamic religious and legal traditions has shown 
how the semantic content of Arabic words can be may be subordinated to their 
power and auspiciousness (barkat) in specific legal and religious contexts.293  In 
the case of cassette sermons in Egypt, for example, Charles Hirschkind argues 
that apart from their referential content, sermons were also valued as techniques 
for “training the body’s gestures and affects, its physiological textures and 
colorations, its rhythms and styles of expression.”294   
  Similarly, as Joyce Flueckiger has noted, patients who visited pirs 
routinely wear, drink, burn, or bury the written word of God and the various 
representations of his name on various kinds of amulets (taviz).  The words 
written on amulets are often manipulated, scrambled or written in such haste as 
to be illegible.  As such, “patients [who visit pirs] do not know specifically what 
is written on the paper, and I never heard anyone ask.”295  The same was true in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
292 Flueckiger 2006: 65. 
293 As Messick puts it in the context of Yemen: “it would be difficult to overstate the high regard 
ordinary Yemenis have for legal documents.  People care for and protect their own papers as the 
most vital of personal effects.  Held in private hands, documents are folded or rolled into narrow 
scrolls, placed in individual protective tubes or tied together in bunches, and then stored in cloth 
bundles or in wooden chests” (Messick 1993: 217).  See also Hirschkind 2001.  
294 Hirschkind 2001: 637. 
295 Flueckiger 2006: 68-69. 
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the case of medical cards; I never heard patients ask what was written on their 
medical card: what mattered was that the card was activated through inscription. 
The amulets received from pirs and the medical cards given by doctors were also 
treated in similar ways by patients.  In addition to circulating in the same 
treatment context, these objects were the property of the patient and were 
usually treated with extreme care.  
 Contrary to practices in the West where the pharmacist retains the 
doctor’s prescription, in India, prescriptions are returned to customers after 
medicines have been purchased so that they can be reused.  This gives 
prescriptions a “floating” quality to them.296  In their ethnographic study of 
chemist shops in Mumbai, Kamat and Nichter describe how customers reused 
prescriptions freely without any objection from chemists; in one case, a 
prescription over five years old was reused unproblematically.297  For patients, 
the actual content of the card was less important than its ability to be exchanged 
for treatments.  As I argue in Chapter Two, this emphasis on treatment through 
writing was one of the reasons for the lack of success of psychosocial 
interventions in Kashmir, which were focused on talk.  Much like the patients at 
the psychiatric hospital, visitors to Amma’s healing room were reluctant to leave 
the healer’s table without tangible prescriptions.298  Similarly, just as amulets 
were imbued with power no matter the length of time or degree of separation 
from the healer, so prescriptions too retained the mark of authority well beyond 
the moment of the transaction. 
Part I: Convergences !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
296 Ecks and Basu 2009. 
297 Kamat and Nichter 1998. 
298 Flueckiger 2006: 105. 
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Patient Extensions 
 In this section, I argue that medical cards were not only significant for 
their contents about a patient’s diagnosis, treatment, and symptoms, but that 
cards were also read on and for their surface (or “formal meaning”).   
 In Kashmir, the medical cards of each hospital were slightly different, but 
most of the cards I saw were made of a thick, cardboard-like paper, with large 
white spaces to be filled up by the doctor on the patient’s first visit.  Medical 
cards were artifacts of hospital bureaucracies; in private clinics, doctors usually 
tore out a single sheet from a prescription pad, hence “cutting’ was also literal.  
Cards were solely the responsibility of patients and kin, and patients usually 
carried their entire written medical history with them to every hospital visit, 
which could include an assortment of different objects, including prescription 
papers from private clinics, multiple medical cards, test results from different 
hospitals or labs, and sometimes, old samples of medicines  (a used strip or 
bottle) to show the doctor what they had been consuming or to confirm dosages.  
Fig. 10 shows the medical card (also called an OPD Ticket) of a first-time patient 
to the psychiatric hospital in Srinagar.   
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 Medical cards thus contained a significant amount of information beyond 
the patient’s diagnosis.  As Risse and Warner have noted, while the basic 
structure of the case history has remained largely stable over the past two 
centuries, both the content and the language used in composing case histories 
have changed dramatically.299  However, Waltraud Ernst has argued that both 
the structure and the content of reports has changed dramatically since the 
nineteenth century.  Drawing on the case reports of Baron Georg von Liebig, a 
young German nobleman who worked in the East India Company’s medical 
service in the 1850s, she argues that rather than the “conclusive summary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
299 For example, in the nineteenth century, methods of physical diagnosis and ‘objective’ signs of 
disease superseded the patient’s subjective accounts of their bodies.  In addition, later in the 
nineteenth century, there was also a shift from words towards numbers and visual 
representations of bodily disorders (Risse and Warner 1992: 191-92). 
Illustration 7:  
A blank 
medical card 
Diagnosis!!!A!“Δ”!indicates!the!diagnosis!is!provisional!written!in!the!ICDS10!code!
Symptoms!Usually!written!as:!“(C/o!–!Complaints!of)”!
Pharmacological!treatments!!
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statements” of today’s case histories, physicians such as Liebig typically supplied 
“a picture of the various stages in the diagnostic process, reflecting the often 
inchoate development of the diagnostician’s hypothesis in exactly the crude way 
in which they occurred, rather than pruning preceding observations post festum 
so they fitted the conclusion subsequently gained.”300  In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, professionals would also write letters to a newspaper or to 
the Royal Society in which they presented a variety of personal impressions and 
observations as evidence for a general statement, such as those pertaining to an 
inferior racial or national character.301  
  The medical cards I saw revealed the trace of: the first encounter between 
psychiatrist and patient in the form of symptoms recorded; the process of 
establishing a diagnosis; a train of psychopharmacological or psychotherapeutic 
procedures that the patient had undergone, with brief notes about his or her 
changing condition, as per the expert on call; which expert had treated this 
particular patient, as these records were handwritten; and, the number of visits 
and duration of treatment that a patient had undergone.   
 While doing fieldwork in the OPD, I was struck by the fact that, rather 
than tell me to listen carefully to what a patient was saying, psychiatrists would 
affectively respond to a particular case by passing me a person’s medical card or 
documents:  “Take a look at this,” they would say, not, “did you hear that?”  For 
doctors, turning to documents was a means of recognizing a patient’s long and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
300 Ernst 1990: 214-215. 
301 One example given is Montesquieu’s argument that after he had ‘observed the outermost part 
of a sheep’s tongue,’ he was able to come to certain generalizations about the physical and 
psychological effects of temperature, and he then used this to make an argument about 
differences in national culture (Glacken 1967: 569). 
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unfulfilled institutional journey, itself evidence for a patient worthy of care, 
rather than the specific condition for which they were seeking treatment.  In this 
sense, papers were self-generative: medical documents were deserving of more 
documents.  Psychiatrists tended to be more compassionate towards those 
patients who had a large quantity of well-kept cards and prescriptions.  Medical 
cards were thus valuable for things other than revealing the “truth” about a 
person’s illness: the card was an important means of eliciting a patient’s 
character and disposition.  Similarly, psychiatrists tended to be more critical of 
patients whose cards were perceived to be in shoddy condition or if any of their 
documentation was missing (unless the lack of documentation was evidence for 
the poor state of an institution).  “To be without documents is to not exist,” 
explained one psychiatrist, when I asked why medical documents were 
important.   
 Patients also recognized the importance of the medical card as an 
institutional record because they knew the record was related to – and could 
even substitute for – their own agency.302  Nargis, a female patient I met outside 
the OPD of the psychiatric hospital, said she was worried that the attending 
psychiatrist would criticize the state of her card.  She showed me that the front of 
her card was smudged.  “He will say, ‘What is wrong with you? Why is your 
medical card in this condition?’” she said in a mock deep voice.  She made a 
gesture of flinging the card toward me with her hand.  In this sense, Nargis’ 
nervous humor captured her worry that she would be held accountable—and 
judged for—the material condition of the card, rather than her bodily condition.     
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
302 cf. Reed 2006; Langwick 2011: 168. 
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 At other times, the surface of documents were significant not for how they 
indexed a particular patient’s character, but for what they revealed about the 
medical institution from which they came.  Inscriptions were sometimes 
analyzed for their adherence to proper procedure, for instance.  One day at the 
psychiatric hospital, Dr. Zaid, one of the Consultant level psychiatrists, directed 
me to a female patient who had been admitted to the Family Ward, which was 
used for short-term stays.  Rimjhim, who was in her mid-30s, was a highly 
atypical patient in the psychiatric hospital: she was not Kashmiri, but from the 
northeastern Indian state of Assam and from an upper-middle class background.  
Although her hair was disheveled, she was well dressed.  The latest diagnosis in 
her file read “bipolar affective disorder,” which had been changed from an 
earlier diagnosis of manic depression.  In English, she told me that her husband 
was South African and worked as a computer engineer in Mysore and that they 
had a three-year old son.  She said that because he was a foreigner, he was not 
given permission to travel to Kashmir to see her.303  Based on her narrative, 
neither I nor the other doctors understood how or why she had ended up in 
Kashmir, where she knew no one. 
 To the doctors, what was more appealing than Rimjhim’s attractive 
appearance was her thick stack of medical records.  Her file showed that she had 
first been institutionalized in NIMHANS – the top-ranking mental health 
institute in India - in Bangalore, where she had been admitted for a period of two 
weeks.  Following this, she had been admitted to the All-India Institute of 
Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in Delhi, again, one of the most renowned medical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
303 Foreign nationals require a special permit from the central government in order to visit 
Kashmir. 
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hospitals and research institutes in the country.  Then, somehow, she had ended 
up at the psychiatric hospital in Srinagar.    
 “This is a very interesting case,” Dr. Zaid told me, as we walked towards 
the ward to meet her, “usually patients go the other way around.”  Dr. Zaid was 
referring to the reversal of the usual trajectory that most middle class patients 
underwent: the movement from state-run hospitals like the psychiatric hospital 
in Kashmir to more specialized, tertiary care hospitals in India’s metropolitan 
centers, such as AIIMS and NIMHANS.  What was interesting to Dr. Zaid was 
not Rimjhim’s diagnosis or condition, but her movement through some of India’s 
most reputable medical establishments.  The doctors were eager to examine her 
letters, referrals, and documents from NIMHANS and AIIMS and compare those 
documentary practices with their own.  They pored over her files and 
commented how thorough her records were, how each transfer from one 
department and one hospital to the next had been written and signed by both a 
resident and a consulting psychiatrist.  In this sense, they marveled at the 
bureaucratic processes recorded in Rimjhim’s files, rather than the medical 
procedures or treatments that were done.  
 Similarly, some months later, one of the Kashmiri residents I knew from 
the hospital, Dr. Zeeshan, returned from an internship at AIIMS; he was the first 
Kashmiri psychiatrist to have gotten this prestigious position.  When I saw Dr. 
Zeeshan again, I asked about his experiences and what he found to be difference 
between the psychiatric hospital in Kashmir and AIIMS.  He said that he didn’t 
find too much of a difference, except that the documentary practices of hospitals 
like AIIMS were much better.  Dr. Zeeshan and other doctors did not make an 
explicit link between documentary practices and patient care, however.  This 
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seemed to be another instance where documentation was valued as ethical 
practice in and of itself, where expert efforts were concentrated on the index 
rather than the outcome.304  However, what was also significant here was that the 
documents were not valued for their depersonalized quality, but rather, for how 
they retained the traces of the prestigious institutions from where they came.   
There was a different epistemology at work here than what Joe Dumit has 
described in the case of PET scans, for example, where the fair, impartial 
objectivity of numbers is seen as ‘harder’ and more persuasive than the expert 
who produced those numbers.  In the case I describe, by contrast, the “expert 
craft at the base of scientific practice” was not papered over, but rather, 
foregrounded.305   
  On the flipside, the lack of a proper paper trail was viewed as a crisis 
within the psychiatric context.  In addition to reflecting poorly on the patient, a 
lack of documents also reflected poorly on the doctors and institutions that had 
treated the individual.  In one instance, a young man of Ladakhi306 origin was 
referred to the De-Addiction Center (DDC) after having spent thirty days in the 
closed ward of the psychiatric hospital.  When he arrived at the DDC with his 
family, Bilal Ahmed Bhatt’s cumulative medical records consisted of a skeletal 
discharge sheet and a single piece of prescription paper.  On the discharge sheet, 
someone had written: “F20 with cannabis abuse.”  F20 was the International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD)-10 code 
for schizophrenia.  The sheet was not signed, and further, it was dated one full 
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day after Bilal’s discharge, which, according to his family had been February 17, 
2010.  Dr. Wiqar Bashir, the attending psychiatrist at the DDC, was visibly upset.  
He passed the charge sheet to me, dismayed.  “This is the shortest description I 
have ever seen,” he said, “I wouldn’t even call this a document.”   
  The fact that the discharge sheet contained no history of Bilal’s treatment 
which had been a substantial 30 days – the medications he had received, his 
condition over the course of his treatment, or the medications he was given upon 
discharge – was bad enough, Dr. Wiqar explained, but even worse was the fact 
that the sheet had not even been signed.  In addition to the discharge sheet, 
Bilal’s family also had a year-old prescription from the private clinic of a well-
known psychiatrist.  However, the prescription was illegible.  Dr. Wiqar called it 
“cryptographic.”  “Even I, a psychiatrist, can’t read this,” he said helplessly.  For 
doctors, Bilal’s flimsy paper trail indexed the poor quality of care he had received 
at the hands of the hospital and the private psychiatrist.  Unlike the case of 
Nargis who I described earlier, this time, the patient was not held culpable for 
the poor state of his medical records.        
   The DDC staff would reinforce this indexical relationship between the 
card and institution by asking Bilal repeatedly about his time at the psychiatric 
hospital: “They kept us like animals there, we felt like we were cows and goats,” 
Bilal would respond.  Dr. Wiqar would suck in his breath sharply, to create a 
whistling sound, a combination of empathy, shock, but also, it seemed to me, 
satisfaction.  The staff consistently promised Bilal’s parents that his treatment at 
the DDC would be significantly better, and importantly, that they would keep 
good records.  Eventually, Bilal spent another five weeks in treatment at the DDC 
and was finally released on March 29, 2010 with a diagnosis of “undifferentiated 
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psychosis,” that is, psychosis linked to substance abuse, not a preexisting 
condition.  In a rare gesture, the schizophrenia diagnosis was overturned.  This 
moment of diagnostic change suggested that although Bilal’s non-existence as a 
medical subject was a “problem” for the clinical staff, it enabled them to craft a 
new subject – a paper subject – from scratch. 
 Paperwork Ethics 
 In this section, I examine convergences between the card and expert.  For 
psychiatrists, writing signified work done, and work done was the expression of 
an ethical, professional self who is able to write documents in a particular way.  
Dr. Wiqar Bashir, the consultant psychiatrist at the police De-Addiction Center, 
told me that one of the most important maxims he learned in medical school was, 
“What you have not written, you have not done.”  I found it interesting that the 
maxim was expressed in the negative, as an absence.  “So, does it work the other 
way around too?” I asked.  “Yes,” he replied, “what you have written, you have 
done.”  Given that psychiatrists equated work done with what was written on 
the file, in instances where clinicians disagreed with each other over diagnoses 
and lines of treatment, they were careful to conduct these arguments verbally 
and not textually.  As I witnessed, and as with the government bureaucrats with 
whom Anu Sharma worked, to textually criticize another expert’s work or to 
point to gaps in work done could permanently damage interpersonal relations, 
whereas verbal disagreements were seen as less serious.307  The primacy of 
writing for psychiatrists was also a source of conflict with professionals from 
other disciplines, such as clinical psychology or counseling, for whom writing 
did not have the same status.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
307 Sharma 2012. 
! 174 !
  Just as poorly kept and poorly written medical cards were to be critiqued 
and even derided based on the institution or doctor who was seen as attached to 
them, doctors often applauded what they considered skillfully written medical 
cards.   This was an example of how medical cards revealed, in the sense of 
making clear a doctor’s expertise.  This was a particularly sensitive issue for Dr. 
Wiqar, who took a great deal of pride in his system of writing a patient’s medical 
history.  Acts of writing the medical card also revealed the ways in which 
psychiatric knowledge was deeply performative: it was about recording work 
done and indicative of the skill level of a particular practitioner.   
 
  In his writing, Dr. Wiqar organized a patient’s history according to the 
drugs they had consumed: nicotine, cannabis, opiods, and benzodiazepines 
(BZDs), in this case.  He wrote details such as the duration of consumption, how 
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they began using, and amounts consumed, in bullet-point form.  According to 
Dr. Wiqar, this bullet-point form was what he described as a “logical” way of 
organizing relevant information about a patient’s prior drug use and was 
preferable to a narrative; it was a kind of “paperwork ethics.”308  As he put it: 
“For me, this approach [of] trying to construct a story out of it 
[drug abuse]…like, one day, he wasn’t feeling well, and then the 
next day, he smoked charas [hashish], etc. as if writing a story… For 
me, that’s not scientific.  If I was in the US, I would have patented 
this [bullet point] approach, it is something that is entirely mine.”  
 
In Dr. Wiqar’s statement, in which he compared his bullet-point system to 
patenting new drugs, he expressed a commitment to bureaucratic innovation, 
but claimed the innovation as a personal achievement.  Under his guiding hand, 
the messiness of patient’s past drug histories were transformed into bullet points 
with a steady, repetitive rhythm.  This particular aesthetic of textual regularity is 
something I will return to in part II of this chapter.     
  Dr. Wiqar was also meticulous about recording a patient’s condition, 
including their blood pressure and the symptoms reported, after their morning 
medical exams.  He wanted all the DDC files to be updated everyday by both the 
social worker and clinical psychologist, so that they could record “what had been 
done.”  Since the social worker and clinical psychologist considered their work 
primarily to be counseling family members and patients, they found it 
cumbersome to record the nitty-gritty of these interactions on paper.   While Dr. 
Wiqar made notes in the file while he spoke to patients (writing as work done), 
the clinical psychologist and social worker usually did this after the fact.  In fact, 
for them, writing took away from other kinds of work: it was an obstruction !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rather than a revelation as Dr. Wiqar imagined it.  Dr. Wiqar had frequent 
arguments with Dr. Muzzafar, the clinical psychologist at the DDC, not about the 
treatments pursued, but about whether and how such treatments had been 
recorded in a patient’s medical card. 
  Learning how to write effectively and succinctly, particularly when a 
patient’s history had to be taken, was a test of skill.  For psychiatrists, these first 
etchings – of relevant symptoms and a potential diagnosis – were usually the 
most significant part of a patient’s card.  The deceptively brief diagnosis – further 
condensed in the form of an ICD-10 code – represented the culmination of an 
extensive verbal process of history taking.  Generally, younger residents were 
given the responsibility of taking a patient’s history in a room separate from the 
OPD.  This process usually took between fifteen and thirty minutes and when 
completed, the file was brought back to the consulting psychiatrist on duty for 
review.  Although residents were responsible for writing down a patient’s 
relevant symptoms, they usually withheld writing a diagnosis until it had been 
orally discussed with the consultant.  As Sarah Pinto has described, the process 
of diagnosis making was “part of the way doctors in training achieve[d] a 
specific mode of perceiving by extracting a named ailment from tangles of 
language and behavior.”309  Pinto also noted the particular affective register to 
reporting a patient’s history in Indian clinics: “When reporting [to the more 
senior psychiatrist], residents’ voices dropped.  They (and I) adopted the 
masklike gaze of the low ranked, silent until spoken to.”310   
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 I witnessed many a nervous junior resident quizzed and berated for their 
failure to attend to the consequential symptoms or their missteps in arriving at a 
diagnosis.  However, the act of “history taking” – of recording a person’s medical 
history, their symptoms and complaints – was not always a smooth or easy 
process, and in many ways, was “para-ethnographic.”311  Like anthropologists, 
psychiatrists had to distill multiple voices and narratives and construct a 
coherent, linear narrative.  Yet while ethnographers have the luxury of, and are 
even encouraged to, record all kinds of details to add “thickness” to their 
accounts, the writing of psychiatrists was evaluated, in part, on its thinness.   
 Given the complexity of assembling patient and kin narratives, many 
psychiatrists recognized that what was at stake in history taking was an act of 
not just linguistic translation, but also cultural translation.  One psychiatrist 
described the act of history taking as “part art, part science.”  Many also 
emphasized the importance of cultural knowledge in the process of history 
taking.  For example, during the session, patients and their kin rarely reported 
physical or psychological symptoms of distress to the psychiatrist.  Instead, as 
Jocelyn Chua found in the case of Kerala, and what was true of Kashmir as well, 
was that “complaints” consisted of “a wider catchment for the grievances and 
morally weighted accusations that circulated among patient, kin and 
clinicians.”312  As such, most clinicians were well aware of how their English-
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language writing on the card required a double translation: from one language to 
another, as well as from ontological state to another.313  
 In history taking and reporting, the performativity of psychiatric 
knowledge was clearly on display.314  The process of diagnosing revealed a chain 
of command, with first-year residents deferring to second years, and second 
years to third years, and finally, to the consulting psychiatrist on duty.  This 
hierarchy was crucial for residents because diagnoses, once written, were rarely 
changed.  While psychiatrists of the same seniority would often disagree with 
each other about a diagnosis, younger doctors would almost always be rejected 
in their attempts to change a more senior person’s diagnosis, even if others 
agreed that the diagnosis was incorrect.  One postgraduate psychiatry student 
who I interviewed said that he had attempted to overturn a more senior 
psychiatrist’s diagnosis twice in his three years at the psychiatric hospital, but 
that he would “never make that mistake again.”  He described feeling “burned” 
at the public way in which his opinion was shot down by senior doctors both 
times.  
 For psychiatrists, then, the written words on a medical card represented 
the distillation of intense verbal argumentation and conflict that characterized 
everyday relations between patients, kin, and clinicians.  The reliance on words 
also marked psychiatry as unique from other branches of medicine (see Chapter 
One).  “As you know, all we have is subjectivity,” one psychiatrist told me, 
referring to the fact that other medical specializations had machines and tests to 
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rely on.  As such, psychiatrists were keenly aware that diagnosing is, as Bryon 
Good described it, a “dialogic process,”315 not unlike ethnography.   
 
  Most history taking was done in the “narrative style” shown above; Dr. 
Wiqar’s bullet point style was thus quite a departure from this form.  In addition 
to the ways in which cards were personalized based on the style of history 
taking, the personalization also extended to actual writing, since these cards 
were written by hand. 
  All the psychiatrists I observed engaged in practices of graphology to 
determine the identity and level of expertise of those before them in the paper 
trail.  In fact, the identity of other doctors on the card was crucial in determining 
or circumscribing their intervention.  Thus, while some psychiatrists longed for 
bureaucratic consistency – such as referrals having signatures from both the 
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consulting psychiatrist and the junior resident on call – they also relied on a 
bureaucratic practice that was thoroughly individuated.  For example, if a well-
respected psychiatrist was identified by his handwriting, it was likely that the 
next doctor would pursue the same pharmacological trail, rather than try to 
change course.  
  As such, clarity of handwriting also represented clarity of purpose, as Dr. 
Wiqar’s dismissal of Bilal’s illegible prescription showed.  Dr. Mohammed 
Yousuf, a retired cardiologist who I interviewed, also described to me how 
practices of writing a prescription revealed a doctor’s character and intention.  
He said that he had carefully kept a few old prescriptions written by Dr. Ali Jaan, 
known as “the father of medicine” in Kashmir.  He was inspired by how each of 
Dr. Jaan’s prescriptions meticulously noted the patient’s full name (most medical 
cards I saw only noted the patient’s first name), diagnoses, investigations, and 
prophylaxis for attendants.  In addition, Dr. Jaan prescriptions also included an 
emergency home contact number, where the doctor could be reached.  Dr. 
Yousuf said that such practices reflected Dr. Jaan’s integrity and the respect he 
offered his patients, and Dr. Yousuf continued to model his own prescription 
writing after him. 
  The expertise of a psychiatrist was thus revealed through the 
representational form of the pharmacological trail they produced, not necessarily 
for the effects that trail produced in a patient.  For example, Dr. Arshad said that 
he recognized a “weak” or “insecure” psychiatrist if he saw a prescription for 
multiple antipsychotics in small doses, rather than one in a more substantial 
amount.  According to him, this showed the character of the psychiatrist as not 
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experienced enough to prescribe one drug in a relatively high dose, and instead, 
took a weaker route, risking the interaction of multiple substances.   
  These examples suggest that our understandings of the medical card as an 
object that is read for meaning are limited.  Rather, the card entangles with 
patients and experts in different ways, such as an index of a patient or 
professional’s character and expertise or as an extension of an institution.  For 
experts, in particular, medical cards are sites where medical authority is 
performed in predictable (as in acts of diagnosing and history taking) and 
unpredictable ways (reading a doctor’s handwriting).  While we might expect the 
expert’s agency to be displaced by increased bureaucratization of knowledge, as 
other studies of bureaucratic organizations have shown, in the case of medical 
cards in Kashmir, the artifact continues to bear the mark of those whom it 
encounters.     
Part II: Divergence  
 
  In part II, through a close reading of a medical file, I examine how, in the 
case of an extended, unresolved psychiatric illness where cure was not possible, 
the medical card emerges as an object of clinical intervention and care 
independent from its relation to the patient.  I describe this separation of the card 
and patient as a form of divergence.  By divergence, I mean the production of 
two, distinct ontological entities – the person and the “file self” – rather than one 
substituting or replacing the other.  However, this was not a smooth or gradual 
process; rather, the establishment of a steady rhythm was only achieved after 
significant back and forth, unsteady, and uneven movements.  The flatter and 
more steady the rhythm of the card, the more separated out the patient and the 
card.   
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  To develop this argument, I turn to the case of Saira Irshad, a case which 
Dr. Arshad had described to me as a “failure,” as one of those cases where, “no 
matter what you do, you are essentially helpless.”  In my decision to focus on 
Saira’s case, I follow a long line of medical anthropological work on troubled or 
troubling subjects who raise paradigmatic questions about psychiatric and 
anthropological narratives, knowledge practices, evidence, and ethics.  One of 
the narrative solutions to these “knotty” cases, to borrow Stefania Pandolfo’s 
metaphor,316 has been to tell the stories of subjects in multiple ways.  In their 
accounts of such cases, scholars have emphasized how knowing was 
simultaneously a process of unknowing.  For example, Ian Hacking writes: “The 
more I know what really happened, the more I wonder if there is a ‘what really 
happened.’”317    
  Similarly, in her work on a female patient named Lata in a case of a 
suspected forced marriage in north India, Sarah Pinto argues that a 
“hermeneutics of discord,” that is, forming an account out of several 
contradictory stories, offers insight into how kinship relations are refashioned in 
the space of the family, law, and clinic.318  Pinto describes the inadequacy of 
different explanatory frameworks, including medicine, law, social reform, 
feminist critique, and anthropology, in understanding Lata’s condition.  Pinto’s 
ethnographic response is to tell Lata’s story, “three ways, emphasizing their 
points of divergence.”319  Rather than see love, arranged marriage, and, I would 
add, the clinic, as sites of exclusion, drawing on Marilyn Strathern’s work on 
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science and kinship, Pinto suggests that they may be sites of accumulation and 
“recombinance” instead, in the sense that both “science and kinship build 
knowledge from relations at points of remaking.”320   
  I draw on these insights in my partial retelling of Saira’s journey to and 
from the clinic to emphasize how processes of knowing Saira also entailed 
simultaneous forms of unknowing or unraveling.  In particular, Saira’s embodied 
self was gradually detached from her “file self.”  In the early days of her 
treatment, Saira’s bodily presence was felt in the card in the form of what I 
describe as a “back and forth,” frequent, oftentimes aggrieved interruptions that 
obstructed the paper trail’s proper path.  Yet, as her treatment progressed, the 
flatter and more regular the rhythm of the medical card became, despite Saira’s 
continued emotional and behavioral trouble.  This suggests that the card 
emerged as a locus of action independent of its referent.  This divergence is one 
of the markings of de-institutionalization; it “empties beds” without the promise 
of a finalized cure.     
  Saira was a twenty-year old female patient who I met in the Family Ward 
of the psychiatric hospital in the spring of 2010, and whose family I continued to 
know and visit with until the end of my fieldwork in June 2011.  In following 
Saira’s case, her own and her kin’s experiences, it became clear to me that as her 
illness progressed, her relationship to the medical file – that “veritable carrier of 
truth”321 – was increasingly loosened.  In this instance, then, Saira’s file was not 
reducible to a technology of biopower in the sense that it was a form of “letting 
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die”; 322 on the contrary, as the medical file attempted to reknit an authoritative 
biomedical discourse, it increasingly separated itself out from Saira’s experience.  
Meanwhile, Saira’s bodily discomforts were displaced from the site of the clinic 
and card to the home.  I tell her story in four, overlapping parts, in order to 
emphasize points of divergence.   
I. Psychotherapeutic interventions 
I first heard about Saira in April 2010 from Dr. Huda Mushtaq, the 
hospital’s clinical psychologist.  Saira had been a regular patient at the 
psychiatric OPD, under treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); 
however, recently her illness had taken a turn for the worse.  Saira had been 
referred to Huda by psychiatrists at the hospital, who hoped that the “softer” 
science of clinical psychology might bear fruit where psychotropic medication 
had been unsuccessful.  Over our usual lunch of buttered toast and tea, Huda 
told me how, in their first session together, Saira had spoken incessantly about 
fire.  Whenever Saira would see a flame, she would put her hand over it and 
burn herself.  For her next session of counseling with Huda, Saira had shown up 
with a burned nose. 
Huda was the hospital’s only qualified clinical psychologist and female 
doctor, having recently completed her M. Phil from a university in Delhi.  She 
only saw patients on a referral basis; most required either IQ testing or 
counseling.  Psychiatrists also passed on patients to her who were suffering from 
chronic illnesses and were unresponsive to medication.  These tended to be 
female patients suffering from illnesses that were known as “women’s distress,” 
such as depression, dissociative disorders, and OCD. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Huda, for her part, had felt that she was more equipped than the 
psychiatrists to treat Saira’s distress.  Despite the fact that her father, Dr. 
Mushtaq Margoob, was the Head of the Department of Psychiatry, privately, 
Huda critiqued the practices of some of the younger psychiatrists, arguing that 
they were too focused on symptomatic treatment.  For example, she told me that 
the psychiatrists in the OPD had attributed Saira’s burned nose to “suicidal 
ideation,” whereas Huda felt that the burned nose was related to Saira’s ongoing 
delusions.  Huda explained to me that Saira she saw herself as a “sinner” and she 
deserved to be punished for sins that were “unforgivable” (these were Huda’s 
words).  After these conversations with Saira, Huda had managed to convince 
the psychiatrists that Saira’s burned nose was not a form of “suicidal ideation,” 
but was part of OCD, which was treatment resistant or unresponsive to 
medication.   
Huda had begun treating Saira for what she described as her “delusions,” 
drawing on the methodology of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) to get Saira 
to view her obsession with flames as “irrational,” and then to reform her 
behavior.  However, the CBT was interrupted when Saira stopped showing up 
for her appointments.  About three weeks after Saira’s absence at the hospital, 
Huda bumped into Saira’s mother on the street.  On seeing her, Saira’s mother 
had burst into tears and told her that her daughter had not eaten anything for the 
last two weeks.  Huda had urged Saira’s mother to have her admitted to the 
hospital’s Family Ward.  Saira’s mother agreed. 
II. Biomedical Inscriptions 
Upon her admission, Saira’s refusal to eat was read by the psychiatrists as 
a confirmation of her suicidal tendencies, and they once again moved away from 
! 186 !
the OCD diagnosis.323  Psychotherapeutic interventions – Huda’s role – was 
considered irrelevant in this crisis situation, since doctors assumed that there 
was a threat to life. 
From this time to the day that I met Saira, 27 days had passed since her 
admission to the hospital.  This was a significant period of time, as admissions in 
the Family Ward rarely exceeded thirty days.  The first time I met her, Saira was 
sitting outside the Family Ward, licking the remnants of rice and kidney bean 
curry from her fingers, as her parents looked on.  While the scene seemed 
happy—Saira and her parents finishing lunch in the warm April sun; she, much 
different from the medical reports of a few days prior—a gloom quickly set in.   
Saira’s parents reported that she had undergone extensive shock (electro-
convulsive) therapy since her admission at the hospital.  At this point, Saira’s 
future was radically uncertain.  She was finally eating, but she and her family 
were now suffering in new ways.  To respond to these uncertain conditions, I 
wondered what had happened in the 25 days prior to her stay.  What could the 
trajectory of her illness, as experienced by her, her kin, as well as on her medical 
file, tell us about the relationship between medical institutions, biomedical 
inscriptions, and suffering patients?    
I began the process of reading through Saira’s file to fill in the blanks of 
the last 26 days.  In this section, I use italics to capture all direct quotes from 
Saira’s file.  I want to draw attention to the rhythm of the writing, specifically 
focusing on how certain types of rhythms indicate the relative entanglement or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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OCD to schizophrenia to psychotic depression with suicidal tendencies to bipolar affective 
disorder (BPAD) at different points in her admission. 
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divergence from Saira as she experienced herself and what I am calling her “file 
self,” following Roma Chatterji. 
At the time of her admission, the postgraduate in charge of Saira’s 
admission noted her refusal to eat as a “threat to life.”  This move established the 
immediacy of the crisis at hand, away from Huda’s preferred diagnosis as OCD.  
Gradually but surely, Huda’s interventions into the case were also wiped out of 
the file in favor of progressively stronger psychiatric techniques (The 
psychologist was also disappeared in this process of psychiatric treatment). 
Saira’s history of mental distress was noted in relation to the crisis thus: 
“Since 2003—complaints of restlessness, loss of interest in work, feelings of impending 
doom, excessive washing.  History of suicidal thoughts and five suicidal attempts.  
Patient withdrawn medication on her own since February 10th.”  Saira’s physical 
condition on her date of admission was described as: “emaciated, conscious, non-
cooperative, depressed.  No involuntary movements.  Dressed appropriately.” 
The initial writings in Saira’s file were marked by what I describe as a 
“back and forth”: an attempt by psychiatrists to move the treatment forward in 
the direction of improvement, but such attempts were frequently undercut by 
Saira’s responses to treatment and her continued suffering, which impinged on 
this thrust towards improvement.  In the Family Ward, psychiatrists did rounds 
at least twice a day, since the aim was to discharge patients as quickly as 
possible.  Yet, at the beginning of Saira’s treatment, the writing in the file would 
swing from a neutral, in-control tone of reportage (of steadily moving forward), 
to backpedaling.   
For example, on Day 3, a large and bold + sign was made in the file, 
signaling improvement.  Later that same day, however, a note written in larger 
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letters and underlined read: Pt. not improving.  The ICD-10 symbol for 
schizophrenia (F20) was written, followed by a question mark.  The pt. not 
improving was further undercut by written comments that Saira was refusing to 
eat or orally take her medication.   
On day 8, a nasogastric tube was put in for feeding and a + sign was 
made.  On day 10, the writing noted that Saira had removed the tube and was 
refusing her oral medication.  The file noted: Pt. continuing to refuse to take orally.  
The urgency of this biological crisis revealed itself in the fact that new 
handwritings in the file appeared, suggesting more consultations as psychiatrist 
tried to respond.  “F20?” a new hand asked, almost insisting now (In the OPD, 
too, I had seen a similar gesture of pulling towards a schizophrenia diagnosis).324  
The F20 diagnosis was an attempt to make sense of Saira’s continued resistance 
towards her treatment, yet it did not address the underlying threat to life, which 
had been noted earlier.       
The hospital’s psychiatrists, apparently under increasing pressure, 
reached out to another department for help.  This letter came next in Saira’s file: 
To: The Registrar, Department of Anesthesia, SMHS Hospital, Srinagar 
Respected Sir, 
Kindly examine and advise us about the pt. admitted with our department for 
the last 10 days, a c/o [case of] schizo-obsessive disorder with suicidal ideation 
with five previous attempts of suicide.  Pt. is most of the time agitated and not 
cooperative.  Presently, she is not accepting anything orally in order to harm !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
324  During my fieldwork, I noticed that patients with complex and contradictory 
symptomatology were often labeled as “F20.”  I would suggest that schizophrenia has emerged as 
a sort of catchall for particularly intractable, chronic illnesses in Kashmir and possibly elsewhere 
in South Asia as well.  When I asked about the frequency of F20 diagnoses in the psychiatric 
hospital’s OPD, Dr. Arshad agreed and described this as the “F20ization of psychiatry.” 
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herself for the past five days.  Pt. needs ECT therapy but ECT machine is out of 
order and we have to maintain her on medication till ECT machine starts 
working.  So, kindly help us to start her oral feeding by putting in a Ryle’s tube 
[a stomach tube]. 
Thank you in advance, 
Registrar – Department of Psychiatry 
The letter clearly laid out Saira’s precarious situation, emphasizing her refusal to 
eat as a form of self-harm (reinforced by “five previous suicide attempts”).  At 
the same time, the letter assumed that Saira’s problem of not eating would be 
resolved once she was given ECT.  Saira was to be kept alive till she could be 
given ECT. 
On day 13 of her admission, the ECT machine started working again.  
ECT, rather than medication and talk, quickly became the primary intervention 
and also gradually transformed the virulent back and forth that characterized the 
early days of treatment.325  On day 16, Saira was given her first round of ECT.  
The event was noted with a frank, “ECT given.”  This was followed by quick, 
positive results: “Pt. accepting [medication] orally.”   However, the next day, there 
was backpedaling again, as Saira was “irritable, verbally arguing.”  A second ECT 
was scheduled for four days later, “Third ECT given: Continue same treatment.”  
However, it was interrupted again with a note: “pt. complaints of psychotic 
depression.”  
However, by day 21, that is, after Saira’s third bout of ECT, there seemed 
to be less back and forth.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
325 However, Saira also continued to be prescribed a heady mix of medications: voxamine, lopez, 
migrabeta.   
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 On day 21, a brief note: Pt. doing well.  
 Day 22, 4th ECT done. Pt. doing well.   
Day 25, 5th ECT done.  No complications.  This was underlined in the file, as 
if anticipating this as a potential endpoint.  But then, a trace of Saira’s continued 
troubles reappeared in the file: “Attendants complaining that she doesn’t sleep at 
night and keeps on talking to us and laughs…but is not inappropriate.” 
From day 26 onwards, there was an even steadier rhythm to the notes, 
and fewer interruptions by Saira in the file.  A new subject was born:   
Day 27, Pt. doing well; ECT done; symptomatically improved.  
Day 29, 7th ECT done.  Pt. doing well.  Continue same treatment (Rx – CST) 
Day 32, Improvement ++ (Rx – CST) 
Day 36, 8th ECT done. Pt. improving + 
Day 42, To be discharged on Friday [A diagnosis of psychotic depression 
with suicidal ideation is also proposed] 
Day 46, Doing well. Continue same treatment.  
 A week before Saira was to be discharged (her discharge was delayed twice), her 
diagnosis was changed again: BPAD [Bipolar affective disorder]: current episode 
psychotic depression with OCD. 
Day 50, Pt. to be discharged tomorrow.  
END  
 At the beginning of her illness, Saira was a persistent and troubling 
presence in the file.  Her long history of mental illness and her current 
complaints, her physical appearance (“emaciated, conscious, non-cooperative, 
depressed.  No involuntary movements.  Dressed appropriately”) were all meticulously 
recorded at the beginning of her admission.  For Saira’s parents, these 
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characteristics resembled their daughter in some way.  Yet as the treatment 
progressed, I suggest that the writing on the card shows the ways in which Saira, 
as a fleshy, bodily presence, was separated out from the file, in favor of a subject 
who was improving and eventually doing well.  Although Saira was in the hospital 
for a total of 46 days, her last appearance in the form of a “back and forth” 
appears on day 25.  After day 26, the card develops its own rhythm, steadier and 
more even than before, yet also increasingly divergent from the reality of Saira as 
experienced by herself and kin. 
II. Saira’s Story 
While the rhythm of her file steadied and gradually reduced over time, 
Saira’s lifeworld continued to be turbulent.  On the day that Saira was to be 
discharged from the hospital, I saw her father pacing nervously outside the 
Nurse’s station, waiting for the postgraduate resident to write her discharge slip, 
which had been delayed several times.  I followed him back to the Family Ward, 
where Saira was alert and dressed in a pink and purple salwar kameez, wearing 
her glasses for the first time since her admission.  At first, she looked almost 
healthy: still skinny, but her large, round eyes seemed ready to take in the world.  
She resembled the pt. doing well. To be discharged of her file. But just for a moment.  
When she saw me, Saira breathlessly asked if I would teach her how to 
swim.  “Will you teach me how to swim? This fear, this fear of water, it is 
holding me back in life,” she told me, almost singing.  It seemed that Saira’s fear 
of fire had also undergone a substitution in this period of intensive intervention.  
Somehow her fear of fire had transmuted into a fear of water.  Saira’s parents 
looked at me helplessly, and asked her to stop talking this way.  Saira had 
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expressed her regret to them: “I feel bad that my heart is weak (dil kamzor) and 
that I can’t bear this pain (dard),” she said.  
It was significant that she used the word dil (heart) to describe her pain.  
As Magnus Marsden has argued in the case of Muslims living in the North-West 
Frontier of Pakistan, and what was true of Kashmir as well, was that the locus of 
a person’s genuine thought was the heart, and not the mind (zehn) or brain 
(dimagh).  While a person’s brain could be cunning (chalak), a person’s heart was 
the source of truth; the only way to understand somebody was to know their 
heart (dil ki baat).  In this sense, the heart was not simply the source of 
spontaneous emotions or passions, but rather, the coalescence of complex forms 
of thought.326  For Saira, it was thus significant that she located the source of her 
suffering in her heart, rather than in her brain, the region targeted by the shock 
therapy.  After being discharged from the hospital, Saira also began seeing a pir, 
but she told me she stopped when he told her that her parents had spoiled her 
and that she was “wasting away at home.” 
Over the next few months that I spent with Saira and her family, she 
would ask me often about her own perceived weakness, which was both physical 
and ethical.  She did not tell me when or how weakness had originated, but she 
repeatedly spoke of her attraction to fire and water.  Why these basic elements of 
life? I asked myself over and over.  Was it their cleansing qualities, their 
significance in marking life and death?  Saira told me that she could not explain 
this, and following Ellen Corin’s argument about the lifeworlds of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
326 Marsden 2007: 88. 
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schizophrenics, this made me aware of just how complex and nontransparent 
this reality was, for her as well as for her interlocutors.327    
After she came home from the hospital, Saira would lie in bed all day and 
watch the Discovery Channel.  She was particularly fascinated by shows about 
deformities and disfigurements like elephantitis.  I think she believed that her 
own illness was such a disfigurement.  Meanwhile, she continued to ask about 
swimming and would practice holding her breath in her bed for long periods of 
time.  One day, Saira left the house and tried to jump into the Jhelum river that 
flowed nearby.  Luckily someone at the bridge had prevented her from jumping 
in.  The last time I saw her, the day before I left Kashmir, she told me that she still 
felt restless.  
IV. Home Life and Kin Work   
The sight of Saira wolfing down her lunch that April day—the first day I 
had met the family—had brought tears to her mother’s eyes.  She had told me 
that this was the first time that Saira was willingly eating since her admission.  
Her father, however, had been less optimistic.  He had taken me aside and told 
me that Saira’s memory was ruined and that she had difficulty remembering 
even simple details.  Later, I found out that he was referring to the effects of 
Saira’s extensive electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatment.      
Furthermore, the long hospital stay had taken its toll on Saira’s parents, 
who were elderly.  For 25 continuous days, they had both slept on the floor, on 
either side of Saira’s hospital bed.  Saira’s mother had lifted up her gray overcoat 
(pheran) and said that she had not bathed or even had a chance to change her 
clothes since Saira’s admission into the hospital.  Saira’s father, the sole !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
327 Corin 1998. 
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breadwinner of the family, had closed down his corner store for the duration of 
Saira’s admission, so the family had been deprived of an income for almost an 
entire month.  When I asked why he didn’t open his shop now, Saira’s father 
explained that Saira would not let him go; she insisted that both her parents stay 
with her.  Her parents had obliged because they recognized a certain 
stubbornness in their daughter.  She won’t let us leave her, even for a second, they 
told me.  Here I understand Saira as not just a victim of her illness, but rather, as 
an agent—unwavering and at times, demanding—in her desires on her parents.  
Saira was their only child, and that too, a daughter.  This further heightened the 
pressure they felt to singlehandedly care for her, given the difficulty of asking 
extended kin to care for a person recognized as mad (mot). 
Her parents also told me that before leaving the hospital, the psychiatrists 
had explained to them that Saira’s original diagnosis had been changed.  While 
they did not know the specific diagnoses, I learned from her file that her 
diagnosis had been changed, on the final days of her admission, from 
schizophrenia to bipolar affective disorder (BPAD) with depressive psychosis.  
One of the doctors treating Saira had told her father that, “earlier we could not 
tell what the illness really was.  But now what we expected to appear has 
appeared [i.e. mania].”   
The doctors also told Saira’s parents to be “encouraging,” which her father 
said he understood to mean giving in to her wishes and demands.  Meanwhile, 
the implications of being “encouraging” meant that while the hospital resolved 
the problem of illness by performing a cut between the card and patient, Saira’s 
family grappled with her desires and demands.  The day they had left the 
hospital, I had asked Saira what she would do once she got home.  She said that 
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she would do some housework, wash clothes, help her mother with the cooking, 
and then, her eyes brightened—maybe watch some TV.   
Over the next few months, I visited Saira and her parents regularly in 
their home near one of Srinagar’s most famous mosques, the austere Jama 
Masjid.  On these visits, it became apparent to me how Saira’s “file self” had 
graduated to the status of routinized entries, whereas Saira’s home life was 
substantively different.  For her parents, the first moment of rupture occurred 
with the psychiatrists’ decision that Saira had to undergo ECT.  While Saira’s 
parents had been adamantly against ECT for their daughter, they had been 
persuaded over a period of days by psychiatrists who insisted that it was the 
only way for Saira to get better.  They consented to the treatment under a great 
deal of pressure, but were never comfortable with it and were affirmed in their 
doubts by the lack of change in Saira’s emotional state.  In particular, while they 
expected that the ECT would allow Saira a certain protective numbing from her 
emotional pain, what they found was that she continued to be in pain, but that 
the numbing had dulled other capacities in her.   Saira’s mother told me that she 
thought the ECT had taken out the light in her daughter’s eyes.   
Saira, on her part, had only a vague recollection of the ECT sessions, and 
also felt that she had lost her sense of time and history.  “How many shocks did I 
have?” she asked me several times.  She was a student of English literature in 
college but confessed that she had “forgotten everything.”328  This was not just a 
case where the stigma of shock therapy had left a mark on the family, but rather, 
where Saira’s parents were convinced that the treatment had actually altered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328 This was not actually the case.  After telling me that she liked Ernest Hemingway, I bought 
Saira a copy of The Old Man and the Sea, which she read easily and remembered key passages 
from class notes. 
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Saira’s subjectivity in fundamental ways.  Aside from the fact that Saira had 
resumed eating, the ECT had no positive effects on other aspects of her behavior 
which her parents were concerned about.  Despite Saira’s best efforts, her 
relentless talk about fire (and now, water) continued, as did her physical 
weakness (she would spend days in bed), and she was unable to help her mother 
with even basic household chores.  Perhaps, then, there was a double divergence 
at work: a file self separated from Saira, and a Saira whose brain was “treated” 
(although what this meant was also questionable) but whose heart remained 
troubled (tang).  Far from the stability that doctors desired, or the restoration of 
her former self that Saira’s parents desired, or to be free of emotional pain as 
Saira wanted, the hospital stay produced a new subjectivity for Saira, an agentive 
self who was difficult to manage for her parents.   
After months of caring for Saira at home, her parents decided that an 
outing might do them good and the family traveled together to Saira’s cousin’s 
engagement party in Batwara.  There, amongst her extended family, Saira 
described feeling “strange” (ajeeb).  At one point, she thought one of her cousins 
said, in English, referring to Saira, “She’s empty, that’s why she makes so much 
noise.”  The phrase repeated itself in Saira’s mind and by evening she felt 
incapacitated, unable to even drink tea with her relatives.  At night, thoroughly 
uncomfortable around so many people, Saira begged her parents to return home, 
and they hired a taxi to drive them back, arriving in Srinagar at one am.  I could 
only imagine the embarrassment that her parents faced in front of their extended 
kin, not to mention the extra expenditure of hiring a taxi in the middle of the 
night.  Were there associations made between the childless marriage of her 
parents and Saira’s illness?  Such late-night travel was highly unusual in 
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Kashmir, reserved only for medical and other emergencies, and in the 
imagination, for stories of boisterous celebrations in the pre-militancy period.  
Later, when she told me about the events that had transpired, Saira said that she 
realized that the voice she thought was her cousin’s had not been real, that it had 
probably emanated from her own mind.   
Meanwhile, despite this event and Saira’s continued bouts of ill health, 
including her attempt to jump into the river, her parents refused to take her back 
to the hospital.  Her treatment would only continue through a “proxy”: her 
parents and her medical card could go to the OPD instead of her.  In the 
psychiatric hospital, it was not uncommon to see kin of patients bring in medical 
cards on their behalf and have the doctor write on the card without consultation 
with the patient.  Both doctors and kin usually offered financial justifications for 
this practice: the family was poor and could not afford two bus tickets, or the 
family could not afford to lose the patient’s labor in the home on that particular 
day.  While “treatment by proxy” raised questions about medical ethics for some 
practitioners, I suggest that they were able to continue this practice because they 
understood that the card was a site of care and intervention that existed in a 
relationship of likeness to the patient.  Both doctors and patients understood that 
the card had a life of its own. 
Yet “proxy” was also enabled by kin work.  The card would continue to be 
treated, to be kept in play through the labor of kin who would make the trek to 
the hospital to collect medicines.  The patient, meanwhile, continued a trajectory 
separate from the card in the form of home life, however disruptive and 
turbulent it may be. 
Conclusion: Anthropological Convergences 
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While significant work in medical anthropology has shown that medical, 
particularly psychiatric, institutions help form collusive relationships between 
the state and family,329 Saira’s case illustrates that there is a more nuanced 
relationship at work between these forces.  Specifically, while psychiatric clinics 
in Kashmir (and more generally in north India) grapple with “the gendered 
fallouts of kinship,”330 they also produce new schisms within the family.  The 
medical card, I suggest, has a significant role to play in this process.  
I have argued that the fragile maintenance of a hospital-kin alliance, in 
part, rests on the kind of relation that is maintained between a patient and his or 
her “file self.”331  In other words, Saira’s kin patiently bore the pain of her 
extended hospital stay, partly because they believed the action on Saira’s medical 
card would correspond to an improvement in her bodily suffering.  In the case of 
Saira, I showed how this relation of similarity between the file and patient broke 
down.  In the failure of the hospital to take responsibility for Saira’s lifeworld 
beyond hospitalization, however, a new relation was made: that of a “proxy.” 
Anthropologists and sociologists have described record keeping as a tool 
of social control in its ability to obfuscate social relations, produce uniformity in 
action, and make actors interchangeable.  In the case of medical cards in 
Kashmir, I have tried to show that, despite attention to them as bureaucratic 
artifacts, they are not necessarily valued for their depersonalized, rationalized 
quality.  Rather, I have shown how cards continue to bear the marks of both 
experts and patients who come into contact with them, a process I describe as 
entanglement.  Instead of the idea that record keeping simply obfuscates social !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
329 Addlakha 2008: 29; Donzelot 1980; De Swaan 1988, 1990. 
330 Pinto 2011. 
331 Harre 1984.  
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relations, then, I suggest that ethnographic attention to the card reveals the 
selective visualizations that the card enables: how certain aspects of a person are 
foregrounded – such as the character of the patient and doctor – while others – 
such as bodily suffering – are diverged.   
By way of conclusion, I want to also reflect on what biomedical 
knowledge might tell us about ethnographic knowledge.  I think documents 
have something important to offer in this regard.  Far from being dry and 
mundane, anthropologists of documents and documentary practice have also 
shown that documents are valuable for the ways that they illuminate the process 
of ethnographic knowledge production itself.332   
While in the psychiatric diseases hospital, I pored over medical records in 
the cool, dark, and generally quiet environs of the Nurse’s Station, away from the 
clamor of the OPD.  Since there were no photocopying facilities in the hospital, I 
was forced to record the content of patient files by hand, a process that was both 
time consuming and meditative in its effects.  Thinking back on the movement 
between the relative silence of the Nurse’s station and the cacophonous Family 
Ward, I have come to see that process similarly mirror the process of writing up 
and fieldwork, in the sense that each was an order of engagement that “partly 
inhabits or touches upon but does not encompass the other.”333  As I discovered, 
to understand the relationship between files, patients, and experts, an alternation 
between immersement and movement was required.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
332 As Annelise Riles puts it, as artifacts, documents are ways for ethnographers to reflect on our 
own knowledge practices.  As the joint labor between the anthropologist and her interlocutors, 
the document can become at once an “ethnographic object, an analytical category, and a 
methodological orientation” (Riles 2006: 7). 
333 Strathern 1999: 2. !
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This switching of perspectives between revealing and concealing is also at 
the heart of the ethnographic process.334  The more I came to know Saira as a “file 
self,” the more she unraveled for me as a person that was still assertive, yet 
suffering.  The more time I spent with her and her family in their home, the less 
visible the “pt. doing well” was to me.  The movement between these perspectives 
did not make a complete picture, by any means; they only reinforced how partial 
each of those pictures – just like our writing work and field work – were in the 
first place.  Yet, if these were the similarities between ethnographic and 
biomedical knowledge, what was different about them?  I came to understand 
that while ethnographic knowledge was forged in the convergences between 
immersement and writing, biomedical knowledge, particularly in difficult cases, 
was actually thwarted by such movement.  Divergence was necessary to achieve 
a rhythmic trajectory for the card, one that could be treated independently from 
the patient.  While anthropological knowledge craves convergence, biomedicine 
requires divergence.  
 In the next chapter, I turn my attention to another material form—pills—
which are revelatory of the multiple ways in which Kashmiri patients interact 
with and use biomedical technologies.  While humanitarian workers have 
critiqued the use of medication to alleviate trauma in the Kashmiri context, there 
has been little attention paid to how pills are circulated, used, and experienced 
by Kashmiris.  Pills are a key node in the “net” of medicalization, not only 
because of their status as boundary objects, but also because their appropriation 
usually exceeds the intent of the biomedical practitioner.  As with the medical 
card, I suggest that pills also make clear the multiplicity of relations between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!334!Strathern!1999:!6.!!
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doctors and patients, complicating biomedical narratives about patient “non 
compliance.”   
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Chapter 4: “English Medicine” and the Multiplicity of Davai  
Prelude: Amidst Pills  
 “Kashmiris are not health conscious; they are disease conscious,” said a 
pharmaceutical distributor to me, leaning back in his swivel chair.  I was 
interviewing him in his house in a middle-class neighborhood of Srinagar, which 
he had converted into a stock room.  He distributed pharmaceuticals from a 
number of Euro-American and Indian companies, such as GlaxoSmithKline and 
Ranbaxy.   Around him, large notebook ledgers lay open, the inventory 
interrupted, tall shelves burst full of medicines, bottles, and cardboard sachets of 
tablets stacked full of “vibrant matter.”335  The room smelled bitter and was 
stuffy, like a school chemistry lab.  Distracted and a little confused, I asked him 
to explain.  “We Kashmiris, we only remember our bodies when we are sick.  
And now, because of the conflict, we want immediate results…so that [explains] 
the success of English medicine in Kashmir.  Because of the conflict, our attention 
has been diverted: we don’t think about our bodies anymore.  No one is healthy 
in Kashmir.” 
 This pharmaceutical distributor presented moral and political – rather 
than commercial, scientific, or historical – arguments for the “success” of 
biomedicine, called “English medicine,” in Kashmir and elsewhere in South Asia.  
Rather than point to aggressive marketing by the pharmaceutical juggernauts, 
for him, the success of pills was due to a lack of concern for the body and a low 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
335 Jane Bennett describes “vitality” as “the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, 
metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi 
agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own (Bennett 2010: viii).  
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tolerance for pain in light of longstanding trauma and suffering.336  In this 
chapter, I examine how pills provoke such heated, and at times, moralizing 
responses on the parts of medical professionals and consumers.  This chapter 
examines the ways that the materiality of pills—their multiple, unstable, and 
mysterious forms—affect the ways in which people experience their effects.   
 For many Kashmiris, pills are the first line of defense against forms of 
bodily weakness (kamzori), as well as other bodily ailments related to long-
standing trauma.  In this context, pills are used as objects of anonymity, such as 
in cases of self-medication or intoxication, while at other times, they are markers 
of the body’s ailments and of knots of familiarity.  In other words, I argue that 
the pill is a commodity form of self-alienation, while also being a way to return 
the individual to his or her body in an intimate way.  In this sense, the pill is an 
important node in the “net” of medicalization in Kashmir.  It shows the ways in 
which medicalization is produced both through the prescription practices of 
experts, as well as through the everyday choices and negotiations of patients.   
Introduction 
In Kashmir and throughout South Asia, the Urdu word davai refers to 
medicine in general as well as connotes the pill’s material form.  In Kashmir, 
psychopharmaceuticals continue to be a significant part of mental health 
treatment, despite the efforts of humanitarian organizations to move away from 
medical or pharmaceutical treatments towards counseling and other techniques.  
However, while humanitarian organizations, psychologists, and counselors often 
characterized the relationship Kashmiris have with biomedicine as a form of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
336 As psychiatrists frequently pointed out to me, unattended trauma reduces a person’s ability to 
withstand even ordinary pain and suffering.  
! 204 !
“dependence,” I argue that the relationship between pills and bodies is actually a 
much more complex one, underpinned by a hermeneutics of suspicion that also 
characterizes interpersonal relations.  For instance, I contest the narrative of “non 
compliance” that practitioners frequently used to critique patient practices by 
taking seriously uncertainties, ambivalence, and doubt toward pills as powerful 
motivating forces for the particular consumption practices that patients 
developed.337 
Within psychiatry, psychopharmaceuticals have emerged as the 
cornerstone of the de-institutionalization movement.  As Paul Brodwin has 
argued, the wide range of out-patient services available to psychiatric patients 
nonetheless all endorse psychopharmaceuticals as a key part of long-term 
treatment.338  Pills have increasingly come into focus as objects of concern in the 
medical anthropology of South Asia as well, particularly with the new National 
Mental Health Program (NMHP) focus on the provision and distribution of 
psychotropic medication at the Primary Health Center (PHC) levels. 339  Sushrut 
Jadhav and Sumeet Jain, for example, use the journey of ‘the pill’ as a metaphor 
to “illuminate the social, cultural, and political processes that shape and actualize 
policy.”340  While this work is an important starting point for understanding the 
workings of macro-policy initiatives such as the National Mental Health 
Program, it leaves questions about the pill’s ontological form unexamined.  In 
this chapter, my aim is not to critique pharmaceuticalization as the antithesis of 
patient participation and access to care.  Rather, I am interested in the multiple 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
337 Cf. Leibing 2009. 
338 Brodwin 2010. 
339 Ecks and Basu 2009; Jain and Jadhav 2009; Kamat and Nichter 1998.  
340 Jain and Jadhav 2009: 61.  
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ways in which pills produce uneven, partial participation within biomedical 
regimes. 
Unlike the English word, medicine, davai does not foreground a body of 
expert knowledge, but rather understands medicine through its material 
aesthetic.341  This chapter attempts to take seriously the semiotic, material, and 
experiential dimensions of biomedical pills in Kashmir as they cut across diverse 
spaces, somatic experiences, and therapeutic functions.  In so doing, this chapter 
maps a “multiple ontology” of davai, in which not just the meanings, but the 
material form of pills are transformed as they move between terrains such as the 
marketplace, where they are sold by local “chemists” (pharmacists), the clinic, 
where they are a highly recognizable form of biomedical care, and in private 
spaces, where they are consumed as modes of self-care or intoxication.  For 
example, how do these “common, sociomaterial practices” 342 produce pills as 
multiple objects? 
In foregrounding the relationship between people’s experiences of pills 
and their material forms, this chapter draws on recent work in science studies 
and medical anthropology which focuses on the production and performance of 
objects, bodies, and entities, sometimes across diverse sites of knowledge and 
practice.343  This work has disrupted the philosophical notion of ontology as “a 
property of things” in favor of showing “how ontologies are distributed through !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
341 The Urdu word daktari or daktari-kaam (from the English word “doctor”) is usually used to 
refer to the study and practice of medicine (medicine as a body of knowledge).  
342 Mol 2002: 8.  
343 Langwick 2011: 8.  A concern for ontology has spilled into medical anthropology from science 
studies and has inspired a number of important works, including Annette Leibing’s work on 
gerontology and geriatrics (2009), Annemarie Mol and John Law’s work on hypoglycemia (2004), 
Allan Young’s history of post-traumatic stress disorder (1995), Lawrence Cohen’s examination of 
Alzheimer’s and its lack in India (1998), Stacey Pigg’s work on the production of AIDS as an 
object of developmental intervention (2001), and Margaret Lock’s notion of “local biologies” 
(1993), to name just a few.     
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practices of knowing and intervening.”344  Building on Annemarie Mol’s work on 
the “body multiple” – that is, how bodies or organisms hang together across 
different sites of medical expertise and bureaucracy – I want to explore the 
“pharmaceutical multiple” – how the pill becomes different things at different 
moments, and how it is produced as a form through affective experiences 
ranging from deliberate self-intoxication to doubt.  In using the term, 
“multiplicity” thus, I refer to the ambivalent, contradictory, and uncertain effects 
that pills or davai are thought to have on Kashmiri bodies.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to disrupt the notion that medicine silences the objects 
of its knowledge345 and shows instead how pills and bodies produce each other 
in unexpected ways.  Further, in drawing attention the multiplicity of pills, I 
provide an alternative discourse to the clinical language of “non compliance,” 
which is seen as a form of ignorance on the part of patients or their inability or 
unwillingness to follow a pharmaceutical regimen.   
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344 Langwick 2011: 8. 
345 Sullivan 1986.  
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I asked one senior psychologist about high levels of pharmaceuticalization 
in Kashmir, for example, and she suggested, citing Peter Levine’s Waking the 
Tiger, that Kashmiris’ overdependence on pharmaceuticals could be a form of 
“abdicating responsibility” for social, political, or psychological problems.  
Counselors and psychologists who were trained in forms of psychotherapy also 
complained that patients preferred to “passively” receive their medication rather 
than take an active part in the therapeutic process.  As a result, they reported low 
efficacy around therapies like Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), which were 
identified as shifting the locus of responsibility for behavioral improvement from 
the clinician to the patient (see chapter 2).    
In drawing attention to the uncertainties and ambivalences in practices of 
consumption, I suggest that there is something more at stake than pills as simply 
the abdication of personal or social responsibility.  The argument for the 
abdication of responsibility did not seem to ring true, since most people I 
encountered felt that this kind of freewheeling agency was not possible in 
Kashmir—and it had not been possible for four hundred years.  While I read 
desires to consume pills as agentive acts, then, I suggest that Kashmiris are well 
aware of the temporary and circumscribed nature of the relief they offer.  
This chapter outlines two kinds of “multiplicities” around pills.  First, I 
argue that there is multiplicity around the aesthetic or form of pills.  The 
singularity of the pill is destabilized by the fact that medicines are used as 
intoxicants, which then have to be retransformed into drugs in the clinic.  I argue 
that anxieties about the aesthetic of pills stems from a) the uneven movement of 
global capital, particularly as it relates to the Indian pharmaceutical market and 
the production of branded, generic, and counterfeit drugs; b) historical and 
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political arguments about the ways in which corruption, mistrust, and suspicion 
have pervaded relations between persons in the period of insurgency (1989-2002) 
and its uncertain aftermath.  As such pills are also markers used to compare 
Kashmir’s political and social environs to other places, while also asserting 
Kashmir’s particular traumatic history. 
Second, I argue that there is multiplicity around the effects of pills, which 
are considered to be unknown, difficult to narrate, and which require somatic 
attention.  This latter multiplicity relates to the fact that biomedical pills are 
thought to be potent or powerful objects, yet this understanding of potency also 
contains an aspect of danger within it.  Rather than such multiplicities being 
excluded from the clinic – the idea that pills are simply prescribed from 
practitioner to patient, or that they exist simply as medicines in the space of the 
clinic - I show how both patients and clinicians are active participants in the 
everyday negotiations around the circulation, use, and consumption of pills.  
As I will show, anxieties around the form and the content of pills cannot 
be easily separated, but rather, mutually inform each other.  For instance, the 
circulation of branded, generic, and counterfeit drugs in Indian markets 
contributes to the sense that the efficacy or content of pills is not stable.  
Approximately 25 per cent of all biomedicines in India are thought to be 
counterfeit, fake, or of “substandard” quality, although there are not clear 
guidelines as to what constitutes “counterfeit” drugs in the Indian market.346  
While concerns around generic and counterfeit drugs abound in other contexts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
346 Lakshmi 2010.  In some instances, counterfeit drugs are those that have been manufactured 
without appropriate licenses.  In other cases, the content of these substances may have been 
compromised when compared to branded or generics.  Further, expired drugs may also be 
labeled “counterfeit” in certain cases.  
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as well, there is something particular about the ways that these concerns congeal 
around pills and not other commodity forms, and that there is a specific history 
at stake here.  
The Marketplace 
In Kashmir, as elsewhere in India, most biomedical pills, including 
psychopharmaceuticals, are obtained over-the-counter from local pharmacy 
(called “chemist”) shops.  Chemist shops are ubiquitous in both rural and urban 
marketplaces, although they are more visible in urban settings.  According to a 
2011 study of consumers in India’s four largest metropolitan areas, 88 per cent of 
respondents said that they had a chemist shop in their neighborhood, while 39 
per cent said that they had more than one.347  In addition to their stockpile of 
drugs, chemist shops also often sell everyday household goods – milk, eggs, one-
rupee sachets of shampoo and laundry detergent, diapers, biscuits, Maggi instant 
noodles, and cooking oil.  The shops are easily identifiable, even to non-English 
speakers, due to the green “+” signs used on their banners (see Figs 15 and 16). In 
Kashmir, chemist shops also occupy an exceptional position as the only vendors 
who are allowed to stay open on strike or curfew days.    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
347 Narayana et al. 2011.  
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Although chemist shops sell drugs at more expensive rates than the 
pharmacies located in government hospitals, they tend to have a more stable 
supply of goods.  As medical anthropologists working in India have shown, most 
pharmaceuticals make their way to Indian consumers not through specialized 
practitioners such as psychiatrists, but through “unlicensed” practitioners, such 
Illustration 
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as chemists, general practitioners (GPs) or rural medical practitioners (RMPs).348  
While chemist shops are usually licensed by the Department of Health, it is 
commonplace to find the everyday running of the chemist shop without the 
presence of a licensed pharmacist.  In addition, many chemist shops are family-
run businesses, where expertise is gained on the job and shared between kin.349     
I gained first-hand experience of the chemist shop as a vital node in the 
circulation of davai when, in the spring of 2010, I developed a kidney infection.  I 
think the infection was caused by the long day-trips I was taking with Action 
Aid’s survey team and the absence of public restrooms for women (an 
unfortunate feature of both rural and urban South Asian landscapes).  Most days 
we would leave Srinagar at nine am and return at six pm or later.  During these 
trips, I would ration my water carefully; perhaps too carefully, I thought later.  
After my symptoms did not improve, one of my psychologist friends took me to 
a GP in a private hospital who smoothly wrote out a prescription for 10 days of 
injectible antibiotics.  I was told that any local chemist could provide me with the 
antibiotics or that I could come back to the private hospital. 
 I decided to go the chemist shop route, partly to avoid the unnecessary 
fuss of the hospital and partly to experience the sociality of a chemist’s shop.  In 
addition to their impressive stockpile of drugs and other everyday commodities, 
the chemist shop I visited also had a separate chamber used for things other than 
collecting medications.  Staff used this space to check customers’ blood pressure, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
348 Ecks and Basu 2009.  
349 In India, the Department of Health and Family Welfare issues two types of licenses for 
operating chemist shops.  One is a Retail Drug License (RDL), which is only supposed to be 
issued to a person who possesses a degree or diploma in pharmacy from a recognized institution.  
The second license, the Wholesale Drug License (WDL) does not have this stipulation.  In practice, 
the pharmacist in whose name the RDL license has been issued might not have any connection 
with the actual running of the shop. 
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administer injections – everything from antibiotics to insulin to calcium – or 
change bandages or gauzes.  Since these shops are often located within 
neighborhoods, many of the customers are known by name or face and have 
been coming to the same shop for years.  In these more informal spaces, patients 
could articulate their preference for injections over other forms of biomedical 
treatment without being questioned.  In her fieldwork in rural north India, Sarah 
Pinto has similarly described how marginalized populations, such as Dalits and 
Muslims, frequently expressed a preference for medical techniques such as 
abortions and injections administered outside of state institutions as entailing 
less risk than those in official spaces.  For such historically disenfranchised 
groups, the fear that hospital needles might contain poison or that they might 
receive inadequate care or forced sterilization while in hospital was a very real 
one.350  As we shall see, patients in Kashmir also expressed similar fears.   
In the chemist shop, the air was usually calm, as people waited around 
unrushed.  Despite the presence of gauzes, syringes, tubes and pills, the 
atmosphere resembled the homely drawing rooms used by pirs351 – in which 
rounds of tea and bread are served as families wait to be seen – rather than the 
bureaucratized space of a doctor’s waiting room.  In addition to this paramedic 
work, in the main part of the shop, chemists acted as full-fledged albeit “ersatz” 
doctors, doing much more than just filling prescriptions.352  They exercised their 
own diagnostic capabilities every day since many customers came without 
prescriptions or with outdated ones.  As a result, chemists created their own 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
350 Pinto 2004: 343.  See also Tarlo 2003.  
351 Most Sufi healers in Kashmir practice from their homes.  
352 Pinto 2004.  
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chains of treatment after asking questions about symptoms, past ailments, and 
side effects.  
Nonetheless, while the chemist shops appeared to be immune from some 
of the formal bureaucratization of hospitals, they were not outside of the logics of 
mistrust and corruption that characterized interpersonal relations in Kashmir, 
particularly those mediated by commercial interests.  Chemists themselves 
acknowledged their in-between role between pharmaceutical companies and 
consumers and told me how pharmaceutical representatives would periodically 
come to quiz the staff about what kinds of drugs they prescribed, in order to 
designate them “A” (high) or “B” (low) prescribers.353  In addition to being 
guided by profit motives, ordinary Kashmiris also questioned the authenticity of 
chemists and the medicines they provided.  
Part of this mistrust was generated by the fact that almost all 
pharmaceuticals and psychopharmaceuticals are found in three, almost identical 
forms in the marketplace: as “branded/ethical,” “generic” and “counterfeit” 
drugs.  Most patients do not know whether they are being prescribed a generic 
or branded drugs, and prescriptions are difficult to read, even for those 
conversant in English.  Although branded and generics are meant to be identical 
in content, generic medications cost significantly less than their branded 
counterparts.  For example, whereas ten capsules of fluoxetine (the active 
ingredient in Prozac) 20mg sold for less than $1 in India in 2008, the same 
amount sold for $40 in the US by the pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
353 Ecks and Basu 2009. 
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Whereas only one company (Eli Lilly) produces Prozac, there are over sixty 
companies that produce fluoxetine in the Indian market.354  
The vast production of generic drugs like fluoxetine in India was enabled 
by a national patent regime (in place from 1972-2005) that protected the process of 
drug manufacturing, not the active ingredients.  In practice, this meant that any 
molecule, even if produced in other countries, could be reverse-engineered and 
generically produced in India.  Over the past decades, this patent regime has 
allowed the Indian pharmaceutical industry to become the world’s leading 
producer and exporter of generic medications.355  Meanwhile, the Indian 
pharmaceutical market is a crowded space, with thousands of small, medium, 
and large pharmaceutical companies competing with practically identical 
“generic” medications.356  Some scholars, like Stefan Ecks and Soumita Basu 
(2009) have argued that the proliferation of generic drugs in the Indian market 
contradicts World Health Organization (WHO) assumptions about “treatment 
gaps” in mental health care between developed and developing countries.  
While it is certainly true that psychopharmaceuticals are widely available 
in Indian markets, such arguments flatten the multiplicity of pills, which produce 
differentiations between generics and branded drugs, even though these are 
alleged to contain the same active ingredients and presumably, efficacy. In other 
words, while it may be true that Indian consumers financially benefit from the 
wide availability and relatively low cost of generic medications, there is an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
354 In a landmark 2004 case, the Indian pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy won FDA approval to 
sell generic fluoxetine 40 mg in the US. 
355Ecks and Basu 2009. This particular regime is set to change in 2015, when India becomes a 
signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
takes effect, as part of its WTO membership requirements. 
356 According to a 2005 Ernst and Young study, only about 250 of the estimated 3000-20,000 
pharmaceutical companies in India today generated annual sales of more than US $2 million 
(Ecks and Basu 2009: 96). 
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“ecology of comparison”357 at work.  By “ecology of comparison,” I refer to the 
process by which pills produce Kashmir as a substandard, potentially poisoned 
landscape in contrast to an imagined ‘outside,’ which is less corrupt, wealthier, 
and more modern.  Such comparisons also manifest themselves in the personal 
preferences of younger drug users, for whom intoxicants that can be purchased 
from the market or stationary shop are more valuable than those that are found 
naturally grown. 
It is not accidental, for example, that while most generics are produced by 
Indian pharmaceutical companies, most branded drugs are produced by Euro-
American companies.  As one pharmaceutical representative told me, “It is not 
clear where generic drugs are manufactured and under what conditions.  There 
could be a scrimping on ingredients or the exclusion of basic salts.”  In this 
account, there is an unstable relationship between the pill’s form and content, 
based on whether or not a drug is labeled generic or branded.  This was also 
captured by the fact that Kashmiris referred to branded drugs using the English 
word, “ethical.” 
Ethical, generic, and counterfeit drugs are difficult to tell apart because of 
the aesthetics at work in the production of these commodities.  Like other non-
branded commodities in the Indian market – such as music CDs, DVDs, or 
clothes – the ‘real’ and ‘not-real’ closely resemble each other.  As Constantine 
Nakassis has shown in the case of counterfeit and branded clothes sold for 
domestic consumption in South India, for example:  
local producers increasingly altered the logos and names of their 
brand ‘models’ [such as turning the outdoor sporting goods 
company Columbia into Columbian] in order to make them different !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
357 Choy 2011.  
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enough so as to not count as counterfeiting.  To their mind, only an 
exact replica would count as breaking the law.  But to treat such 
brand designs as aesthetic objects, freely able to be borrowed the 
same way one might use a color palette or geometrical shape, 
would be unproblematic.”358   
 
Unlike the production of counterfeit clothing, generic medications in India 
are legal. However, recent news reports have also pointed to the vast market in 
counterfeit drugs as a byproduct of generic production.  As one New Delhi-
based private investigator put it, “They look real, but these are all fakes,” 
pointing to confiscated counterfeits in the packaging of GlaxoSmithKline, 
Novartis and Pfizer.359  In this sense, a similar logic governs the aesthetics of 
domestic pharmaceutical packaging, whereby the branded packages serve as 
“aesthetic objects, freely able to be borrowed” in the way that Nakassis describes 
branded clothing companies like Columbia and Adidas.  Brands such as Prozac  
(Fig 17) serve as “models” for the ways that fluoxetine generics, such as Fludac 
by the Indian pharmaceutical company, Cadila (Fig 18) look.  
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358 Nakassis 2012.  
359 Lakshmi 2010.!!
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 Many patients articulated the unstable relationship between ethical, 
generic, and counterfeits in economic terms: if the same medicine can cost ten 
rupees or forty rupees, how can it be the same thing?  A patient I met at a 
hospital of Unani medicine, Bashir Iqbal also described generics with a sense of 
distrust.  Bashir told me that recently, his wife had gotten a rash and she had 
used a tube of generic medicine, but her symptoms had not improved.  “Here the 
chemists make so much money,” Bashir told me, “And I have no faith even if I go 
to the doctor, because he might prescribe a generic medicine [rather than a 
branded one].  It would be different if he were to write a proper medicine. But 
how would I even know if he wrote a poison or if he wrote a medicine?”   
 In his narrative, Bashir located the agency of the thing firmly with 
branded rather than generic drugs by describing branded drugs as “proper 
medicines.”  Yet, as a person without the medical expertise to distinguish 
Illustration 13: The 
packaging of Fludac 
(fluoxetine) by the 
Indian pharmaceutical 
company, Cadila!!
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between generics and branded drugs, Bashir also pointed to how this 
pharmaceutical regime promoted a culture of mistrust between doctors and 
patients, in which doctors might just prescribe poison.  The questioning of 
generics was not restricted to patients.  One of the psychiatrists I worked with 
described the subsidized psychopharmaceuticals available at the Government 
Psychiatric Diseases hospital as “sawdust.”  I found that this deep sense of 
mistrust and inconsistency about the content of pills has led patients to develop 
modes of self-medication or self-care, which are more in line with their own 
bodily sensations, responses, and experiences of medication, rather than clinical 
prescriptions.   
 For Bashir, the efficacy of pills was also dependent upon the ethical 
orientation of the biomedical practitioner or the person giving the medication.  
As such, practitioners could also be ranked in terms of their efficacy.  For Bashir, 
pills and practitioners were deeply intertwined; as he put it, “English medicine is 
alright as long as the practitioner is alright.”  Within global psychiatric practice, 
pills are powerful precisely because they are detachable from practitioners and 
institutions, fostering de-institutionalized care.  For patients, however, the 
detachability of pills was also a source of anxiety: “We buy medicines from the 
market, we don’t even know what is inside of them,” one patient said, contrasting 
this with an economy of the past, in which you procured raw ingredients, such as 
medicinal plants or herbs directly from healers themselves.  (Today, of course, 
Ayurveda, Unani, and biomedical concoctions all jostle for space on the same 
crowded shelves of chemist shops).  “And if we did know what was inside of 
them, but still ate them, then that would be an even greater sin,” he said, 
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referring to the possibility pork fat being used, which would be haram 
(forbidden) within Islam.360  
Others like Bashir also felt that doctors had become corrupted and now 
only worked for money.  Bashir compared the contemporary situation to a past 
where biomedical treatment was untainted by the nefarious forces of violence 
and corruption.  He told me that, years ago, there used to be an English doctor in 
SMHS, Kashmir’s largest public hospital, who had put his hand on his mother’s 
stomach and knew that she had a gall bladder problem. This particular doctor 
had also saved Bashir’s father from having an unnecessary surgery, while a 
different doctor had told him that surgery was essential.   
Medical practitioners who I interviewed also echoed a sense that 
‘branded’ or good doctors were ones who had a x-ray clinical vision and could 
unlock powerful ailments simply by touching or listening to a pulse.361  
According to Bashir, the entire discipline of medicine had become corrupted; 
rather than rely on touch, “now they have ultrasounds and God knows what 
else; they even strip the person naked,” he told me, horrified.  Bashir’s aversion 
to these biomedical practices invoked doctor-patient relations that were not just 
corrupted by the onset of commercial interests (although this was also 
important), but also by the compromise of social ethics and responsibilities, such 
as norms of modesty.  
In his narrative, Bashir pointed to the possibility of being poisoned either 
by the drug itself or by the practitioner.  This suggests a level of mistrust that is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
360 As I recounted in Chapter Two, medical missionaries also faced similar rumors about pork fat 
being used in biomedical treatment.  
361 Listening to the pulse is one of the diagnostic techniques used in Ayurvedic and Unani 
medicine. 
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deeper than the idea that medicine has been sullied by commercial interests.  In 
particular, I argue that such worries about misrecognition marked daily 
interactions between Kashmiris, as it was commonly said that, “You never know 
who anyone is in Kashmir.”  Given the long duration of the conflict and the 
ongoing participation of multiple shadowy forces – Indian and Pakistani 
paramilitary groups and intelligence organizations and local political factions 
(some of whom were funded by either side) – it was difficult to know who 
worked for who.  Many times I would return from an interview and a friend 
would tell me that I had actually interviewed a mole of the Indian or Pakistani 
intelligence or sometimes even the CIA.  I would suggest that the unpredictable 
movement of rumors about persons also extended to rumors about objects of 
care, including pills.  While violence had exacerbated people’s dependency on 
davai, many felt that this dependency was not without consequence.   
The Clinic 
 Medical professionals tried to establish a singular ontology of pills in the 
clinic, based around notions of compliance and the definition of mental illness as 
a chronic problem, requiring the consumption of psychopharmaceuticals, even 
without the presence of existing symptoms.  However, given the multiplicities 
around pills, such norms of “compliance” were rarely accomplished.  As such, 
rather than being a one-way process of prescription, the clinic was a space of 
negotiation, where relationships between patients and biomedical pills could not 
be reduced to a singular, clinical ontology.   
In this section, I explore the ways in which complex relations between 
persons and pills emerged in the clinic to unexpected ends.  These multiplicities 
once again related to the effect and forms of biomedical pills, including a 
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troubled history of kinship expressed through relations with pills; class-based 
preference for pills as intoxicants or medicine as drugs; and the sense that pills 
act on the body in ways that are difficult to discern but ultimately detrimental.  
In presenting a case of patient non-compliance from the Drug De-Addiction 
Clinic (DDC), I show how a clinical ontology of pills interacts with, and misses, 
the complexities of one particular patient’s complicated history with 
biomedicine.  
Tuesday, June 15, 2010 [From my field notes] 
Today is the third day of a statewide strike. Three days ago, a teenager, 
Tufail Ahmed Mattoo, was killed by a teargas shell on his way home from 
an after-school tutorial.  The shell came from security forces or the police; 
we are not sure.  On the street, they found his notebooks, half-filled with 
practice exercises.  Syed Ali Shah Geelani, the head of one of Kashmir’s 
largest pro-independence political parties, the Hurriyat-G, lies on a 
hospital bed in Delhi and issues a call for more strikes.  The marketplaces 
are eerily quiet in protest of Tufail’s death; all the shop shutters down—or 
almost down. By now we’ve learned to read the in-between signs, those 
shopkeepers who crack their shutters open a few inches are willing to sell 
surreptitiously. Long, green summer gourds and money are exchanged 
quickly and quietly. Nothing more is revealed than a tanned and wrinkled 
hand from the other side.  Some mumble that they have been threatened by 
young boys on motorcycles who demand that their shutters stay all the 
way down.  The dogs own the streets – they stretch themselves out in the 
middle of the road, yawning lazily.  
 
There are no auto rickshaws today, so I walk to the De-Addiction Center, 
from the street confrontations into the confrontations of the clinic.  Hilal, 
one of the admitted patients, is standing in the middle of the ward in 
disheveled clothes.  He announces to the other patients that they should 
not swallow their medicines. He has been faking his own medication intake 
for days, it turns out.  
When the staff tells Hilal to “come down, talk to us, at least talk to us 
first,” Hilal responds, “I am absolutely fine, I am absolutely fine.”  He is 
mimicking the psychiatrist, Dr. Wiqar, who tells him those same words 
every morning (“You are absolutely fine now”) while taking his blood 
pressure and tapering his medication.  But now the staff tell him: No, 
Hilal, this time you are not fine.  
 
The clinical psychologist, Dr. Muzzafar, and the social worker, Yasir, 
exchange glances at this irony.  Dr. Muzzafar has been in arguments with 
Dr. Wiqar for weeks over the fact that he tells patients that they are 
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“absolutely fine” during their medical check-ups every morning.  “Well, 
then they think, if I’m absolutely fine, why can’t I go home?”  Dr. 
Muzzafar told me earlier, shaking his head.  “Then it becomes a problem 
for us to keep them here.  We have to motivate them all over again.”  Of 
course, what Dr. Wiqar means is that they are “absolutely fine” from a 
purely medical standpoint, not in terms of the psychological or social 
component of their treatment, which is not his “domain.”  
 
In the middle of this standoff, I ask Hilal why he doesn’t want his 
medicine.  He says that he’s not suffering any side effects.  “I don’t have 
diarrhea or pain in my legs or body, so why should I take these 
medicines?” he asks.  Dr. Muzzafar tells Hilal that it’s not his choice; it’s 
not up to him when to decide to stop taking the pills. Now Dr. Muzzafar 
tries to appeal to Hilal in a more gentle way: he is older than the other 
boys, he is married, he is from a pirzada (high caste) family and he 
should be behaving in a manner more befitting of his position and status.  
Finally, after much persuasion, Hilal reluctantly agrees to start taking his 
pills again.  As we file out of the ward, Dr. Muzzafar tells one of the 
security guards that he has his permission to beat up any patient who 
refuses to take his medication.  Dr. Wiqar tells me that in the US, patients 
who refuse to take their meds are called “cheekers,” because they store the 
pills in their cheeks.  “In psychiatry, we call these people malingerers,” he 
tells me.   
 
 Although it was a crisis, Hilal’s outburst was not a total surprise.  A day 
earlier, Hilal’s refusal to take medication had been anxiously noted in his file by 
Dr. Wiqar.  Dr. Wiqar marked this event as a crisis by noting not just the date of 
its occurrence, but also the specific time, 4:20 pm.  
From the file of Pirzada Hilal Ahmed: 
June 14, 2010 – 4:20 pm.   
Pt. does not want medicine. 
STOP Gabapentin362 
STOP Inj. Neurobion forte 
STOP Librium363 
STOP Dolo364  
Pt. refuses to consume syp. Practin [sic] on inquiry of allegation. 
Plan: Pt. to be kept in DDC only if motivation is enhanced  (Pt. creating problems 
in DDC, trying to get Codeine by various means). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
362 Used in the treatment of seizures or epilepsy.  
363 Chlordiazepoxide, used to relieve anxiety and to control agitation caused by alcohol 
withdrawal. 
364 Paracetamol.  
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Here pills and the dispute around them became the markers of ongoing tensions 
between the different disciplines in the clinic – the clinical psychologists and 
social worker, on the one side, and the psychiatrist on the other.  “Pt. to be kept 
in DDC only if motivation is enhanced” indicated that since motivation was the 
realm of the psychosocial, as the psychiatrist, Dr. Wiqar was absolved of all 
responsibility.  He reduced his role to purely pharmacological functions and the 
repeated “STOPs” in the file were a note limiting his own interventions since the 
psychosocial interventions had failed.   
 The day of Hilal’s outburst, Dr. Wiqar also avoided responsibility for what 
happened.  In the file, he described Hilal’s outburst as: “Misbehavior in ward 
reported.  Pt. has not taken medicine and reports no medical complaint.”  
Although he was present in the ward for the unfolding of this scene, Dr. Wiqar 
again chose to write himself out of it.  “Misbehavior” was simply reported; it just 
happened.  This signaled his careful attempt to delineate a field of intervention 
for himself that was separate from the realm of the psychosocial, but nonetheless 
one that was also marked by it (see Chapter One).   
 For the DDC staff, Hilal presented a risk in a number of ways.  He was 
“creating problems” in the center and he lacked motivation to stay.  As Dr. Wiqar 
frustratingly described to me the day before the incident in the ward: “Yesterday 
he bluntly refused medicine.  I discussed it with him for a long time, but he 
bluntly refused.  Medicine cannot be forced, but this is where the skill of the 
practitioner comes in… he will have to be motivated again.”  In referring to the 
“skill of the practitioner,” Dr. Wiqar felt that the brewing crisis was due to 
ongoing failures by Dr. Muzzafar and Yasir.  Meanwhile, Dr. Muzzafar and Yasir 
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used Hilal’s outburst to express their frustrations towards Dr. Wiqar.  They were 
secretly relishing the fact that, in his psychotic outburst, Hilal had turned Dr. 
Wiqar’s medical phrase – “you are absolutely fine” – upside down.  
 The incident with Hilal left a trace on the De-Addiction Clinic in terms of 
tensions between the staff being foregrounded, but it was not a particularly 
significant event in Hilal’s own self narrative.  Within the clinic’s logic, Hilal’s 
refusal to take medication was an effect of his opiod dependency, or possibly, an 
indicator of Bipolar Affective Disorder or “F19” (mental and behavioral 
disorders due to multiple drug use and use of other psychoactive substances),365 
both of which were “queried” in his file as potential diagnoses.  In a subsequent 
interview with Hilal, however, it came to light that his dependency on medicinal 
opiates was tied to a much more complicated relationship with biomedicine in 
general and pills in particular.  Pills, for Hilal, were a material force connecting 
him to his father, who had also suffered from a severe mental illness.  
 Hilal told me that his father was treated for many years by Dr. 
Mohammed Beg, a famous (he described him using the English phrase “brand 
name”) psychiatrist in Kashmir who was widely known as the ‘father of 
psychiatry.’  Hilal’s father ran a chemist shop in Shopian, a town in north 
Kashmir.  According to Hilal, his father had such a sharp temperament (tez) that 
he would “scare customers away.”  During Hilal’s childhood, he remembers his 
father yelling at him and his siblings, “If even two rupees were missing.”  In 
contrast, Hilal’s mother was a very “decent and loving” (shareef) woman, he says.  
His mother’s relatives used to tell her that it was because she had “too much !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
365 The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioral Disorders: Clinical descriptions and 
diagnostic guidelines (F10-F19).   
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patience (sabr)” that all her children turned out badly.  Hilal told me that ever 
since he could remember, his father used to beat his mother, and she would lie to 
people, telling them that she fell down the stairs.  “My father,” began Hilal, 
would take medicines for his illness. Dr. Beg would give him 
medicines for tension366 [Eng.] He would give him Librium and 
Diazepam. Then he would fall asleep and I would take control of 
the shop.  But after Dr. Beg’s death, about 20 or 25 years ago, my 
father stopped taking the medicines.  He started misbehaving with 
us all over again, but people would tell me, ‘Leave it.  He’s your 
father.’ 
 
 Nonetheless, the problems between Hilal and his father continued and 
eventually led Hilal to seek treatment from a psychiatrist as well.  The doctor 
Hilal visited, whom he remembered by name – Dr. Ghulam Rasool Sheikh – also 
prescribed Hilal with Diazepam as well and some other pills he called “81.”  The 
problematic kin knot was tightened through the generational transmission of 
illness.   
After taking these medications, Hilal said that his “mouth would shut 
down.  I wouldn’t be able to speak at all.”  He went to see another doctor who 
told him to drink “a couple of capfuls of Corex [Codeine phosphate].”367  Hilal 
says that he slowly got into the habit of taking Codeine because it would make 
him feel relaxed and peaceful [sakoon milta tha].  Gradually, he began increasing 
the amount he took and eventually he felt that “he couldn’t do anything without 
it.”  Despite his escalating medicinal use, it was important for Hilal to keep it a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
366 As Murphy Halliburton has astutely pointed out, although English language words such as 
tension, stress, and depression have made their way into vernacular South Asian languages, 
these words are used distinctively from their association with psychological distress or embodied 
experience in English.  Specifically, he argues that these terms are used as kinetic metaphors in 
Malayalam (and I would argue, Kashmiri as well) and denote a physical torsion – “they convey a 
feeling of pressure or weight on the body in order to represent conditions of mind and emotion” 
(Halliburton 2002: 1131).   
367 An opiod painkiller.  
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secret.  He got engaged about two years after he started using Codeine, and since 
his fiancée’s family lived nearby, he didn’t want word about his drug use getting 
around.  He used to only drink Codeine alone, he said.  “I felt that others who 
took drugs were dirty (ganda), and I didn’t want to be associated with them.  I 
still drank, but just alone.”   
 For Hilal, it was important that Codeine was medicine or davai.  “Yes, its 
true that it intoxicates,” he told me, “but it is a medicine.”  According to Hilal, 
this made Codeine distinct from other intoxicants like alcohol (sharaab).  Because 
Codeine was a medicine, it also had positive properties.  While other intoxicants 
like alcohol, “depressed the mind” (dimag dal jaata hai), with Codeine, Hilal felt 
that he could be more productive, that it enhanced his ability to work well.  As a 
result, he felt that he would not have taken another substance in place of 
Codeine.  
Nonetheless, Hilal’s drug use precipitated the sense that he was becoming 
like his father.  “Slowly, I became like him,” he told me.  Before his wedding, 
Hilal decided to quit Codeine because he was worried that it might affect the 
relationship with his fiancée.  He said that he managed to stay clean, despite the 
fact that he was in a lot of pain.  Although Hilal worked hard to maintain cordial 
relations with his wife and in-laws, his father made it extremely difficult for him.  
The day of the nikah ceremony (the signing of the marriage contract), there were 
32 relatives from Hilal’s family who were set to go to his wife’s home.  A few 
hours before the ceremony, Hilal’s father called his wife’s family and 
mysteriously told them that only four people would be coming.  His wife’s 
family became upset and said that they had made arrangements for forty people 
to come, and why had Hilal’s family “ruined [lit. thrown water on] everything?”  
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They thought that the entire marriage was going to be called off.  Eventually the 
issue was straightened out and the marriage proceeded.  No one knew why 
Hilal’s father had taken this bizarre step and almost jeopardized the entire 
arrangement.  When Hilal spoke to me about this particular incident, his voice 
quivered with anger.  
 Hilal articulated his knotty relationship with his father through the 
language of biomedicine, specifically davai; in other words, the dependencies 
produced through mental illness and drugs such as Diazepam became “part of 
the relational mix that is kinship.”368  For Hilal, the relationship with his father 
was cemented through the fact that they shared a history of “tension,” as well as 
with medication - both father and son were prescribed Diazepam.  However, 
unlike the heroin addicts that Angela Garcia worked with in New Mexico, for 
whom shooting up heroin together was a form of care, here, Diazepam was not a 
shared practice.  Rather, like heroin, it was the unfortunate groove through 
which painful kin relations circulated.   
Hilal structured the time spent with his father as drifting between times 
when his father was “on medication” and therefore his behavior was somewhat 
subdued (“he would fall asleep”) so that Hilal could properly “take control” of 
the shop.  However, times when his father was not on medication are marked by 
anxiety and interpersonal turmoil for Hilal, including the violent behavior he 
expressed towards his mother and the fact that he almost jeopardized Hilal’s 
marriage plans as well.  This complicated history with medicine – including an 
ambivalent relationship to his father’s own treatment and problems with mental 
illness (although Hilal never named it such, only as “tension”) – was somehow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
368 Garcia 2010: 128. 
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crystallized in the ward incident.  Yet it also extended to experiences outside of 
his troubled relationship with his father.  In this sense, pills, even when used in 
the clinic, articulated with a range of interpersonal relations that were outside of 
the staff’s control.  Further, despite the clinic’s best efforts to demarcate drugs 
within the clinic as being different from intoxicants used outside the clinic, such 
distinctions were constantly blurred by patient doubts about the sanctity of the 
form/content relation of pills. 
Medicine as Drugs, Drugs as Medicine  
Other patients in the De-Addiction Clinic also expressed complex, 
ambivalent relations towards pills.  Most patients had abused some form of 
medicinal opiates in the form of pills and described these as davai or medicine.  
As I will show in this section, there were many reasons why former drug users 
found pills to be desirable intoxicants, including, significantly, a metonymic 
relation between substance and person.369  These classifications were strikingly 
different from the medico-legal classifications used by clinicians, which 
categorized drugs as opiates, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, cannabis 
and volatile solvents.  Whereas clinicians also used character “typologies” to 
relate to particular substances (ex. alcoholics tend to be gregarious, jovial and 
have rosy cheeks), patients described an alternate ontology based on whether 
drugs were “natural” or “man made.”  Further, given their prior entanglements 
with and dependence on biomedicine, most patients found it difficult to continue 
to trust medicines as a form of de-addiction treatment within the clinic.     
Whether a patient chose to do “natural” drugs or “man made” drugs said 
a lot about his personality, class background, and ethics.  While those who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
369 Daniel 1984. 
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smoked hashish were generally derided as being “low class,” they were also 
described as being more “spiritually inclined,” “artistic,” or “Sufi” compared to 
those who chose other substances.  As a precocious seventeen-year old patient 
named Junaid made clear, differences between drugs indexed differences in 
personhood.  Junaid was a user of what the clinic called “volatile” substances – 
namely glue (known by its brand name, Fevicol) and whitener fluid (known as 
“flud” or mushka).  Junaid felt that substances like medicine or glue – those that 
could be purchased at a chemist or stationary shop – were more respectable than 
“natural” drugs like cannabis.  According to Junaid, substances like fluid or glue 
were “the drugs of choice for Westerners” (yeh angrez ka nasha hai); they also 
happened to be the drugs of choice for young men under the age of 21.  While 
substances like whitener fluid and Fevicol came from other parts of India, 
“natural” drugs were produced locally.  For Junaid, cannabis and other “natural 
drugs” were what “low class people, like drivers,” consume.  On the other hand, 
those who chose to do “fluid” and other substances styled themselves as middle 
or upper-middle class and were desirous of a fast-paced, exciting life (mazaa).   
In contrast to “natural” drug users who self-identified as Sufis and were 
more “spiritually inclined” (see chapter 5), those who used medicines also felt 
that there were certain advantages to the materiality of pills.  In addition to the 
advantages of class, “man made” intoxicants such as pills were preferable in that 
they were more difficult to detect - they did not have a distinct smell, like alcohol 
or hashish.  As everyday commodity or therapeutic objects, they were also easier 
to conceal than bottles of alcohol or cigarettes.  Since hashish was mostly smoked 
mixed with tobacco, in rolled cigarettes, cigarettes could arouse suspicion.  In 
addition, according to many drug users that I interviewed, the red eyes that 
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sometimes accompanied cannabis use were a giveaway.  While medicines 
blurred your perception, sense of time, and balance, many said that these were 
easier to disguise than the telltale signs of “natural” intoxicants.   
In this sense, “man made” vs. “natural” substances were seen as 
producing fundamentally different ethical subjectivities, which were in turn, 
deeply influenced by class distinctions.  Despite the fact that using medicines 
was a form of mitigating the shame associated with drug use, however, all 
intoxicants were labeled as shameful in some way.  While many patients in detox 
described experimenting with drugs for the first time in social settings, many 
described getting high alone because they were too ashamed or embarrassed that 
their habit might bring ruin to their entire family.  A former alcoholic told me 
that his decision to get clean was catalyzed by a time when he heard his neighbor 
call out to her children not to play with his daughter, because she was the 
“daughter of an alcoholic” (sharaabi ki beti).370  He said that he flashed forwarded 
to a time in the future when he and his wife would struggle to find a marriage 
partner for his daughter because of his behavior.  It was in this moment that he 
realized the effect of his behavior on his family, and it was then that he decided 
to seek help.   For Hilal, similarly, the fact that he was using a medicine and not a 
“drug like cannabis” somewhat mitigated the label that he was an addict.  Yet, he 
was well aware of the habit-forming potential of Codeine, which he described as 
making him feel “dirty” (ganda).  Despite the fact that he was using medicine, 
Hilal was not immune to the logic of contamination or impurity with which he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
370 Alcohol (sharaab) occupies a different status in Kashmir because of its explicit prohibition in 
the Qu’ran.  In everyday discourse, I found that there was much more social stigma around 
alcohol than other intoxicants.   
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associated the act of being high (nasha karna).  This meant that he had to keep his 
drug use a secret and that he only drank Codeine alone.371   
Many former drug users at the Drug De-Addiction Center also expressed 
skepticism about the role of medication in the process of detoxification or getting 
clean.  As Veena Das has argued, skepticism has the ability to “unsettle social 
relations and produce the conditions of possibility for suffering and violence.”372  
I add to this an ethnographic account of how not just social relations, but 
relations with objects, are also disrupted in a highly skeptical environment, 
producing the sense of being caught or suspended. 
This skepticism was produced through patients’ emphasis on willpower 
as the key to staying clean rather than anything the clinic could offer them, as 
well as the experience of having already been habituated to medicines.  Rafiq, a 
28 year-old handicrafts salesman and former heroin user, often complained to 
me about the medicines that he was being given at the De-Addiction Center.  He 
said that the medicines gave him headaches, made his mouth dry, and were 
“unreliable.”  He also acknowledged that medicines were not all that important 
in the process of staying clean, and on a previous occasion, he had quit “brown” 
(heroin) entirely on his own, by locking himself up in his room for a month.  
Many other patients also had similar experiences of detoxing on their own and 
being able to stay clean for a few months or years, without their relatives or 
friends ever knowing about their habit.  For many, this was preferable to being 
incarcerated and potentially outed.     
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
371 There was a pervasive sense that both drug use and treatment needed to be kept a secret.  
Drug users were anxious about the group setting of the De-Addiction Clinic, for instance, and 
how it might betray their association to intoxicants.  For more on this, see Chapter Five. 
372 Das 2007 in Khan 2012: 13.   
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Others, like Hilal, also doubted medicines because their addiction had 
been iatrogenic.  One patient I interviewed, Hidayatullah, was 45 years old, 
married, with four children.  He worked as a senior pharmacist in the Health 
Department of the Jammu and Kashmir government and had also been 
appointed as First Respondent for the Indian Army in Uri, an area close to the 
battlefield of the Kargil war, which was fought between India and Pakistan in 
1999.   When I asked him about the years of insurgency in Kashmir, he sounded 
rattled.  He said that “militancy” (the insurgency) has wrecked havoc on 
Kashmiri society; “the panorama of death has depressed me, despaired me, 
handicapped me,” he said.  “There was a time I thought—which bullet will kill 
me?  Or which might rescue me?  I experienced it all: despondency, grief, 
despair, helplessness.”  Hidayatullah said that soon after the war, he decided to a 
see a doctor for what he described as “persistent shivering.”  The doctor 
prescribed a sleeping aid, Alparax373 (known in the US as Xanax), which is 
known to have addictive properties. As a pharmacist, Hidayatullah knew this, 
but said that he continued to take it, sometimes mixing it with another 
alprazolam called Anxit.  Hidayatullah told me that he knew that the doctor had 
made a mistake prescribing Alparax, but he kept using.   
Then, in 2007, Hidayatullah became ill with pneumonia and began taking 
Codeine phosphate, a medicine that is one of the most widely used 
pharmaceutical intoxicants in Kashmir.  He said that when he tried to quit 
Codeine, he couldn’t, because by then his drug use “had already become a 
chain.”  Hidayatullah said that he had taken pills to “escape his original life.”  
However, unlike Rafiq, Hidayatullah said that although he had tried to stop !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
373 A short acting anxiolytic of the benzodiazepine class of psychoactive drugs. 
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several times at home, he had not been successful.  As a result, he felt that the in-
patient treatment he was receiving at the De-Addiction Clinic was necessary for 
him to quit drugs entirely.  
For drug users, as well as for other users of pharmaceuticals, davai are 
thus known to have potent, and potentially dangerous, properties and effects.  
While I have shown how former drug users negotiated their intoxication through 
substances that were befitting to their personalities and class considerations, in 
the following section, I focus on how notions of potency make their way into the 
clinic through means other than the phenomenology of intoxication.   
Negotiations 
Unlike the English word potency, the Hindu/Urdu term shakti374 has an 
ambivalent quality – the potential to harm as well as heal.  While doctors often 
characterized their patients as hungry or desirous for pills, I found that pills were 
located within a continuum of biomedical objects of efficacy and care, which 
included more reliable objects such as injections and less reliable objects like talk 
therapy.  As I have shown, pills were laden with anxieties related to their form 
(generic, ethical, and counterfeit) as well as their content or uncertain effects.  As 
such, rather than think of pills flowing in one direction, from doctors to patients, 
I have tried to describe a more complex map, where pills circulate beyond 
authorized domains and where they frequently exceed their intended function.  
As such, I argue that diverse patient experiences of these objects produce them as 
unstable material objects. 
Within the psychiatric hospital, the role of pills in treatment had to be 
carefully negotiated through an account of bodily effects.  However, as I will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
374 The English term, “potent” comes from the Latin potens or able, from the verb posse, to be able.  
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show, in order for a negotiation to be successful for the patient, the language of 
the body needed to fortuitously dovetail with the language of “extrapyramidal” 
symptoms or side effects.  Psychiatrists in Kashmir were well versed in the 
intense debates around side effects for different psychopharmaceuticals.  Debates 
around traditional antipsychotics, for example, have been particularly intense, 
where “extrapyramidal symptoms” (EPS) or side effects include tremors, 
involuntary movements, rigidity, bodily restlessness, muscle contractions and 
changes in heart rate, and in some cases can be fatal.375  As I will show, debates 
about “extrapyramidal symptoms” served as important guidelines in everyday 
clinical practice, when many patients expressed symptoms and bodily affects 
that did not fit into the existing scientific literature.  Thus, although advances in 
neurochemistry and pharmacology have been essential to global de-
institutionalization movements, psychiatrists and mental health practitioners 
were also often cognizant of the fact that pills can have unexpected, detrimental 
effects on the body.  Yet the burden of proof always lay with the patient.  
As I have shown, patients frequently expressed concern whether or not 
they had been prescribed the correct medication – whether they had gone to a 
doctor or a chemist, what these medicines actually contained, and what 
unknown effects they had on the body.  Unlike many consumers of 
psychopharmaceuticals in the United States, who expressed side effects that were 
in line with clinical conceptions (such as weight gain or drowsiness),376 many 
consumers in Kashmir spoke in idioms – such as notions of pressure or 
temperature – that were not recognized by doctors as legitimate. Even the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
375 Leibing 2009: 182.  
376 Jenkins and Carpenter-Song 2005.  
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English-language word, “tension,” which has been vernacularized, does not 
connote the clinical definition of hypertension so much as the notion of heaviness 
or weight, as in, literally, ‘Don’t take more weight on yourself” [Tension mat 
le].’377  As such, many of the effects described by Kashmiri patients did not fit into 
the clinical matrix of “acceptable” or “authorized” side effects.   
A clinical encounter that I witnessed between a woman in her twenties 
called Ruksana and one of the psychiatrists at the government psychiatric 
hospital, exemplified the ways multiple ontologies can rub up against each other.  
Much like the complex negotiations that mark relations between healers (pirs), 
djinns, and persons, the clinic is also a space where the effects of drugs are 
negotiated, rather than fixed.   
Ruksana came to the Out Patient Department (OPD) of the psychiatric 
hospital on a cold Saturday morning in November 2009.  Despite the damp, gray 
day, patients and their families huddled outside the OPD in their long overcoats 
(pherans), waiting for their name to be called to enter the doctor’s chamber, as 
they did almost every day.  This particular morning, I found Dr. Zaid Wani, the 
psychiatrist on duty, in a bad mood.  When I entered the consulting room, Dr. 
Zaid told me that he was suffering from a bad backache, due to the fact that his 
car had broken down the previous day, and while changing the tire, he had 
experienced a spasm in his back.  In addition, he explained, none of the 
postgraduate (PG) psychiatry students or other psychiatrists who were supposed 
to be in attendance for the OPD were present, leaving Dr. Zaid to handle the 
large volume of patients single handedly.  When I entered the OPD, I overheard 
him telling someone on the other end of the phone, “No one is here.  No one is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
377 Halliburton 2002. 
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here.”  Nonetheless, as he had done so many times before, Dr. Zaid decided to 
get on with it.  The steady stream of patients began at ten am and ended at two 
pm, at which time Dr. Zaid would usually wearily retreat to his office, where I 
had seen him chain smoke cigarettes, play Farmville on Facebook, and maybe 
work on his PTSD article.   
  
At about 10:30 am, when I had been sitting with Dr. Zaid for about half an 
hour, Ruksana entered.  From their familiar mode of greeting each other, I 
learned that Ruksana had been Dr. Zaid’s patient for the duration of her illness.  
Here, I reproduce an excerpt of their exchange to underscore the ways in which 
pills and their effects on the body are negotiated between doctor and patient: 
Dr. Zaid:  How are you?  Tell me your news.  You look “set” [good] today. 
Ruksana:  Yes, today I feel like I’ve improved.  But overall I have become much 
weaker [kamzor]. 
Dr. Zaid:  You have been weak for a long time… 
Ruksana:  But today I feel weaker. 
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Dr. Zaid [to me]:  You should have seen her before – she was almost dead. 
Ruksana: When I went to JVC [another hospital], I improved.  They gave me 
some medicines and I got a lot of strength [taaqat] from them.  They also gave me 
calcium.   
Dr. Zaid:  Don’t worry.  You can have another calcium injection. 
Ruksana:  Yes, calcium gives me strength. 
Dr. Zaid [to me]:  She was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder and she 
has gradually improved.  Presently she’s in remission [symptom free for two 
months].  
[To Ruksana] Last time you came, I had given you a syrup.  What happened to 
that? 
Ruskana: It helped with my hunger [mel].  But I can’t walk because of this 
tiredness [thakavat]. 
[One of the postgraduates who has just showed up for duty interrupts the 
conversation to ask Dr. Zaid a question, then leaves]. 
Dr. Zaid [to Ruksana]:  So, should I prescribe you an injection or something else? 
Ruksana: Do I have to put the injection in my arm? 
Dr. Zaid: No, on your thigh.  
[Another patient who Dr. Zaid has already seen comes into the consulting room 
and asks again about when he should be taking his medication. Dr. Zaid repeats 
it: ½ a tablet twice a day, after morning tea and after dinner.  Then after six days, 
the ½ tablet is increased to 1.  The patient leaves the room mumbling that his 
memory is weak.] 
Ruksana: Oh, I thought you had to put the injection in your arm. 
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Dr. Zaid: No, you shouldn’t put an injection into your arm because your arm is 
already weak.  You’ll have to take the injection every alternate day.  In any case, 
where do you live? 
Ruksana: Khejan. 
Dr. Zaid: Also, you’ll have to keep eating the medicine I gave you.  How many 
children do you have? 
Ruksana: I already told you last time that I’m not married yet.  I got engaged 
recently.  
Dr. Zaid: So when is the wedding? 
Ruskana: Well, right now, I’m dying.  I feel like I’m in a grave.  The medicine I 
ate, that red medicine, from that something happened to me…  
Dr. Zaid: But tell me, how much are you improving?  
Ruksana: I still have pain in my arms and legs. 
Dr. Zaid: You have to keep taking that red medicine.  That will help you.  
Otherwise you will have to buy a medicine from the market.  What do you say?  
What does your husband do? 
Ruksana: He’s a carpenter. 
Dr. Zaid: OK, there is a tablet that you can buy from the market.  From that you 
will see quick improvement.  Do you have acidity in your stomach? 
Ruksana: No just this: my heart gets troubled [tang] and I feel pain in my legs 
and arms.  Then I have to ask someone to massage my legs for me. 
Dr. Zaid: You will be all right. 
Ruksana: These last few days, I thought I would kill myself.  I was feeling 
horrible. 
Dr. Zaid: Do you urinate OK? 
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Ruksana: Yes, twice a day.378 
Dr. Zaid: Since you started taking this red medicine, did you have any problems 
urinating? Did it lessen? 
Ruksana: No – from that medicine, I felt happy.  But I felt a weight over my 
eyelids. 
Dr. Zaid: Yes, it happens with this medicine. 
Ruksana: The rest of my body is weighed down.  I feel like I really can’t move. 
Dr. Zaid: So I will stop it then.  Take one medicine from the market and take it 
once per day. 
Ruksana: We’re from the village and we have a lot of work, which we have to do 
ourselves.   
Dr. Zaid: Don’t worry.  [After writing the new prescription, he hands the medical 
card back to Ruksana, who says salaam and leaves]. 
 There are several micro-negotiations that take place in this encounter 
between Dr. Zaid and Ruksana, and the encounter is imbued with sexual tension, 
particularly Dr. Zaid’s comments on Ruksana’s physique (“You look set today”).  
It seemed that Dr. Zaid was not actually listening to Ruksana; his repeated 
injunctions to “not worry” seem dismissive.  In fact, “don’t worry” and “you will 
be fine” were two of the most oft repeated phrases in the clinic.  Nonetheless, 
Ruksana persisted in her requests. 
Pills are supplemented with injections as per Ruksana’s request (“calcium 
gives me strength), and eventually and accidentally, Ruksana is able to convince 
Dr. Zaid that the “red medicine” is too unstable to continue.  On his part, Dr. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
378 Female patients from rural Kashmir often said they would urinate only twice a day – once in 
the morning before sunrise and once at night after sunset.  
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Zaid presses Ruksana for signs of improvement but only receives negative 
responses (“I am much weaker now,” “I felt like killing myself,” “I have pain in 
my arms and legs”).  Nonetheless, once he checks whether or not Ruksana can 
afford to get off the red medicine (he asks what her future husband does to 
gauge their economic status) and once she describes “legitimate” side effects, 
such as drowsiness, Dr. Zaid is willing to change her regimen.   
 At the beginning of this encounter, Ruksana describes her experience with 
psychopharmaceuticals through a language of ambivalence and uncertainty.  
While Dr. Zaid locates her improvement in her physical comportment, Ruksana 
immediately contradicts this by pointing to the longer trajectory of her illness: 
“Yes, today I have improved,” she responds, “but overall I have become much 
weaker.”  As I described in the Introduction, the language of “weakness” 
(kamzori) here that Ruksana draws upon indexes not just physical weakness, but 
also a spiritual, moral, and political affliction.  This form of weakness is not easily 
treated by pills, as Ruksana indicates, but rather is better treated through 
injections, which are seen as “giving strength.”  The experience of weakness and 
strength suggests that the body Ruksana knows through her experience of the 
“red medicine” is a radically different one from that which Dr. Zaid seeks to 
produce.  Yet that body demands to be heard; it is insistent.  In this exchange, I 
argue that Ruksana hails her body as a different kind of materialized presence 
than what Dr. Zaid is willing to acknowledge.  I use the term “materialization” 
here, following Judith Butler, to extend Althusser’s notion of interpellation to 
embodiment.379   Ruksana’s insistence on the primacy of her experience suggest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that the interpellation by Dr. Zaid – and by extension, the state and medical 
establishment – do not fully capture her.  However, both Dr. Zaid and Ruksana 
direct the process of medicalizing weakness (kamzori), though for different 
reasons, producing multiple materializations of suffering. 
However, Ruksana’s weakness is not equated with helplessness, in that 
she clearly indicates that when she took a calcium injection at another hospital, 
she felt much better.  Yet, for her, better necessary implies stronger, whereas for 
Dr. Zaid, better would mean the subsiding of somatic symptoms.  Whereas pills 
are seen as potentially dangerous, unknowable, and unstable, many patients 
express a preference for injections.  In addition, many doctors and psychiatrists 
told me that they would use injections as a carrot in order to treat ambiguous 
symptoms such as weakness, because they felt that patients preferred injections, 
even though they did not have a rational basis for doing so.  In the Kashmiri clinics 
where I did fieldwork, calcium, vitamin and even saline injections were common.  
Doctors would accede to these requests cheekily, treating these as placebos.  
Rather than dismiss injections at the level of perception, however, I would 
suggest that in examining their relation to pills, we see a fundamentally different 
body brought into being – one that can be made commensurable with a 
biomedical body only in a moment of contingency. 
 Injections have had a long history in South Asia and have been a highly 
visible marker of biomedicine in the region.  As David Arnold has argued, 
colonial vaccination and immunization campaigns became emblematic of the 
colonial regime’s “self-declared humanity and benevolence toward the people of 
! 242 !
India.” 380  Arnold argues that mass vaccination campaigns were the counterpoint 
to the East India Company’s ‘rule by force’ strategy, which became starkly 
evident in their ongoing disputes with the Maratha kingdom.  Immunization 
programs continue to be an important cornerstone of the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare’s child and reproductive health strategies and are under close 
World Health Organization (WHO) monitoring and assessment.  For instance, in 
1985, India instituted the Universal Immunization Program (UIP), targeted 
towards vaccine preventable diseases including diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, 
poliomyelitis, measles and childhood tuberculosis.  Injections, central to 
vaccination and immunization programs, are thus one of the first and most 
visible vehicles for the transmission of biomedical knowledge and practice in 
India.   
 Far from being a mute or inarticulate recipient of biomedical treatment, 
Ruksana provided Dr. Zaid with a rich vocabulary for understanding how she 
saw the phenomenological core of her condition – including fatigue [thakavat], 
weakness [kamzori], and restlessness [tang] – which the pills were unable to 
dissolve.  In contrast, Dr. Zaid asked pointed questions about the effects of the 
pills according to the “extrapyramidal effects” that have been authoritatively 
established, such as whether or not the medicine has affected urination.  
Towards the end of the encounter, there was a moment of accidental 
convergence between the language Ruksana provides and what Dr. Zaid was 
willing to recognize: that is, Ruksana’s description of “a weight over my 
eyelids… I feel like I really can’t move” which Dr. Zaid quickly translated into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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feelings of sedation, which he finally acknowledged, can “happen with that 
medicine.”381  
The “actant”382 that mediated this encounter is the “red medicine.” 
Ruksana takes seriously the fact that this medicine has dangerous, potentially 
unknown effects (“I don’t know what happens to me,” she said) and as a result, 
she keeps it at arm’s length. I argue that Ruksana’s deliberately vague 
description of the “red medicine” is a strategic distancing of this object from her 
body.  While doctors would describe this lack of referentiality as an example of 
Ruksana’s ignorance about pills, there is something particular about the way in 
which this medicine does not get named here.  The “red medicine” is a 
mysterious object; this open field of meaning suggests that its effects are also not 
fully known.  
This encounter between Ruksana and Dr. Zaid exemplifies how both 
patients and doctors in Kashmir operate within competing, although not entirely 
distinct, ontologies of medicine.  Nonetheless, while Ruksana chose to curtail her 
engagement with pills, other patients suffering from severe depression actively 
chose to continue taking pills in cases when the alternative was electro-
convulsive therapy (ECT).383  In one case, I witnessed a male patient who lobbied 
his consulting psychiatrist to stay on his medication rather than begin sessions of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
381 As Judith Butler has argued, subjects appear agentive when they do something more than 
simply be iterative.  As she puts it, a performance succeeds “not because an intention successfully 
governs the action of speech, but only because the action echoes prior actions and accumulates 
the force of authority through the repetition…of a prior and authoritative set of practices (Butler 
1997: 51). 
382 Following science studies scholars, I use the term “actant” to refer to anything or anybody that 
shapes, influences, or modifies another entity through interacting with it.  Actant covers the 
agency of both humans and nonhumans.  
383 Much controversy surrounds the use of electroconvulsive therapy in severe mental illness, 
particularly in the developing world where it is often administered without anesthesia.  While 
psychiatrists at the hospital were very aware of the debates surrounding “modified,” that is, with 
anesthesia, and “unmodified” ECT, the psychiatric hospital in Kashmir continued to administer 
“unmodified” ECT.  
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ECT.  He described feelings of “chronic phobia” towards ECT.  Although the 
psychiatrist continued to push for ECT, arguing that the patient was already on a 
high dose of medication and ECT had shown to be effective in cases of severe 
depression, the patient pleaded to stay on the medication.  In the middle of this 
exchange, the ECT technician entered the psychiatrist’s chamber and complained 
that the machine was not working properly and that they were not being able to 
generate convulsions.  The psychiatrist ordered the technician to stop doing any 
more ECTs until the machine was fixed.  After this interruption, he conceded to 
the patient, telling him warily that, “it is your right to choose your own 
treatment.”  Once again, this seemed to be a particularly fortuitous coming 
together of different interests in a moment of contingency, rather than the careful 
working out of a strategy.  As with Ruksana, here too, the ability of a patient to 
negotiate in the clinic—while possible—was dependent on how it knitted 
together with authoritative biomedical epistemologies, such as established 
extrapyramidal symptoms or the smooth functioning of technology.   
Conclusion  
This chapter has attempted to map out the multiple materialities of pills – 
as medicines, forms of intoxication, unstable commodities, and as objects in a 
biomedical toolkit.  I have tried to show how the uncertainty around the form 
and content of pills is produced by, and further exacerbates, a profound 
uncertainty about the ontological foundations of the social in Kashmir, situated 
in a long history of violence and occupation.  As such, the circulation, use and 
misuse of pills, are a way of seeing the effects of violence, and they make visible 
the limited ways in which Kashmiris are able to navigate a net of medicalization. 
As such, pill negotiations are “not just examples of agency; they are agency’s 
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critical ground.”384  As a “critical ground,” however, such negotiations are 
uneven.  For Ruksana, a gendered subject who is otherwise all too easily 
flattened under the gaze of Dr. Zaid, an intimate, bodily experience with pills is a 
means of asserting knowledge.  Significantly for my larger argument, this 
knowledge does not consist of overturning the medical net, but of finding a way 
to maneuver within it.  
In delineating the multiplicity of pills, I also seek to provide a counter 
narrative to the argument that Kashmiris are excessively dependent on pills 
because they are either a) looking for “fast relief” because they have a lower 
threshold for pain due to the corrosive effects of violence or b) due to culturalist 
arguments about a love of all things “new” or “Western.”  As one doctor put it, 
“now patients want treatment (eilaj) for all kinds of aches and pains.  The nail on 
my pinky finger hurts, so give me something for that, they’ll say.”  
In this sense, pills were called upon to make a culturalist argument of 
decay, of a general weakening of the body, and the sapping of the Kashmiri 
bodypolitic by violence and colonization.  While patients longed for a more 
intuitive medicine – where doctors could “feel” or “touch” disease – many 
doctors and pharmaceutical distributors moralized and fantasized about a time 
where they did not exist, at least not in such demand.  Dr. Wiqar, the psychiatrist 
at the De-Addiction Clinic, told me the following story when I asked him about 
the prevalence of biomedicine in Kashmir:  
When the Mughal Emperor Akbar came through the Pir Panjal 
mountains [the mountain range that separates north India from 
Kashmir] in the 16th century, he found that he had a headache.  He 
thought that it might be because of the saffron being cultivated in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
384 Cohen 1999: 667. 
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the fields.  He asked those working in the fields: how come you 
don’t get headaches?  They responded, ‘What is a headache?’  
 
This fantasy, told to me in the quiet of an empty afternoon consulting room, 
suggested that at least some biomedical practitioners longed for their own 
erasure.  It also echoed the sentiments of the pharmaceutical distributor at the 
beginning of this chapter.  At least part of this fantasy comes from the sense that 
the biomedical toolkit is unable to grapple with the forms of illness with which it 
is confronted, such as patients like Ruksana who insist that today she is better, 
but overall she is much weaker.  In one ontology, calcium injections work better 
than the psychopharmaceuticals developed in high-end labs.  In another, davai is 
more desirable as intoxicants than opium or cannabis, blurring the inside and the 
outside of the clinic.  Pills are slippery, producing disjunctions between aims and 
ends, becoming markers of things and bodies larger and other than themselves.   
 In Chapter 5, I examine the ways in which an “epidemic” of drug 
addiction is produced in Kashmir by human rights, humanitarian, and media 
reports, as an artifact of trauma.  In producing this tightly drawn link between 
violence, trauma and addiction, I argue that biomedical and humanitarian 
discourses obscured a view of everyday sufferings that were also present in the 
De-Addiction Clinic.  In the final chapter, I seek to make visible some of these 
obfuscations, and in so doing, I point to a particular politics of visibility as 
opposed to exclusionary practices that I see at work in humanitarianism.   
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CHAPTER 5: LOVE IN THE TIME OF PTSD: LOSS, LONGING, AND ADDICTION 
 
Introduction: Making an Epidemic  
On a crisp April morning in 2010, to much media fanfare, the Jammu and 
Kashmir police hosted inauguration of a Stress Management Telephone Helpline.  
Since early that morning, the helpline’s newly minted staff—clinical 
psychologists and social workers—had been nervously dusting their desks and 
chairs, adjusting and readjusting the optimistic posters they had made, and 
setting up trays of flowers and sweets for the dignitaries, including high level 
bureaucrats from the police, paramilitary organizations, and civilian 
government. The chief guest for the occasion, the Minister of State for Home 
Affairs, was taken on a tour of the DDC, flanked by dozens of junior police 
officers.  The Minister peered into the ward, the large, dormitory-style room 
where the eight in-patients resided.  The patients, all of them bathed and neatly 
dressed for the occasion, sat on plastic chairs in a semi-circle: a menagerie for the 
Minister to behold.  Then, one of the junior bureaucrats blurted out, “Sir! They 
are even sniffing shoe polish!”  The Minister paused for a moment, as if sensing 
that this was a perfect opportunity for a quote:  “We have lost one generation to 
guns, and we are going to lose another generation to drugs!” he declared. 
 The Minister’s statement was part of a well-rehearsed narrative about an 
“epidemic” of drug addiction as an effect of conflict-generated trauma that was 
told by the media, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and clinicians.  
As I have tried to show in this dissertation, this moment of revelation—designed 
to spotlight the “epidemic”—also concealed more than it revealed.  For one, 
moment amplified the issue of drug addiction through the perversity of inhaling 
shoe polish.  While this account fit the biomedical narrative of addiction as 
! 248 !
pathology, it was particularly striking in a context where feet—associated with 
shoes and shoe polish—are considered the most impure part of the body.  
Through shoe polish, then, drug users were identified with a particularly 
perverse pathological act; they were not the “sympathy-deserving suffering 
humans”385 that have been mobilized in human rights and humanitarian claims 
in Palestine, for example.   
This incident captured for me some of the paradoxes and “double binds” 
that constitute biomedical and humanitarian work in Kashmir.  Rather than 
victims as the exemplification of “bare life,” which is so often seen in 
anthropological critiques of humanitarianism, here victims emerged through the 
lens of Kashmir’s particular political history.  The traces of the dangerous 
insurgent or terrorist, which have marked, and continue to mark, male Kashmiris 
are still present within the humanitarian embrace.     
The Minister was not alone in his belief that an entire generation of 
Kashmiris was in danger of being “lost” to drug addiction as a direct effect of 
violence, however; drugs had replaced guns, as he put it.  In public accounts, 
medical professionals often identified drug addiction primarily as a product of 
conflict-generated trauma.  In private, over hushed tones, medical professionals 
often present another explanation for addiction, namely that it was one of the 
lingering effects of Sufi influences in Kashmiri society.  Despite the different 
political implications of both explanations, there was a consensus around the fact 
that drug addiction was at epidemic levels in contemporary Kashmir.   
A recent news report claimed that approximately forty per cent of school 
and college students in Kashmir have used drugs in order to cope with ongoing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
385 Allen 2009. 
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socio-political violence.386  Another feature on drug addiction in a local, English-
language magazine, developed a tight causal relationship between torture, 
trauma, and addiction thus: 
Inam Rashid (name changed) was among the many unfortunate 
ones who was picked up and interrogated by state agencies on the 
pretext of having links with militancy.  For five days he was put 
under severe interrogation and was subsequently released without 
being charged.  The mental scars of this ordeal refused to heal.  As 
if this was not enough, this 35 year old lost 12 members of his 
family to the massive earthquake of 2005 in Uri.  This was more 
than Rashid could bear.  He sought a grim refuge in multiple 
addictive substances ‘to erase the memories of his extended 
sufferings.’  He turned to cannabis, nicotine, opium, ethanol, and 
benzodiazepine in search of relief.387 
 
In this narrative, drug addiction and PTSD were inextricably linked, and drug 
addiction brought into the fold of other conflict-related psychiatric and 
psychological forms of distress, which, the argument went, were practically non-
existent prior to 1989.   
It was not only medical professionals who claimed that drug addiction 
was part of the PTSD phenomenon.  The Indian military establishment was also 
making similar arguments.  Anthropologists of PTSD and humanitarianism have 
powerfully shown how the diagnosis, recognition, and treatment of trauma have 
been rapidly globalized.388  A number of rich ethnographies have also shown that 
the globalization of PTSD has depended upon, and in some cases, been limited 
by, its appropriation into local political agendas.389   In the case of Kashmir, I 
have argued that the tools of medical humanitarianism, specifically PTSD, have 
been readily instrumentalized by the Indian state as well. 
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387 Boga 2010. 
388 Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Fischer 1999. 
389 Breslau 2000. 
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  The Telephone Helpline was the latest such effort, located adjacent to a 
Drug De-Addiction Clinic, which was set up in the heart of the police 
headquarters, open to both civilians and police personnel.  In addition, the police 
had also sponsored a number of de-addiction camps in both rural and urban 
areas.  As with other “social services” in this zone of emergency, the redressal of 
drug addiction by the military establishment produced a belated response by the 
civilian government, leading to the establishment of a number of new de-
addiction centers in both rural and urban areas as appendages to existing 
Primary Healthcare Centers (PHCs).390  
The Jammu and Kashmir police’s involvement in drug and alcohol 
awareness and treatment was described to me as a curious accident of history; 
however, the police’s involvement in drug and alcohol awareness and treatment 
fits into a larger trend of Indian military efforts to use developmental and 
humanitarian instruments as justifications for continued Indian rule of the 
region.  As Ravina Aggarwal and Mona Bhan have shown in the case of Ladakh, 
the impetus of the Indian military to do development or humanitarian work in 
the state was given a robust framework by Lt. General Arjun Ray, who laid out 
an initiative for the Indian army called Operation Sadbhavana (Operation 
Goodwill) in 2001.391  Sadbhavana was implemented in 190 villages and towns in 
the Ladakh border region, not in the Kashmir valley.  However, my ethnographic 
material suggests that Sadbhavana has been influential in Kashmir as well, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
390 See for ex. http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jun/13/drug-de-addiction-centre-in-
sopore-60.asp.   
391 While the intervention of the military in developmental efforts as a subsidiary organization 
and as an ‘aid to the civil government’ was not a new phenomenon for India, Sadbhavana 
marked the crystallization of hitherto isolated developmental and welfare efforts by the military 
into a comprehensive program especially geared towards border communities (Aggarwal and 
Bhan 2009: 520).   
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including as part of the military’s self narrative.  For instance, in recent years, the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has rolled out billboards in Srinagar city, as 
well as on the Jammu-Srinagar highway, explicitly extolling its own civic virtues.  
One shows an elderly Kashmiri man, cupping his hands to accept water from the 
flask of a young Indian soldier.   The proliferation of such humanitarian images, 
slogans, and programs in Kashmir, though not necessarily explicit at the policy 
level, nonetheless show how influential Sadbhavana as a slogan and a policy 
directive has been among bureaucrats and police personnel.   
The police-run De-Addiction Center was another instantiation of 
Sadbhavana, in that it was part of an effort by the Indian government to 
recalibrate the means of counterinsurgency work by examining how terrorist 
“Others” could be transformed into helpless victims.  In this sense, the DDC was 
part of a broader effort to rearticulate the means of counterinsurgency itself, 
including recalibrating how enemies could be transformed into victims through 
the language of medical humanitarianism.   
In this chapter, I argue that, in the process of both Indian state and 
biomedical accounts of drug addiction as an effect of PTSD in Kashmir, everyday 
forms of suffering located in the link between love, madness, and intoxication, 
were increasingly obscured from clinical view.  For example, it was through the 
idiom of intoxication, rather than the biomedical language of addiction, that drug 
users described their habit, as in, “I used to intoxicate myself (Main nasha karta 
tha).”  In this sense, I suggest that narratives of love and drug intoxication can 
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reveal how drug users construct an alternative or “adjacent”392 ethics outside of 
dominant clinical and religious discourses.   
Recent anthropological work on ordinary ethics has argued for 
understanding of ethical and moral life beyond the capacity of individuals to 
make moral judgments and follow rules of conduct.393  In her work on Hindu-
Muslim marriages in Delhi, for example, Veena Das has argued that “love [can] 
provide an opportunity to realize our ‘virtual being,’ which is not the idealized 
infantile self but rather…an adjacent self that is allowed to come into being.”394  
Drawing on Stanley Cavell’s work, she defines an “adjacent self” as not a self 
that strives “to some higher level,” but points to a “striving in which the eventual 
everyday emerges in a relation of nextness to the actual everyday.”395  While this 
chapter is indebted to Das’ call to attend to the “everyday” as a place of 
“achievement”396 as she puts it, in Kashmir, I suggest that the language of 
intoxication favored by drug users includes an idea of transcending the 
vicissitudes of daily life.  While this ascendency is not for the “idealized infantile 
self,” nonetheless, I argue that the import of Sufi idioms in love stories is due to 
their ability to dovetail with, and thereby elevate, the status of worldly love to 
the divine.  
Located in the heart of the J&K police headquarters or Police Control 
Room, the DDC was established in 2008.  The police compound, a heavily 
fortified and guarded area, was located in one of the neighborhoods most 
affected by ‘militancy’ in Srinagar, Batmaloo.  The neighborhood still had the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
392 Das 2010. 
393 Lambek 2010. 
394 Das 2010: 397. 
395 Das 2010: 377. 
396 Das 2007. 
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scars of urban insurgency: bunkers, some abandoned, some still occupied by 
soldiers scattered amidst shops and homes; ominous searchlights still turned on 
in the evenings and followed people’s nervous shadows as they scuttled home.  
Some of my interlocutors told me how, in the 1990s, it had been impossible to 
walk the streets outside the police compound after four pm.   
At the time of my fieldwork, the DDC had a total of eight beds.  These 
beds were always occupied, with a waiting list of over 200 patients at any given 
time.  This was despite the fact that the DDC was not publicized in any way, and 
all of the patients who visited the center came through discreet, interpersonal 
networks – through doctor referrals, ex-patients, or relatives in the police.  
Almost all of the patients I interviewed were trying to keep their treatment a 
secret from someone in their lives – girlfriends, extended family members, friends, 
or neighbors.  For staff, patients, ex-patients, family members, and anyone else 
who wanted to visit the center, there were three security checkpoints to cross.  
The DDC’s staff also included two policemen who provided 24-hour surveillance 
and were responsible for frisking all male visitors.  The security was 
cumbersome, to say the least.  
Clinical staff consisted of a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist and 
administrator, a social worker, and a pharmacist.397  This was an all-male staff 
complementing an all-male ward.  Aside from the occasional visits by female 
family members – who conducted their conversations behind the privacy of a 
curtain in the waiting area – I was usually the only woman present.  When I 
asked one middle-aged patient why he was so protective of his wife who had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
397 In early 2011, in addition to the Stress Management Helpline staff (four full-time counselors), 
another medical officer was also hired for the de-addiction clinic.   
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come to visit him, he said, “The men are not right here.  They are capable of 
inappropriate things.”  On my first day at the center, the clinical psychologist, 
Dr. Muzzafar, asked me not to divulge too many personal details when 
interviewing patients and to never give out my phone number.  Although I was 
hyperaware of my gendered existence within this space, thanks largely to the 
staff’s generosity, I was able to establish a good rapport with most of the patients 
I interviewed and with many of their female relatives who visited.  Nonetheless, 
there were jokes and asides that I was not privy to, so I could only observe the 
more bawdy aspects of male sociality from a distance.  Although, through the 
reveries I will present, I was able to glimpse another dimension of male 
subjectivity that, to the best of my knowledge, was not accessed by the other staff 
at the DDC. 
 At any given time, there was usually only one patient out of eight whose 
drug use was directly related to a violent experience, in the way that the news 
report I cited earlier described.  So, while I continued to collect narratives of 
trauma, I also began to opportunistically collect the narratives of ‘non-PTSD’ 
patients.  These stories surprised me.  Unlike the ‘PTSD’ patient narratives where 
the conflict was center stage, in the ‘non-PTSD’ patient population, the conflict 
was almost entirely absent.  I asked my interlocutors direct questions about the 
possible links between the conflict and addiction, but none of the patients I spoke 
to described this as a reason for their drug use.  Far from suffering from conflict-
related wounds, those who I interviewed privileged love wounds as sites of their 
psychic trouble.  Rather than read these love wounds as a sign of displaced war 
trauma, I argue that they are worthy of ethnographic attention in and of 
themselves.  Methodologically, I attempt to treat the love stories here as 
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ethnographic artifacts, in that an artifact is the product of the ethnographic effort 
of working through one’s theoretical concerns not by deductive analysis but as 
Annelise Riles puts it, “laterally, through the ethnographic apprehension of, or 
empathy for, others’ analytical concerns.”398    
When I asked DDC staff about the prevalence of love trouble in narratives 
of addiction, they acknowledged their frequency, but dismissed them as youthful 
meanderings.   Only one of my psychiatrist interlocutors found the love stories 
worthy of analysis, but for him, they were symptomatic of a larger pathology 
that had beset Kashmiri culture: globalization.  He was pointing, in part, to the 
dramatic effect of modern technologies in facilitating love affairs.  At the DDC, 
for example, patients carried out their businesses, love affairs, and familial 
obligations through cell phones.  Cell phones also worked as boom boxes, 
providing a mode of sharing and singing along to the latest Hindi hits, and thus 
of broadcasting, although obliquely, one’s particular mood.  In this sense, as 
devices that selectively straddle both the public and private, mobile phones 
disrupt scholarly accounts of love in South Asia as happening mainly, “in the 
imagination, in the interstices of ordinary life, when no one else is looking, or in 
the interval between dreams and expectations.”399     
While acknowledging the significance of modern technologies in 
sustaining love affairs in Kashmir, I do not want to argue that such stories are the 
effects of such technologies.  Unlike Laura Ahearn’s ethnographic study of youth 
in rural Nepal, falling in love in Kashmir was not only about being modern, 
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successful, developed and independent.400  Rather, the reveries I present here are 
interesting precisely because they resist being fully subsumed within any of the 
available narrative frames: the history of the conflict, the narrative of PTSD, the 
onslaught of global modernity, or the handiwork of Sufi charlatans.  Specifically, 
I argue that these reveries provide temporary literary flights out of the daily 
drudgery of the De-Addiction Center and Kashmir’s present political ennui more 
generally.  At the same time, these stories are not only “abstract lines of escape”401 
from the rigid confines of violence and trauma.  Rather, these narratives also 
contain justifications for the present state of suspension or liminality that their 
speakers find themselves in.  In Freud’s terms, in “wandering back” to the past, 
they are modes of reflecting on “current impressions.”402   
In the case of love stories, I explore how such reveries enact links between 
madness, love, and intoxication, which cannot be easily folded into clinical 
discourses about addiction, violence or PTSD.  For example, these stories drew 
on diverse yet highly conventional South Asian love repertoires – from Perso-
Arabic stories focusing on ishq (a Sufi term that means love for the divine) and 
muhabbat (usually glossed as romantic love), to Hindi film plots highlighting 
structures of impossibility, to Sufi poetry and devotional songs (qawwalis), 
blurring the language of divine and worldly love.403   
To situate these narratives in a more concrete time and place, let me first 
describe in some detail the temporality of everyday life at the DDC.   
Timepass 
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402 Freud 1958: 48. 
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 The DDC’s policies were explicit attempts to distract patients from the 
state of suspension that they found themselves in after years of sustained drug 
use.  One of the major challenges for patients and staff alike was motivating – or 
feeling motivated – to stay for the duration of treatment, typically 30 days.  After 
all, no one willingly admitted themselves for in-patient treatment.  In most cases, 
they were coerced, cajoled, or tricked into doing so by their family members.  
During the first week of admission, patients were usually in an agitated 
state and eager to leave.  Clinicians were able to convince family members that 
the desire to leave was simply a manifestation of “cravings” related to 
withdrawal.  During this period, patients were usually heavily medicated while 
psychological interventions were kept to a minimum.  It was usually after the 
first week, when the period of intense biomedical intervention was over, that 
patients would experience mood swings – moments of euphoria, but also 
feelings of anxiety, boredom, listlessness and depression.  On their part, staff 
tried to combat their “lack of motivation” by analogizing the clinic to a “hotel.”  
“You have every comfort here,” staff members would tell patients, citing the fact 
that family members could visit them, that there was a TV in the ward, and that 
there was non-vegetarian food at least three times per week. These small 
‘luxuries’ did mark the DDC as different from other in-patient treatment options 
in Kashmir, but patients could not shake the feeling that they were imprisoned.  
To punctuate time and to facilitate motivation, the staff had also created 
what they considered to be a full and varied schedule, which included a “gym” 
and “outdoor game” period, in addition to a medicine review with the 
psychiatrist, an educative session with the social worker, and group sessions 
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with the clinical psychologist.  This schedule was optimistically displayed in a 
glass display case at the center’s entrance.  In practice, however, the schedule 
operated more as a “fantasy document”404 rather than a strict template for daily 
activity, and certain parts of the schedule were more fixed than others.  While 
patients often appreciated the daily “medicine review” every morning as other 
drug treatment facilities did not have doctors on site or check-ups on a daily 
basis, these morning routines also quickly became monotonous.  For patients, 
responding to the same questions about mood, appetite, quality of sleep, 
cravings, and somatic complaints became redundant.  By the end of thirty days, 
many would respond simply by rote, describing the encounter with doctors as a 
mandatory performance of progress. 
For patients, the everyday of in-patient treatment seemed to have a 
problematic, doubly oppressive quality to it.  They were frustrated by the fact 
that the outside could impinge upon their activities within the clinic, but that 
they could not effect the outside, either in times of strikes (hartals) or curfews or 
during important family occasions, such as weddings.  Strikes (hartals) were 
always a particularly tense time in the city, with the heightened possibility of 
stone pelting (pathrav) or curfews imposed at a moment’s notice.  
Despite the staff’s optimistic promises that the center was like a “hotel,” 
for patients, the more obvious analogy was with jail.405  Time was marked by the 
discomforts of communal living.  All eight in-patients slept on hospital beds in a 
single, large ward.  For the bulk of my fieldwork, patients did not have lockers to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
404 Clarke 2001. 
405 Robert Desjarlais similarly notes that while staff of the homeless shelter in Boston where he 
conducted fieldwork described their shelter as the “Rolls Royce” of shelters, guests “do not hold 
the same level of enthusiasm” (Desjarlais 1994: 898). 
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place their personal belongings.  There were regular complaints about the “lack 
of privacy.”  There was only one bathroom, which had frequent hot water 
shortages and plumbing problems.  Although there was the theoretical promise 
of non-vegetarian food, there were frequent fights between the patients and the 
police canteen staff over the low quality of the food.  These daily confrontations 
orbited precisely around the same facilities that the staff had declared as making 
the center “hotel”-like.   
In addition to these daily frictions, patients had several strategies to do 
timepass (pass the time) in the clinic.  The television was helpful; it was 
perpetually on.  Cigarette breaks were highly valued for their ability to pass time 
as well as important constituents of sociality;406 nonetheless many patients found 
it ironic that they were being weaned off drugs while being allowed or 
encouraged to smoke tobacco.  One patient joked that, “even if I wasn’t a smoker 
before coming here, the center would have made me one.”407  There was also a lot 
of horsing around, joking, and teasing that punctuated the monotony of DDC 
life.  Nonetheless, patients did not consider the center an appropriate place to 
make lasting friendships.  When I would ask those who were friendly with one 
another if they would stay in touch after their admission, many were 
noncommittal or downright refused.  At least part of this refusal had to do with 
the compact of secrecy shared by many admitted patients.  If they were seen 
hanging out around town together, there was the likelihood that the secret of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
406 In his analysis of the prison of Bomana gaol in Papua New Guinea, Adam Reed foregrounds 
the agency of tobacco or smuk in everyday prison life.  For the inmates of Bomana gaol, smuk “is 
the dominant actor in prison.”  More than something to do while passing time, tobacco smoking 
is held to alter one’s state of mind in ways that Reed finds are not reducible to its chemical effects.  
See Reed 2006.  
407 While patients acknowledged the ontological status of tobacco as a drug, I did not find the 
same kind of transformative power of tobacco that Adam Reed found in Bomana gaol. 
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their addiction would be revealed. Thus, friendships at the DDC were also a 
form of timepass.   
In this sense, cigarette breaks, quarrels, chitchats, naps, and television 
watching - those activities that broke the monotony of the schedule – were forms 
of provisioning (jugar), improvisations of bringing together diverse practices or 
technologies to cope in the meantime.  In his work on unemployed, educated 
young men in north India, Craig Jeffrey found large numbers of youth engaged 
in forms of timepass characterized by “aimlessness and ennui.”408  Nonetheless, 
while timepass was productive for the unemployed youth Jeffrey worked with, at 
the DDC, there was the sense the timepass was an endpoint in itself.   
In particular, at the DDC, timepass did not produce the rich forms of 
sociality that Jeffrey has described.  DDC patients were doubly constrained in 
their relations with others by conditions of incarceration and the feeling that 
addiction was a shameful act that needed to be kept private because of its ability 
to reflect poorly not only on themselves, but on their entire family.409  In this 
sense, the stigma of drug addiction was similar to the stigma of dementia that 
Lawrence Cohen was written about since both were understood as forms of 
madness; the ‘old’ or ‘mad’ body “[was] not stigmatized as ‘itself’ but as the 
body of the family.”410  The methods of timepass inside the DDC were not so 
different from the kinds of timepass outside the clinic, given the high rates of 
unemployment.  As such, in many ways the DDC only heightened further the 
sense that “living in Kashmir is like living in a big jail,” a phrase I heard many 
times. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
408 Jeffrey 2010: 4. 
409 Cohen 1998. 
410 Cohen 1998: 177. 
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Reveries 
The telling of love stories was another kind of timepass that was important 
in the life of the DDC.  These stories walked the line between the fantastical and 
real.  While they had a dreamlike quality to them, they were not, strictly 
speaking, acts of dreaming.  They were somewhere in-between stories, 
daydreams, contemplations, sexual fantasies, and musings. As John Borneman 
has pointed out, while anthropological interest in the activity of dreaming has 
been sustained through the discipline’s history411, anthropologists have left 
lateral activities – such as daydreaming and reverie - relatively untouched.  As 
Borneman points out, reveries are akin to the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy, 
which describes processes that are accessible to the conscious subjects (unlike 
phantasy).  While I do not take up Borneman’s concern with how conscious 
reveries reemerge in unconscious dream-states, I find the concept of reverie 
useful in thinking about these stories as a narrative genre that is particular to 
South Asia.  The temporality of reverie also captures the sense of suspension that 
I think is particular to the telling of these stories during a period of exile from 
society.  
In this sense, while the telling of love reveries was a form of timepass, I 
suggest it was more than absent-minded television watching.  Rather, it was 
closer to the idea of “experience” that Robert Desjarlais explores in his 
ethnography of a homeless shelter in Boston.412  Desjarlais argues that 
anthropological notions of “experience” are not particularly well defined and 
suggests that the term often stands in for a “fundamental, authentic, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
411 See for example, Fabian 1966.  More recent work on dreaming includes Borneman 2011; 
Mittermaier 2010.  
412 Desjarlais 1994. 
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unchanging constant in human life.”413  For the tenuously mobile inhabitants of 
the homeless shelter who were his informants, Desjarlais argues that “struggling 
along” rather than “experiencing,” is a more appropriate category for the quality 
of time and reflection that was possible in that precarious place.414  As he 
beautifully describes, the majority of shelter residents spent their time “between 
nervousness and staying calm,” making an effort to keep “shocks to a minimum 
and to hold oneself together.”415  
While many of Desjarlais’ descriptions resonated with the temporality of 
life in the DDC, particularly the residents’ preoccupation with time, I would 
argue that the telling of reveries provided patients with the possibility of 
narrative that was beyond simply “holding oneself together.”  This might be 
because many of the patients came from relatively stable, middle-class homes 
and did not face the same existential threats of life on the streets as Desjarlais’ 
informants.  The reveries I describe are one example of how patient experiences 
at the DDC transcended “struggling along.”  These love reveries created an 
aesthetic, which included integration, coherence, renewal, and tying things 
together through time – some of the facets of ‘experience.’416  
Let me now turn to the storytellers.   
Sajad 
Sajad was 35 years old at the time of his admission, but looked much 
older.  Years of sustained Codeine use had made his frame skeletal, many of his 
teeth had fallen out, and he had lost most of his hair.  Out of the eight patients at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
413 Desjarlais 1994: 887. 
414 Desjarlais 1994: 887. 
415 Desjarlais 1994: 891. 
416 Desjarlais 1994: 896-7. 
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the center, he was the oldest and often took on the role of spokesman.  In one of 
our interviews, Sajad said, “These boys are young.  They go into drugs but they 
don’t have real problems – they do it for fun, on a whim (shawk).  I feel like I have 
lived for 100 years.”  
Sajad came from an illustrious and well-respected family.  His father had 
served as a MLA under the Bakshi government and had spearheaded the revival 
of kani shawls in Kashmir.417 Sajad’s father died in 2001, at which time he 
describes feeling a very big “jolt.” He felt unprepared to handle the host of 
responsibilities thrust on his shoulders.  However, it was not his father’s death 
that Sajad blamed for his Codeine use.  He told me that he started using in 1992-
93.  He turned to drugs after “a train ride changed his life.”  Sajad’s narrative 
went like this:       
I was traveling with my father by train.  There was a girl sitting 
across from us, in the same compartment.  She wrote a note and 
threw it to me.  The note read, ‘My name is Anjali.  I’m from 
Mysore [a city in the southern Indian state of Karnataka].  What’s 
your name and where are you from?’  I responded to the note.  My 
father and I were supposed to get off the train at Bangalore, but 
when my father saw what was happening between us, he told me 
to continue on to Mysore with Anjali.  My father had had a love 
marriage, and so he had never limited anyone’s marriage choice. 
I asked Anjali where she lived since I knew Mysore quite well.  She 
gave me an address.  It was a place where a lot of dhobis [washer 
men] lived.  At that time, I thought to myself, even if she’s the 
daughter of a dhobi, I’ll marry her.  It turned out that her father was 
not a dhobi, but an industrialist.   I later learned that her mother was 
American and that her parents had also had a love marriage.  When 
I got back to Kashmir after meeting her in Mysore, my mother had 
a letter from Anjali already waiting for me.  She had also sent me a 
little Hanuman418 statue for protection. 
Anjali spoke no Hindi, so we would exchange letters in English.  
Our relationship blossomed.  I went to Mysore regularly to meet 
her for the next 2-3 years.  The last time I saw her, she said !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
417 Kani is a historically significant practice of shawl weaving using numerous eyeless wooden 
spokes (tujis or kanis) in the place of a shuttle.  Kani literally means eyeless in Kashmiri. 
418 Hanuman is a Hindu deity and one of Rama’s most devoted companions in the Ramayana epic.  
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something that scared me.  I told her I was coming to Mysore.  She 
came to meet me on her Kinetic Honda scooter and we went to a 
park.  Then she told me, ‘I don’t want to waste my time.  I can’t 
marry you.’  I asked her why she had proposed [to have a 
relationship] to me in the first place.  I told her, ‘You should have 
told me straight.’ 
I caught the train back to Bangalore and cried profusely.  I came 
down to earth from the sky.  
 
 Sajad’s story contains many motifs that are familiar to South Asian literary 
and cinematic genres.  Two that interest me here are the train journey and love 
letters, both of which are highly significant in Partition narratives, which Sajad 
grew up hearing.  During the Partition, trains were transformed from being the 
grand instruments of colonial rule to silent funeral carriers.  In the short story, 
“Her Body Beyond Pain” (Khol Do), for example, the Kashmiri writer Saadat 
Hasan Manto juxtaposed the timetable-like certainty of train journeys with the 
radical uncertainty of the Partition violence unfolding outside them.  Khol Do 
begins thus:  “The special train left Amritsar at two in the afternoon and reached 
Mughalpura eight hours later [a thirty mile journey]. Many people were killed en 
route, many injured; some went astray.”419  In Khushwant Singh’s more 
optimistic 1956 novel, Train to Pakistan, the horrors of Partition violence are 
transcended by cross-cultural love between a Sikh boy and a Muslim girl.     
 Like Khushwant Singh’s novel, Sajad’s narrative recuperated the train as a 
site of utopian possibility.  The train compartment is a space where difference is 
visible (caste/class/ethnicity/religion/region), but does not exist as a structure 
of impossibility.  Rather, Sajad is enticed by Anjali precisely because of her 
difference from him:  she is Hindu, half-American, from a southern corner of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
419 Manto 2011. In 2002, trains were once again the sites of intense communal violence.  Riots that 
claimed the lives of thousands of Muslims in Gujarat were triggered by the burning of a train 
carriage carrying Hindu pilgrims, allegedly by a Muslim mob.   
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India, while Sajad is Muslim, Kashmiri, from the northern corner.   This structure 
of opposites – particularly Hindu/Muslim and rich/poor – has been replicated 
countless times in contemporary Hindi cinema lovescapes.  Although Anjali 
turns out to be rich like Sajad, he fantasizes about her as the daughter of a 
washerman, preparing himself to cross boundaries of class in addition to his 
willingness to traverse boundaries of religion, race, and geography.420    
Sajad’s narrative exemplifies this traversing of boundaries, but also of 
linguistic registers.  He told the story to me in English with sprinklings of Urdu 
and Hindi phrases.  As Rachel Dwyer has argued, love in Hindi films is polyglot; 
it is “made out of a whole set of visual codes (landscape, setting, physical 
appearance, costume, symbols, and so on) as well as those of language itself, a 
blend of registers of Hindi, Urdu and English.”421  The fact that Anjali and Sajad’s 
romance blossoms though the writing of letters in English is also significant.  As 
scholars have shown, in Hindi cinema, the expression or affirmation of love is 
often expressed through the English phrase, ‘I love you,’ rather than through any 
of the numerous words or phrases in Hindi/Urdu.  Suvir Kaul also points out 
that Hindi-language film came to the motif of letters partly because of Partition 
separations, and partly because men and women did not have venues in which 
to meet, so “glances from afar and letters/notes stood in for real contact.”422  In 
this story, Anjali initiates the process of letter writing, suggesting that Sajad is a 
somewhat passive recipient of Anjali’s desire.  It is Anjali who makes the first 
move by throwing him a note; Sajad merely responds.  This is an arena of life 
where Sajad does not have to take charge, unlike say, in the continuation of his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
420 Das 2010.  
421 Dwyer 2000. 
422 Personal communication, December 11, 2011. 
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father’s business.  This abdication of agency is important in a context where love 
and intoxication are semiotically linked – a point which I will return to.  
In his 1908 essay, “The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming,” Freud 
cautions against stereotyping fantasies or viewing them as static.  Rather, he 
argues that the relation between fantasy and time is of utmost importance.  
According to Freud, fantasies “fit themselves into the changing impressions of 
life, alter with the vicissitudes of life.”423  For Freud, day-dreams and reveries 
contain within them three periods of time or ideation: some current impression, 
occasioned by an event in the present, which has the power to arouse desire; a 
wandering back to the memory of an earlier experience in which this wish was 
fulfilled; and the creation of a situation of emergence in the future, representing 
the fulfillment of the wish.424   
Following Freud, attending to the temporal structure of Sajad’s reverie is 
instructive here: a “current impression” – an interview with a younger, 
unmarried, female, non-Kashmiri researcher - makes space for a “wandering 
back” into the past, which in turn paves the way for the future fulfillment of a 
wish.  While I find Freud’s intersecting temporalities useful, there is a need to 
complicate what we mean by “wandering back” and “wish fulfillment” in 
Sajad’s narrative.  For example, Freud’s “wandering back” refers quite 
specifically to an early experience, generally belonging to infancy.425  While there 
may be the latent desire for a future wish fulfillment, I suggest that the 
temporality of importance here is between the past and the “current impression,” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
423 Freud 1958: 48. 
424 Freud 1958: 48. 
425 Freud 1958: 48-49. 
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the moment of the interview, the location within the de-addiction center, and 
more broadly, within Kashmir’s stagnant political present.   
Sajad ends his story with the phrase: “I came down to the earth from the 
sky.”  At first listen, this appears to be a unidirectional fall from grace.  Yet I 
suggest that the telling of this reverie, its ability to transport both speaker and 
listener to a different temporal and experiential plane, can itself be thought of as 
a re-ascension.  In this sense, while Sajad projects himself in a state of fall, he also 
recognizes the need to move beyond this moment.  This is a different 
engagement with the past than that of the “melancholic subject,” who is trapped 
in affect and incapable of sublimating the pain of past loss so that he may live 
meaningfully in the present.  Sajad is clearly marked by the past, but not entirely 
inhibited by it.  In this sense, Sajad is different from the heroin addicts with 
whom Angela Garcia worked in the Rio Grande; he is not a “prisoner to the past” 
whose destiny is to “live a life as a partially realized subject.”426  Rather, what 
Freud opens up for us nicely in his description of daydreaming is the possibility 
of performance in the present – the “current impression” – and the sense that the 
visit to the past is a “wandering,” although perhaps a culturally familiar 
“wandering.”  For Sajad, wandering back to the past is also full of pleasurable 
moments – the tacit consent of his father, the writing of love letters between two 
cosmopolitans, the electric connection between two strangers.   
Sajad’s love story took another turn when I became acquainted with his 
wife, who would come to visit him every other day at the De-Addiction Center.  
Sajad and his wife had an arranged marriage in 2000, a year before his father’s 
passing.  It was clear why she had been an appropriate match for him: she was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
426 Garcia 2010: 209. 
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elegant, well educated, and from a well-to-do family.  Although she felt betrayed 
by Sajad’s drug use – which had been a constant part of their marriage – she was 
determined to help restore his health.  While Sajad’s relationship with Anjali had 
been marked by passion and impossibility, his relationship with his wife was 
marked by understanding and possibility.  Anjali and Sajad’s relationship, as 
with many narratives I collected in this genre, did not culminate in marriage.  In 
Sajad’s life, they played diametrically opposed roles: his lover drove him to 
addiction, while his wife patiently shepherded him out of it.  
One day, Sajad’s wife brought a photo of him for me to see, from his 
“unspoiled” days, as she called them.  Although Sajad had taken drugs since the 
early 1990s, his physical deterioration was evident only in the last few years.  He 
was completely unrecognizable in the photo.  He was holding his daughter in his 
arms, smiling widely with all his teeth in place, had a full head of hair, and a 
healthy frame.  His wife told me that they had scheduled an appointment with a 
famous dentist in Delhi so that Sajad could have his teeth fixed.  At the time, 
holding the photograph, I felt a sense of sadness in which her love was 
unrequited to the warmth that Sajad had bestowed on Anjali, and still did, so 
many years later.  Reflecting on that moment now, however, it is clear that 
Sajad’s past was more complex and contradictory than that of his reverie.  There 
were forces and people who were pulling him out of his dreamlike state.  By the 
end of his admission, Sajad had put on a bit of weight. There was a sense, 
however tenuous, that his new life – starting with a new set of teeth – was 
beginning.  
Rouf 
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Rouf was 21 years old when I interviewed him.  He embodied the 
quintessentially cool Kashmiri teenager, blasted the latest Bollywood hits on his 
cell phone, and shuffled around in dark, skinny jeans, Converse sneakers, and 
printed T-shirts.  Rouf used to drive a commercial minibus in the city and 
enjoyed telling stories about his reckless driving and the roadside accidents he 
had gotten into, or almost gotten into, because he had been high on cannabis and 
painkillers.  
In private, my conversations with Rouf turned to the romantic.  Unlike 
Sajad, whose narrative flowed chronologically and had a clear beginning and 
end, Rouf’s story meandered and was full of contradictions.  It was difficult to 
draw out a clear trajectory of events, as Rouf spoke in fragments.  The first time 
he told me about his love affairs, it was in the middle of a casual conversation 
about something else:  
“I have replaced drugs with tears.  Now I just cry for her,” Rouf said.     
“Who is she?” I asked him.  
“Her family is poor and my family is rich.  My father is completely against 
the wedding.”   
“Does she know about your treatment here?”  I asked. 
“She knows that I am getting some kind of treatment (eilaj), but that she 
thinks it is for stomach problems and back pain.”  
On another day, Rouf told me how, once when he had been intoxicated, 
he told her to stop studying after she had passed her tenth grade exams (i.e. 
matriculated).  When I asked him why, he said,  “Well, I was scared that she 
would go to college, and then other boys might see her….” His voice trailed off.  
He admitted that it was an irrational, even mad, thought.   
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“Her brothers are very dangerous, and are also dead against the 
relationship.   They are even more dangerous than Hindus,” he told me, without 
a trace of sarcasm.  Later, he said that although they were dangerous, that “he 
could handle them.” 
Rouf said that he used to sneak into her room at night and stay until the 
morning call to prayer (azaan) and then duck out of the window.  They almost 
got caught once; they heard a knock on the door but she had quickly said that a 
cat had jumped in through the window. 
 “She is my Khuda (God),” said Rouf. 
Unlike Sajad, however, Rouf was not exclusive with his ladylove.  He often 
spoke about other women he had affairs with.  In one of our interviews, he 
openly tried to flirt with me.  Uncomfortable, I casually ended the conversation.  
His flirtation did not seem to be premeditated or serious.  The next time we met, 
it seemed that he had forgotten his forwardness.  
For Rouf, managing an unsanctioned love affair from the DDC was 
difficult.  He was frequently on the phone, either talking to his family members 
about his girlfriend or trying to appease her.  This intense back-and-forth left him 
quite tired and often in a bad mood.  On one of those days when he was upset, I 
asked Rouf what was wrong.  He said:  “All I ask of her is that she speak to her 
mother [about our relationship].  But she faints at the smallest sign of stress.  For 
hours, she just lies there unconscious.  She has become a heart patient because of 
me,” he said, his head bowed.  Rouf said that she had also threatened to kill 
herself if Rouf got engaged to someone else.  She told him that she would rather die 
than let another man touch her, echoing many a Hindi film.  Towards the end of his 
time at the DDC, Rouf revealed that although he was promiscuous, he was 
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unable to forget her.  There was something that was preventing him from 
ungluing himself from her:  “I saw another girl that looked like her, but she 
didn’t talk like her.  That’s what I missed: the way she talks,” he said.   
Rouf’s love story provides an important contrast to Sajad’s, and, in many 
ways, is emblematic of what has transpired between a generation of Kashmiri 
men.  Sajad, having already come of age when the insurgency began in 1989, had 
opportunities to travel beyond Kashmir with his father, and his narrative clearly 
reflects cosmopolitan desires for a united, postcolonial India that is achieved 
through transcending difference.  Like Sajad, Rouf’s narrative was also marked 
by certain structures of impossibility, but I would argue that these were of a 
critically different scale than those of Sajad’s.  In particular, Rouf’s narrative 
centered on issues around class, ‘my family is rich, her family is poor,’ rather 
than the geographical, religious, ethnic, and regional boundaries that Sajad was 
able to imagine.   
Further, unlike Sajad’s narrative, in which romance was clearly contained 
within the material forms of the letters and train, Rouf’s narrative was both 
highly sexualized and tinged with violence, both in his telling of spending the 
night in his girlfriend’s room, as well as her promise that “she will not let 
another man touch her.”  In addition, Rouf’s desire to trample his girlfriend’s 
dreams of a higher education because of his jealousy (understood as a form of 
madness in this context), her threat of suicide if they did not marry, and Rouf’s 
willingness to take on her “dangerous” brothers, were examples of the 
intermingling of violence and love.  While Rouf was too young to have 
participated in Kashmir’s armed movement for self-determination, his narrative 
reveals the ways in which long-standing violence and suffering and the intense 
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militarization of everyday life, are experienced and reformulated in seemingly 
mundane stories of love and loss.   
Of love, drugs, and madness 
Despite their differences, for Sajad and Rouf, the reveries and the Sufi 
poetic language deployed in them, specifically the language of intoxication, 
provided a way to voice transgressive desires, longings for intimacy and unions 
in a way that was culturally recognizable, while still being elusive.427  In 
particular, I argue that the language of intoxication or nasha, drawn from Sufism, 
enabled both Sajad and Rouf, but also others who I interviewed, to draw upon 
phenomenological and semiotic links between love and madness.  Unlike the 
young women who Sarah Pinto worked with in a north Indian clinic whose 
romantic lives were the objects of biomedical intervention,428 for male drug users 
in Kashmir, stories of romantic love operated as alternatives to biomedical and 
dominant religious discourses on addiction.  As such, they were not the objects 
of biomedical intervention as much as responses to it. 
While patients like Sajad and Rouf drew on a Sufi linguistic and 
phenomenological repertoire, clinicians often critiqued Sufism based on the 
perceived association between Sufis and intoxicating substances, particularly 
cannabis.429  The argument, which I heard many times over, was that prevalent 
drug use in Kashmir was the handiwork of pirs who relied on cannabis to lure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
427 Green 2010: 308.  Intoxication, love and poetry have been long intertwined in the South Asian 
Islamic context.  See also Jaisi 2004. 
428 Pinto 2011. 
429 Historically, one sect of Sufism has been associated with practices of asceticism (qalandar) 
including smoking cannabis.  
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unassuming devotees.  Dr. Muzzafar, the clinical psychologist at the De-
Addiction Center, told a version of this story numbers times: 
I knew a boy once who used to hang out in the park with his 
friends.  One day, they met a pir in the park who promised them 
heaven (jannat).  The pir took them on a long trek through the 
mountains until they reached a cave.  For three days straight, the 
pir provided the boys with cannabis and they smoked 
continuously.  They smoked so much that they believed they had 
actually seen heaven [usually laughter at this point].  They returned 
to the city, the pir’s promise fulfilled.  But the boy was not satisfied: 
he wanted to experience heaven again.  He began looking for the 
pir all over the city.  Finally, he found him.  When the pir saw the 
boy, he laughed knowingly.  The boy became an addict.   
 
This story was fascinating – although certainly not new.  Nonetheless the story’s 
mythic overtones also suggested that it was not meant to represent reality in a 
straightforward way, but rather, showed the ways in which a biomedical 
problem – addiction – has been instrumentalized to make a sectarian argument 
about proper Islamic practice.  
The narrative satirizes the journey of divine love central to Sufism, clearly 
situating Sufis on the wrong path, and in so doing, exemplified the ways in 
which sectarian debates between Sufis and non-Sufis were alive and were heated 
everyday topics of conversation.  During my fieldwork, I heard friends and 
colleagues argue vociferously over whether or not certain Sufi practices were 
proper to Islam.  While some lamented the “demise” of Sufism – which they saw 
as an indigenous movement and thus tied to Kashmiri nationalism – in the face 
of reformist movements such as Salafism, others echoed familiar colonial and 
modernist arguments that the “superstition” of Sufism had persisted largely due 
to the backwardness of Kashmiri women, who continued to visit pirs and shrines.  
Most doctors I met, however, agreed with Dr. Muzzafar, that pirs did more harm 
than good.  As Ernst and Lawrence have astutely pointed out, both sides of the 
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debate on the place of Sufism within Islam rest on a narrative of “decline,” a 
narrative, which has historically appealed to everyone from Orientalists, secular 
modernists, and fundamentalists, albeit for different reasons.430   
Despite the public controversy surrounding Sufi devotional practices, 
many of the patients who told me stories about love quietly identified as Sufis.  
This practice was similar to what Katherine Ewing has described in the case of 
Pakistan, where men, in particular, were “drawn to Sufism and yet avoid 
[openly] identifying themselves as Sufis.”431  For many, including Sajad, listening 
to Sufi devotional music (qawwalis) was a favorite pastime, although they knew 
that the place of music in devotional practice was highly contentious in 
contemporary public discourse.432  However, Sufism provided a language 
through which to link the loss of self entailed by love – divine or worldly – with 
the loss of self entailed by intoxication.  Urdu language poets, for example, Mir 
Taqi Mir, have also elaborated links between intoxication, love, and religious 
transgression, where intoxication is directly linked to the idea of losing oneself in 
divine love (haqiqi).   
In making this argument, I want to note that I am not arguing that the 
language of Sufism is somehow more literal, truer to the subject, than the 
language of addiction or trauma.  Rather, Rouf’s narrative drew on both Sufi and 
biomedical idioms—his invocation of tension and his reference to her as a “heart !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
430 Ernst and Lawrence 2002: 12. 
431 Ewing 1997: 163. 
432 The twentieth-century missionary movement of the Tablighi Jama،at, for example and the 
Sabiri Chishtis – who founded the Deoband seminary – rejected Sufi practices of tomb pilgrimage 
and listening to music altogether.  Within certain strands of Sufism, particularly Chishti Sufism, 
the remembrance of God is achieved in two ways: through reciting the divine name (zikr) or 
evoking God’s presence through song (sama،).  As Ernst and Lawrence (2002: 107) along with 
other scholars have pointed out, the concept of sama، has been particularly contentious the 
history of Islamic thought, between different sects of Sufis as well as between Sufi and more 
scriptural forms of Islam. 
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patient” are just two examples—in a seamless fashion to craft a narrative that 
hinged on a journey of being lost in intoxication.  This is significant in my 
argument about the interweaving of biomedical and local idioms of suffering in 
Kashmir.  However, it is also notable that the language of intoxication, rather 
than addiction, captures the sensual pleasures and turbulence of both love and 
drug highs.  Here both Sufism and biomedicine are instruments through which 
Rouf and other drug users expressed their devotion—to God and their lovers—
as ecstasy and madness. 
Within Sufism, the path to divine love is achieved through fana، or 
annihilation of the self.  As Ernst and Lawrence eloquently put it, the attainment 
of fana، “requires divine love, love inspired by God, satisfied by nothing less than 
God.  It is an overpowering love.  It is a love that leads to annihilation.  It leads to 
what is described as ‘destruction of the soul.’”433  This destruction is not an 
endpoint, but rather an entryway into divine restoration or permanence (baqa،).  
As such, this sense of annihilation as productive is also radically different from a 
biomedical understanding of death or annihilation, which is read as a failure. 
Within Urdu poetry, this permanence is imagined as a form of restlessness 
or agitation (iztirab).  As the poet Mir writes, “Again and again I am caught in 
fear [of her?]/Now I’m restless, agitated in my being”).434  The ambiguity of 
divine and worldly love so central to Mir’s poetry are echoed in Rouf’s words 
and in Sajad’s loss of Anjali: the loss of unity with the divine and the fall from the 
sky to the earth is analogized to the return to the self after ecstasy or fana،.  
Similarly, the call to experience the immediacy of God through acts such as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
433 Ernst and Lawrence 2002: 15. 
434 Bar bar us ke dar pah jata hun/ Halat ab iztirab ki si hai (From: Hasti Apni Habab Ki Si Hai). 
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spiritual intoxication, I would argue, also informed the ways in which patients at 
the DDC described their journey through worldly love (majazi).  These were 
phenomenologically linked, as in Rouf’s succinct phrase, “She is my Khuda 
(God).” 
I argue that the language of intoxication (nasha) thus provides a way to 
move between discourses of devotion and addiction.  Nasha has polysemic moral 
and religious valences which go beyond clinical understandings of addiction; 
nasha is not only intoxication from illicit substances, but can also be a form of 
ecstasy, borne of unity with the divine. There is also a direct linguistic association 
between “madness” and “love” in Urdu, through the concept of junoon, a word 
etymologically derived from classical Arabic love story of Layla and Majnun or 
“The Madman and Layla.”  Today, “Majnun” continues to refer to a person who 
in junoon (madly in love).  Junoon, a word which sometimes substitutes for 
“addiction,” literally means something you cannot live without.      
Conclusion: An Alternate Self? 
To conclude, I also want to suggest that the language of intoxication 
(nasha) also opens up an alternative ontology of drugs at work in Kashmir.  In 
this ontology, drugs are not lumped into a single category, but rather are 
distinguishable based on the ethical subjectivities they produce.  This was a very 
different ontology from the language of clinicians, for whom addiction was an 
artifact of misguided Sufi practices or conflict-generated trauma.  These reveries 
also called for a sense of being lost that was radically different from the Minister 
of State’s proclamation that a generation of Kashmiris had been “lost” to drugs. 
To lose oneself rather than to be lost, however, does not simply suggest an 
inversion of agency, although the implications for agency are important.  After 
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all, the path to divine love, to lose oneself in intoxication or ecstasy, can be 
riddled with turmoil and dizzying uncertainty.  Yet, losing oneself in love or 
fana، also means that there is an Other to whom we speak; losing oneself can be a 
means to reanimate the subject in a dialogical relation. 
Similarly, for many patients, a connection with a Sufi pir constituted an 
important part of their healing process, and in spite of the advice of mental 
health professionals to the contrary, many continued to visit pirs for the duration 
and beyond the course of their medical treatment.  They cited several reasons for 
doing so, but one patient I met, Sohail, articulated his reasons well.  Sohail, a 
seventeen-year old auto rickshaw driver that I met at the DDC was firmly 
committed to the idea that a pir, not the DDC, would cure his dependency on 
drugs.   
Sohail described to me his experience with a pir named Yusuf Sahab from 
his hometown.  He said that meeting him had been a transformative experience.  
As I scribbled furiously in my notebook, Sohail said, “You see, as you’re writing 
now, I don’t feel anything.  But when he used to write, I would feel that he was 
writing words in my heart.”  Sohail wore a ring that Yusuf Sahab had blessed in 
2001.  He said that this object, not any medical treatment, would get him out of 
this spiral.  When I asked him why, Sohail responded that the medical 
establishment did not fully understand the complexity of substances like 
cannabis, but they simply labeled them as ‘bad.’  When I asked Sohail what was 
positive about cannabis, he said that it enabled the contemplation of certain 
unknowns.   “Such as?” I asked him.  Sohail engaged in a rare moment of eye 
contact with me and responded, “What comes before birth and after death.”   
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 In other interviews, some patients had also confessed to me that rather 
than being un-Islamic, cannabis actually produced a more ethical subjectivity 
than they would otherwise have.  An eighteen-year old patient, Umar Farooq, 
who I met at the DDC, who described himself as an “excellent” student before 
his drug use (a combination of whitener fluid and cannabis), was particularly 
eloquent on this subject.  One day, as I was interviewing another patient, Sameer, 
in the ward, Umar was sitting near by, within earshot, but with his attention 
turned to the TV blaring Hindi film songs.  During the course of my interview, I 
asked Sameer why someone might prefer one form of intoxication (nasha) over 
another.  Umar turned his head around and interrupted us, “Nasha, what do we 
even call nasha?”  
Sameer and I were both stumped, and Umar happily took over the 
conversation.  According to Umar, while some drugs “stopped your mind from 
working, other drugs, like charas (cannabis), helped you to start thinking.  Charas 
has a different effect on you.”  I asked Umar to give an example.  Umar said that 
when he was high on cannabis, he was able to remember God.  He also said that 
cannabis allowed him to properly practice respect towards elders and women, 
such as nazar (lowering the gaze).  As he explained to me, when he used 
whitener fluid, “I used to speak to my father with my nose in the air (lit. boldly; 
sir uttha ke).”  But when he used cannabis, he was able to “lower his gaze.”  
Echoing Sohail, Umar also said that cannabis enabled a certain solitary (tanhayee) 
contemplation; it brought about a more humble self in relation to God.   
Thus, in addition to the alternative language of nasha, drug users in 
Kashmir also described a different ontology of drugs at work than those used by 
the clinic.  While clinical staff typically distinguished between different types of 
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drugs (benzodiazepines, cannabis, nicotine, alcohol, and volatile substances), the 
experiences of Umar, Sohail, and others suggested that they deployed a different 
system of classification, one that enabled a parsing out of drugs based on the 
kinds of ethics and phenomenological states they enabled.  As such, drugs were 
distinguishable for the kinds of ethical horizons they opened up, and cannabis, in 
particular, was valued for its ability to move the user closer to god.  
In this chapter, I have argued that the language of intoxication enables the 
enfolding of narratives of worldly love and loss into notions of divine love.  I 
have also tried to show how biomedical understandings of PTSD, violence, and 
addiction in Kashmir obscure a view of alternative ontologies of drugs and 
experiences of intoxication present within the space of the clinic.  However, 
humanitarian knowledge and Sufism are not fundamentally opposed, but as part 
of the same “net” which subjects find themselves caught in: one that makes 
visible certain nodes and connections while concealing others.  For example, 
while Sufi idioms offered drug users a way out of the drudgery of timepass and 
constricting biomedical and religious discourses on addiction, they presented a 
path to love that was dizzying and unsteady.  Nonetheless, I contend that these 
love stories provided a way, however fleeting, for drug users to carve a coherent 
narrative self in a world lacking in such coherence.   
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CONCLUSION: MEDITATION ON A NET 
 
 In this dissertation, I have proposed the net as an appropriate form 
through which to understand relations between bodily experience, medical and 
humanitarian knowledge, and profound social, political, and historical 
upheavals in Kashmir.   
Several key works in the anthropology of humanitarianism have focused 
on how social life is recalibrated within a new moral economy of 
humanitarianism.  In these analyses, suffering is shown as replacing social and 
economic inequalities; social and political problems are individualized; political 
violence is re-read as psychosomatic “trauma”; and politics itself is replaced with 
an emotional response directed at depoliticized victims.435  I have argued that 
some of these critiques obscure more than they reveal about the frictions that 
characterize everyday life in the clinic and the ways in which biomedical and 
humanitarian tools are appropriated outside of their intended functions.  Rather 
than view humanitarian and biomedical forms as characterized by totalizing 
ontological and epistemological shifts, I have argued instead, that it is forged by 
a politics of visibility marked by co-presence rather than substitution or 
exclusion. 
In evoking the net as both visual metaphor and performative device, my 
aim has not been to imply the existence of an object and its corresponding image.  
Instead, I understand the net as constituted by both interwoven lines and by 
gaps in between.  This includes the co-presence of alternative epistemologies—
such as around madness (Chapter One), medical cards (Chapter Three), pills !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
435 Fassin 2011; James 2010; Malkki 1995; Pandolfi 2011; Summerfield 1999; Ticktin 2011.  For other 
accounts of co-presence see Pandolfo 2007; Povinelli 2002.  
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(Chapter Four), and addiction (Chapter 5), as well as around less visible subjects, 
such as local or national staff, victims, and patients (Chapter Two)—within the 
biomedical and humanitarian aesthetic.  In this sense, I do not see 
humanitarianism as a politics of movement between “lives to be risked” and 
“lives to be saved.”436  Rather, I insist that it is forged through practices that are 
about living with chronic illness, broken politics, and epistemological doubt in 
Kashmir.  
I use the idea of the net to also capture the fact that, despite their 
purported aim of being ‘outside’ existing cultural or social practices, 
humanitarian and biomedical knowledge are constituted by specific knots or 
convergences.  For example, I focused on local and national staff, as well as 
ongoing debates over trauma therapies in Kashmir (Chapters One and Two) in 
order to contest humanitarian self-narratives which position themselves as 
outside of “backward” Kashmiri beliefs and “superstition” about mental illness.  
For humanitarian organizations, the outside tends to be an impingement to the 
work of the inside, particularly since the humanitarian space is conceived as 
neutral, excluded from the surrounding conflict, thus rendering it neutral and 
impartial.437  Instead, I have tried to show how psychiatric and psychosocial 
expertise were forged through debates about what constituted ‘Kashmir’ and the 
‘outside’ (behar), categories that had to be constantly remade.    
The convergences I describe also have to do with the circulation and the 
co-existence of medical and psychological vocabularies within and beyond the 
clinic.  Rather than see the clinic as the site of diagnostic language and the world !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
436 Fassin 2008. 
437 As Peter Redfield has argued, however, the relationship between witnessing and neutrality has 
always been unstable (2011: 63). 
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outside as the site of somatic distress, I have tried to show how the language of 
‘tension,’ PTSD, pills, weakness (kamzori), and stress, to name just a few, were 
related to each other and re-appropriated by patients and experts in unlikely 
ways.  As such, while the language and technologies of biomedicine were widely 
used in Kashmir, there were significant re-routings and re-orientations of 
knowledge and practice.  For example, while the movement to de-institutionalize 
mental health care in Kashmir made visible certain aspects of the institution 
(such as the OPD), it also concealed others (the closed wards).  In other words, 
de-institutionalization and de-stigmatization efforts were themselves constituted 
by simultaneous practices of quarantining madness. 
This dissertation has attempted to go beyond the language of trauma and 
PTSD by focusing on patients, experts, and encounters that are often written out 
of humanitarian self-narratives.  In particular, I have tried to show how feelings 
of weakness (kamzori), the overwhelming presence of ‘local’ or national staff, the 
quiet scribbling and personalized medical cards, pills, and love stories, present 
threads of movement between the clinic and the world outside.  In so doing, this 
dissertation has argued that states of emergency such as Kashmir are not only 
zones of endless suffering, violence, and occupation, but rather, of many 
moments in-between: of cigarette sociality, waiting for pills or patients, timpeass, 
and drinking endless cups of chai.  These moments not only constitute 
emergencies, as Veena Das’ work has powerfully illustrated, they also make 
visible anthropological entanglements.   
Co-presence, rather than substitution or exclusion, is also the eventual aim 
of ethnographic knowledge.  As I argued in Chapter Three, ethnographic 
knowledge is enacted in the movement from immersement to writing, which also 
! 283 !
hinges on a politics of movement between ‘here’ and ‘there.’  However, a 
compelling ethnography, as a final product, requires a hybrid ‘(t)here’ to be 
created through writing: it must transport us.  Biomedical knowledge, in 
contrast, insists on divergence rather than entanglement.  In creating a (t)here, I 
suggest that ethnographic knowledge has the ability to draw together and reflect 
on disparate entities, subjects, and practices in ways that the net cannot.   
Medical humanitarianism, I suggest, merely catches these disparate entities 
in its net while insisting on their separation.  For example, as Annemarie Mol 
and John Law have argued, epidemiology is “incapable of articulating links and 
tensions between [different variables].”438  The “jagged story-lines”439 and at 
times cacophonous voices that I have presented in my ethnography are thus 
attempts to capture these tensions of life in Kashmir and in the clinic and the 
flows in between.  In this sense, ethnography is itself constituted by the 
interwoven lines and shapes of the net.   
By way of conclusion, I also want to reflect on how my net is different 
from some analogous forms within anthropology and science and technology 
studies.  First, I want to distinguish my net from Roy Wagner’s use of the net in 
An Anthropology of the Subject.  As Wagner writes: 
the net is an image of what holography may be from the standpoint 
of one who cannot grasp the absolute identity of part and whole.  It 
is only a “net,” an iconic snare or entangler, if its parts are 
perceived as holes, interstices.  From the viewpoint of the god on 
the insight, or darsan, of his divine encompassment, the image of 
the net and its contagious qualification of things does not exist.  
What may seem to others to be holes in a net are priceless and 
perfect jewels, gems that reflect one another so perfectly that ‘they 
do not know whether they are one or many.’440 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
438 Mol and Law 2004: 17. 
439 Mol and Law 2004: 17. 
440 Wagner 2001: 13. 
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Wagner uses the example of Indra—the chief of the ancient Vedic pantheon of 
India and “pragmatic ‘imaginer’ of world and divinity through the net of maya 
(illusion)”441—to explicate the holographic worldview.  In Wagner’s analysis, the 
“holes” or points in Indra’s net (the “gems that reflect one another so perfectly”) 
illustrate the symmetry or “absolute identity” of part and whole.  The net I 
describe is not holographic, in that the holes (parts) are mirrors of the whole.  
Rather, what I have tried to show are the ways the net is composed of both 
individual “holes”—nodes/connections/links—but also by what is in between 
different nodes and connections.  In this sense, this dissertation presents shapes 
created by individual lines and points on the net or by its “gaps.”  The holes that 
I describe are thus distinct from Wagner’s idea of the (w)hole.  However, I will 
return to an aspect of Wagner’s net which I find useful. 
 A closer concept to my idea of the net is meshwork in anthropology and 
science and technology studies.442  Tim Ingold has described meshworks as forms 
in which nodes/egos/subjects/agents are made by the combination of the ties in 
which they are enmeshed.443  In his formulation of meshwork, Ingold challenges 
the idea that networks are composed of discrete, interconnected entities by 
arguing that humans and nonhumans are constituted by the network fabric in 
which they are embedded.444  Unlike the network, which is determined by a 
particular aesthetic in which connections are valuable for their own sake, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
441 Wagner 2001: 13. 
442 Escobar 2008; Ingold 2001; Murillo et al. 2012; Pollard 2010. 
443 Ingold 2001.  For Ingold, this is also a powerful argument against the idea of two, ontologically 
distinct domains of nature and culture.  Ingold’s definition of meshwork is distinct from 
Escobar’s, for whom meshworks are lateral, informal and decentralized and in contrast to fixed 
structures of participation, such as labor unions, political parties and social movements which 
have hierarchical network forms (Escobar 2008). 
444 Ingold 2001: 379. 
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meshwork and the “net” I propose allow for uncertain, improvised and 
unfinished outcomes.  The concept of meshwork also takes us away from 
thinking about “interconnected points” to an understanding of “interwoven 
lines,” each of which is a relation along which “materials flow, mix, and 
mutate.”445      
Ingold’s focus on materials is instructive in that what is at stake in the 
Kashmiri clinic are not just different epistemologies and subjectivities, but also 
different material expressions of madness and understandings of the body.  For 
Kashmiri experts and patients, bodies were made permeable through encounters 
with potentially polluting substances, including illness.446  For example, the tools 
of psychosocial work, such as group therapy, were blunted in the face of the 
gnawing possibility that one was permeable to the dirty (ganda) habits of 
someone else.  I recall one afternoon in the DDC when a young patient stormed 
into the consulting room, where Dr. Wiqar, the psychiatrist, Yasir, the social 
worker, and I were sitting and chatting.  When Yasir asked him what was wrong, 
he said, “There is something wrong with Imtiaz… He is completely crazy [pagal].  
When we smoke outside, I’ve seen him pick up our tossed cigarettes from the 
ground and smoke the entire filter.  You need to tell him that it is disgusting.”  
The patient was visibly shaken; this seemed his first face-to-face encounter with 
what he understood to be madness.  What disturbed him, it seemed, was the 
sense that madness was not contained within Imtiaz, but rather, it flowed 
through material forms, such as saliva, cigarettes, and shared living spaces such 
as the DDC. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
445 Ingold 2001: 35. 
446 Daniel 1984. 
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Similarly, as I described in Chapter Two, psychosocial workers who were 
constantly confronted with chronic illnesses that may or may not be treatable, 
found their own bodies to be sites of ill health and weakness (kamzori).  This was 
not merely a side effect of the difficult labor of counseling, but rather, was an 
instance where bodies were viewed as permeable to the substances (illnesses) of 
others.  I used these moments to illustrate how psychological idioms and 
technologies coexisted with engagements with multiple materialities, including 
radically different understandings of substances such as pills or intoxicants 
(Chapters Four and Five).  
However, while meshwork is helpful, there is some conceptual work that 
the net does that is different.  In particular, the net’s constitution means that 
humanitarian and biomedical practices in Kashmir are made by both visible 
relations (the interwoven lines), but also of the less visible aspects of 
humanitarian and biomedical knowledge, such as the ways in which 
medicalization is produced from ‘below.’   Further, unlike the mesh, which is 
composed of strings or lines, the net provides a grid-like structure, in which 
individual parts are replicable.447  I have tried to describe this self-scaling 
capacity of the net in my ethnography, in moments such as when doubts about 
interpersonal relations are transposed on to the realm of biomedical objects, such 
as pills (see Chapter Four), as well as in terms of the medical card’s self-
referential capacity (Chapter Three).  Similarly, as in the example of the patient 
smoking cigarette butts above, despite the regime of de-institutionalization and 
de-stigmatization, there was always the danger that madness (mot) would spill 
over into the bodies of others and be replicated.  This was also the anxiety of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
447 Wagner 2001.!
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genealogical knot that Hilal shared with his father through a shared diagnosis of 
tension and the consumption of Diazepam (Chapter Four). 
I want to provide a final anecdote that illustrates the replicability of the 
net, while also opening up the analytical possibility that violence itself might be a 
net. 
*** 
 “Kashmir jannat hai (Kashmir is heaven),” I often heard Kashmiris remark.  
The statement echoed the iconic statement of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, who 
was reportedly the first to proclaim this, ca. 1586.   
The statement was, however, usually accompanied by a long sigh.  
Indeed, during my fieldwork – the long car rides to and from neighboring 
districts of Srinagar or walking along the banks of the Jhelum river on my way 
home to Rajbagh after a day at the hospital – despite my wariness of the clichés, 
the beauty of the Kashmir valley took my breath away.  From afar, the landscape 
seemed to have it all: jagged, imposing mountains, florescent green paddy fields, 
glassy lakes, and bubbling streams flowing with crisp glacial water.   
Yet the landscape had also been through a war, decades of conflict and 
neglect, which showed in a big way.  The banks of the Jhelum were littered with 
plastic bags, trash, and the remnants of a once-booming tourist industry, 
including decayed, out of use houseboats.  The famous Dal Lake, the postcard 
and travel brochure staple, was dense with weeds and slushy water.    
The debates that raged around Kashmir’s ecology were similar to those 
raised in mental health circles.  Should efforts be spent on an issue that was a 
side effect, not the root cause, of the conflict?  How could the issue of 
environmental degradation (or trauma) be addressed when the occupation was 
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still in place?  For some, the quest for self-determination and freedom (azaadi) 
eclipsed other, immediate concerns.  Others argued that these problems would 
be there regardless of Kashmir’s political situation.  These were also struggles 
over the ontological and epistemological meaning of Kashmir as place: was it 
jannat (heaven) or was it jail? 
Despite these two rather distinct issues—trauma and environmental 
degradation—they were both caught within a net of illness and broken politics.  
The net ensnared forms of social and political life unlikely to be connected to 
each other otherwise.  In its capacity to encompass unlikely domains, the net was 
both suffocating and comforting.  There was no further explanation required for 
the unseemly, highly charged events that seemed to occur on a daily basis.   
This dissertation has attempted to describe, perform, and finally, to go 
beyond the suffocating potentiality of the net by focusing on what is less visible.  
I have tried to capture the kinds of agentive action that are possible when the 
experiential starting point is being caught.  Rather than the lofty goals of “saving 
lives,” I have tried to show how psychosocial workers refuse certain lives as 
worthy of care (Chapter Two), how Kashmiris suffering from long-term 
weakness and tiredness cope by consuming pills, but not without transforming 
them into permeable objects (Chapter Four), and how narratives of desire and 
love underpin accounts of biomedical addiction (Chapter Five).  In so doing, this 
dissertation has been an account of what kinds of actions are possible when non-
movement is the given condition of life. 
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